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ABSTRACT
The Dilemma of Mixed Methods

Bradford J. Wiggins
Department of Psychology, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy

The past three decades have seen a proliferation of research methods, both quantitative
and qualitative, available to psychologists. Whereas some scholars have claimed that qualitative
and quantitative methods are inherently opposed, recently many more researchers have argued in
favor of “mixed methods” approaches. In this dissertation I begin with a review of the mixed
methods literature regarding how to integrate qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Based
on this review, I argue that current mixed methods approaches have fallen short of their goal of
integrating qualitative and quantitative methodologies and I argue that this problem may be due
to a problematic ontology. In response to this problem I propose and conduct an ontological
analysis, which examines the writings of leading mixed methods researchers for evidence of an
underlying ontology. This analysis reveals that an abstractionist ontology underlies current
mixed methods approaches. I then propose that an alternative relational ontology might better
enable mixed methods researchers to meaningfully relate qualitative and quantitative
methodologies and I provide an exploration of what assuming a relational ontology would mean
for mixed methods research.
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The Dilemma of Mixed Methods
Chapter 1: Qualitative and Quantitative Methodologies in Opposition
The past three decades have seen a proliferation of research methods available to
psychologists. With this preponderance of methods has come the so-called “paradigm wars,”
arising from the perceived inadequacies of the received quantitative philosophy of science.
Critics of quantitative methodologies offered an alternative philosophy of science which tended
to favor qualitative methods. The juxtaposition of these two methodologies within the paradigm
wars has led many to view quantitative and qualitative approaches to research as inherently
opposed (e.g., Bednarz, 1985; Forshaw, 2007; Ogborne, 1995; Simpson & Eaves, 1985).
At present, there appears to be general acceptance of qualitative methods as having some
value in psychological research, even if quantitative methods continue to dominate the
mainstream of psychological research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, 2011; Denzin & Lincoln,
1994; Hill & Lambert, 2004; Kazdin, 2003; Lambert, Garfield, & Bergin, 2004). Perhaps the
best example of the field‟s increasing openness to a diversity of research methods comes in the
report of the American Psychological Association (APA) Presidential Task Force on EvidenceBased Practice (2006). This task force encouraged practitioners in psychology to base their
practices upon the best research evidence available from methods as diverse as clinical
observations, case studies, qualitative methods, randomized controlled trials, and meta-analyses.
The task force‟s endorsement of such a variety of methods seems to suggest that the supposed
opposition of qualitative and quantitative methodologies has somehow been resolved.
However, although qualitative methods are achieving greater legitimacy alongside
quantitative methods, their relationship to one another is not entirely clear. Are these
methodologies in competitive opposition as the paradigm wars would suggest or are they
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potential allies in psychological inquiry? In fact, many contemporary researchers, in step with
the APA task force, are advocating the use of both quantitative and qualitative methodologies.
Nevertheless, very few are elaborating how methods based on such divergent philosophies of
science can be meaningfully integrated, leaving unanswered the questions and problems raised
by the paradigm wars.
Worldviews, Methods, and Methodologies
In order to make sense of the paradigm wars, it is crucial that we understand that these
philosophies of science originate from different views of the world—different worldviews. In
other words, these philosophies are not simply abstract beliefs or propositions, but very real
senses of the way the world operates. Indeed, for a method to be formulated, the formulators
must already have these assumptions about the type of world in which the method would be
effective and successful (Bishop, 2007). A worldview, then, is the framework of foundational
beliefs, values, assumptions, and philosophies through which one experiences, interacts with, and
makes sense of the world.
According to philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1962), worldviews (or paradigms in
Kuhn‟s parlance) guide scientists in terms of what they observe and study, the nature of the
questions they ask about their objects of study, how they structure these questions, and how they
interpret the results of their investigations. Because worldviews are so basic to the practices in
which scientists engage, they often operate behind the scenes and are taken for granted in the
normal practice of science unless they are confronted with alternative worldviews (see Bishop,
2007; Slife & Williams, 1995). For example, by the end of the 19th century physicists largely
took for granted the Newtonian worldview and presumed that their primary task was to work out
the questions put forth by that worldview. However, when Einstein published his work on
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special relativity he offered a competing worldview that brought into relief many of the
Newtonian assumptions that heretofore had been taken for granted (e.g., time and space are
absolute; Kuhn, 1962).
Similarly, the rise of qualitative methods in the social sciences resulted in a clash of
worldviews—the paradigm wars. Qualitative methodology was founded in a worldview that
sharply contrasted with the received worldview of quantitative researchers and many researchers
observed these worldviews to be incompatible (see Slife & Gantt, 1999). These worldviews
have been variously labeled, but are most commonly referred to in the literature as “positivist”
(grounding quantitative methodologies) and “interpretivist” (grounding qualitative
methodologies). In using these labels, I mean to follow the conventions of their use in the
methodology literature where they refer to two families of philosophical assumptions (rather than
single monolithic philosophies) that have guided these methodological traditions. In general,
positivist researchers typically represent psychological phenomena numerically, they favor the
observable in their investigations, they value the replication of findings, and they seek out causal
explanations where warranted and available. Conversely, interpretivist researchers typically
represent psychological phenomena in textual narratives, they favor unobservable meanings
(along with the physically observable) in their investigations, they view most studies as unique in
important ways (and thus not replicable), and they seek out meaning structures such as narrative
structure (as opposed to causal structures) to explain phenomena.
The contention of incompatibility arises from the recognition that these worldviews
widely differ and often contradict one another in their assumptions about what is real (ontology),
how we can know this reality (epistemology), and what values and morals should guide
researchers (axiology). Furthermore, many scholars have argued that research methods
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implicitly carry the assumptions of their associated worldview and that they are biased toward
interpreting the world according to these assumptions (Bishop, 2007; Danziger, 1985;
Feyerabend, 1993; Gadamer, 2004; Polkinghorne, 1983; Slife & Gantt, 1999; Slife & Williams,
1995; Spackman & Williams, 2001; Sugarman & Martin, 2005; Williams, 2005).
To sort out and examine all of these claims and issues, we need to clarify important
terms, in particular the terms “method” and “methodology.” Although we sometimes use these
terms interchangeably in psychology (Guba & Lincoln, 1988), they carry an important
distinction which pertains directly to the role of worldviews in research. Whereas the term
“method” refers to the procedures, techniques, and approaches used to gather, store, analyze, and
present research information, the term “methodology” refers to the study or critique of methods
and makes reference to the worldviews which ground such a study or critique. In other words,
methods are guided by methodologies, which in turn are guided by the basic fundamental
assumptions of a worldview.
For example, a positivist worldview assumes that reality can be known through sensory
observation (an epistemological assumption; Slife & Williams, 1995). This worldview shapes a
positivist methodology which values observability, selecting and developing methods that attend
to observables and rejecting methods that do not. This is one reason that most positivistic
research methods in psychology rely on operationalism—their worldview and methodology
demand that unobservables like thoughts, emotions, personalities, and relationships be translated
into observables like questionnaire responses or behaviors if they are to truly be known.
Conversely, an interpretivist worldview assumes that reality is necessarily constituted, at least in
part, by interpretation and that it can only be known by attending to interpretive meanings. Thus,
an interpretivist methodology selects and develops methods that attend to meanings (regardless
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of their sensory observability), relying on linguistic methods and data (broadly conceived) as the
purest representations of meaning. What this means is that a method is always shaped and
biased by a methodology and worldview. Likewise, because methods carry with them the
purposes and values of a particular worldview, the integration of methods from seemingly
incompatible worldviews must address how it overcomes this incompatibility.
The Incompatibility of Methodologies
The thrust of the incompatibility thesis is that many of the core philosophies and
assumptions of the post-positivist and interpretivist worldviews are in irreconcilable opposition
(e.g., material reality vs. interpreted reality) as are the methodologies and methods that arise
from them (e.g., sensory observation vs. linguistic meaning). To put it another way, the use of
one methodology contradicts and effectively rules out the other if the two truly are incompatible
because their basic understandings of the world are in competition with one another. It is on this
claim of incompatibility that some have concluded that qualitative and quantitative
methodologies are inherently opposed (Bednarz, 1985; Forshaw, 2007; Ogborne, 1995; Simpson
& Eaves, 1985). Likewise, this opposition has led some researchers to advocate one
methodology for psychological research and to reject the other.
From the qualitative perspective, for example, Stam (2006) expressed concern that,
should quantification be incorporated in the interpretive tradition of qualitative research,
researchers would risk adopting certain biases of post-positivism. Although Stam was careful
not to foreclose on the possibility that quantification could have a place in the interpretive
tradition, he argued that the interpretive tradition has no clear approach to numerical
measurement. This lack, according to Stam, leaves a vacuum that is more likely than not to be
filled by approaches that still have their roots in post-positivism. Thus, although Stam attempted
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to not reject quantification outright, he argued that quantitative methods would at least need to be
reinvented to fit in the qualitative worldview, amounting to a rejection of quantitative
methodology, and thus quantitative methods as they are currently practiced in psychology.
In contrast, those favoring the ascendancy of quantitative over qualitative methodologies
tend to make the argument against qualitative methodologies by default, since the postpositivistic worldview has historically dominated psychological research. For example, Stiles
and colleagues (2006) presented a review of types of evidence that might be considered in
evidence-based practice in psychology. Although the group considered a diversity of methods,
including single-case and qualitative methods, they evaluated these methods according to the
assumptions and biases of the post-positivistic paradigm. Specifically, they considered whether
a method was able to establish Humean causation, minimize researcher and subject bias, and
aggregate and generalize results. Although the group did not argue against qualitative methods
(in fact one researcher was an advocate for qualitative methods), they measured these methods
according to a methodological framework which favors quantitative methods. It is no surprise
then that these methods were presented in ascending order according to their fit with the postpositivist worldview, with randomized controlled quantitative trials (RCTs), which are postpositivist in nature, at the pinnacle. Indeed, the portion of the chapter by Steven Hollon
advocating RCTs argues that RCTs are the gold standard of evidence for psychological
practitioners, implying that other methods fall short and that, when available, RCTs are to be
preferred. The implication of this discussion is that qualitative methods are implicitly relegated
to having low evidentiary value and that, perhaps more importantly, the interpretivist worldview
is simply ignored.
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Mixed Methods
Despite these claims of incompatibility in qualitative and quantitative methodologies and
the tendency of some researchers to ignore the foundational differences in worldview, many
more researchers have felt reluctant to discount one or the other of these methodologies (Aluko,
2006; American Psychological Association Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice,
2006; Barrett, 2003; Brannen, 2005; Carey, 1993; Dzurec & Abraham, 1993; Haight, 1997;
Henderson & Bedini, 1995; Hoshmand, 1989; Lambert, et al., 2004; Looker, Denton, & Davis,
1989; McKeganey, 1995; Michell, 2003; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005a, 2005b; Plewis &
Mason, 2005; Richards & Bergin, 2005; Shadish, 1995; Stiles, 2006; Tashakkori & Teddlie,
2003). These researchers worry that constraining the discipline to only one set of methods would
be unnecessarily restrictive and that all research evidence can have at least some practical value.
Thus, the most common response at this point in the qualitative/quantitative debate is a call for
some sort of integration1 of the two methodologies, variously labeled “methodological
eclecticism” (Hammersley, 1996; Priola, Smith, & Armstrong, 2004; cf. Yanchar & Williams,
2006), “methodological pluralism” (Dawson, et al., 2006; Payne, Williams, & Chamberlain,
2005; Richards & Bergin, 2005; Sechrest & Sidani, 1995; Slife & Gantt, 1999; Yanchar, 1997),
or “mixed methods” (Bryman, 2006; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Curlette, 2006; Giddings &
Grant, 2006; Greene, Benjamin, & Goodyear, 2001; Hanson, Creswell, Plano Clark, Petska, &

1

Within the literature, many calls for mixed-method approaches use the term “integrate” or “integration” in
reference to their intended relationship between qualitative and quantitative methodologies (e.g., Anchin, 2008;
Patricia Bazeley, 2009; Blake, 1989; Brady & O‟Regan, 2009; Bryman, 2006; Caracelli & Greene, 1993; Connidis,
1983; Dawson, Fischer, & Stein, 2006; de Vries, Weijts, Dijkstra, & Kok, 1992; Dzurec & Abraham, 1993;
Giddings & Grant, 2006; Haight, 1997; Kelle, 2006; Mason, 2006; Rabinowitz & Weseen, 1997; Sandelowski,
Barroso, & Voils, 2007; Sherman & Strang, 2004; Slonim-Nevo & Nevo, 2009; Stange, Crabtree, & Miller, 2006;
Steckler, McLeroy, Goodman, & Bird, 1992; Sullivan, 1998; Waller & Gilbody, 2009; Wiggins & Forrest, 2005;
Woolley, 2009). Although this term can be taken in the strong sense to mean an amalgam or blending of the
methodologies, these researchers appear to intend the term to indicate an interface or meaningful relating of the two
methodologies. For my purposes here I will rely on the latter usage of the term.
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Creswell, 2005; Harden & Thomas, 2005; Johnstone, 2004; Kelle, 2006; Kelley, 2007; Mason,
2006; Shank, 2006; Stange, et al., 2006; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003). As the term “mixed
methods” has become most prominent, I will use it to refer generally to attempts at the
integration of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Indeed, the issue of mixed methods
has become such an important issue in the social sciences that entire journals have been
formulated as outlets for the work involved in dealing with it (e.g., Journal of Mixed Methods
Research).
Proponents have offered a number of rationales for why a mixed methods approach is
preferable. First, most researchers acknowledge that all methods have their limitations (cf.
Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) and some worry that constraining
our discipline to only one set of methods would leave us acutely vulnerable to its particular
limitations (Johnson & Turner, 2003; Kelle, 2006; Slife & Gantt, 1999). Likewise, some
contend that drawing from multiple methods can insure against the limits of any one method
(Kelle, 2006; McGrath & Johnson, 2003; Plewis & Mason, 2005; Stainback & Stainback, 1985;
Steckler, et al., 1992). For example, Kelle (2006) argued that the flexibility and greater intimacy
of qualitative methods are better suited than quantitative methods to help researchers obtain data
that is culturally nuanced or that may depend on developing a relationship of trust with subjects.
Likewise, Kelle asserted that following up such research with a quantitative study can ultimately
allow for greater generalizability of the findings. In this way the strengths of each methodology
(flexibility and intimacy for qualitative, generalizability for quantitative) make up for the other‟s
weaknesses (low generalizability for qualitative and rigidity and objectivity for quantitative).
Another rationale for mixed methods has arisen as some researchers have questioned
whether the distinction between the worldviews of qualitative and quantitative research are as
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sharp as they are often portrayed, especially considering that at the level of practice many
psychologists seem to be able to integrate the methods and findings of both qualitative and
quantitative research (Howe, 1988, 1992; Lund, 2005; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005a, 2005b;
Sechrest & Sidani, 1995). Likewise, some make the argument that neither paradigm precludes
the use of any particular method (Aluko, 2006; Lund, 2005; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005a,
2005b). That is, there is nothing in interpretivism that prohibits the use of a numerical
representation of data nor does post-positivism prohibit the use of a verbal representation of
data.2
The Dilemma of Mixed Methods
Notwithstanding the rationale and optimism of mixed methods advocates, the success of
the mixed methods project in bringing about a satisfactory integration of qualitative and
quantitative methodologies is far from clear (see Chapter 2; Yanchar & Williams, 2006). That is
to say, the question remains as to whether mixed methods researchers have sufficiently overcome
the problems raised in the paradigm wars in their proposals for methodological integration. The
purpose of this dissertation, then, is to take up what I am calling “the dilemma of mixed
methods”—the tension between the pragmatic call for integration from research practitioners and
the philosophical and methodological objections from the paradigm wars that suggest how
deeply problematic this integration may be.
I begin this investigation in Chapter 2 with a review of the mixed methods literature,
examining the success of current mixed methods researchers in bringing about an integration of
qualitative and quantitative methodologies that preserves what is essential to each methodology

2

Of course, this argument does not address the problem that Stam (2006) raised, namely that these worldviews deal
with each other‟s methods in completely different ways.
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and its grounding worldview. In this chapter I argue that current mixed methods approaches
overwhelmingly fall short of preserving multiple worldviews in their attempts at integration.
Rather, I offer evidence that they either implicitly or explicitly embrace a single worldview,
severely limiting the influence of the alternative worldview and its methodology. That is, this
review of the mixed methods literature suggests that mixed methods approaches fail to
meaningfully relate qualitative and quantitative methodologies at the level of their worldviews,
and thus accommodate a true diversity of methodologies. My contention, concluding this
chapter is that the dilemma preventing satisfactory integration in mixed methods, is not
unsolvable (as this review of the literature would seem to suggest), but is rather due to a
problematic ontology (philosophy of what is most real). I argue that an ontological analysis of
the mixed methods literature is necessary to reveal and clarify the ontological roots of the
dilemma of mixed methods.
In fair warning to readers, this move toward exploring ontology necessarily moves us into
much deeper philosophical waters than are typical of most discussions of social science research
methodology. Although I attempt to provide practical examples throughout these philosophical
explorations, the final chapter of my dissertation will include a substantial case example that is
thoroughly grounded in the practical. My hope is that this example will serve as an anchor for
the philosophy I employ in this dissertation and will illustrate my arguments in practically
accessible ways.
In preparation for this ontological analysis, Chapter 3 takes up in greater depth the issue
of ontology, laying out two basic ontological frameworks: abstractionism (the philosophy that
abstractions such as laws and principles are most real) and relationality (the philosophy that
relationships are most real). In preparation for my ontological analysis I explore the features of
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each ontology as well as the implications that each would have for mixed methods, in particular
their implications for the issues surrounding the incompatibility of methodologies. This
understanding of abstractionist and relational ontologies, along with their basic features, will
serve as an “ontological toolbox” to inform my analysis.
Following the ontological framework laid out in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 takes on the
ontological analysis of the mixed methods literature. In this analysis I examine the writings of
leading mixed methods researchers for evidence of either an abstractionist or relational ontology
grounding their attempts at integrating qualitative and quantitative methodologies. As this
analysis reveals, current mixed methods approaches are deeply entrenched in an abstractionist
ontology, creating a number of problems for methodological integration.
In response to my Chapter 4‟s conclusions, Chapter 5 explores how a relational ontology
might approach methodological integration in a way that overcomes the problems of
abstractionism. I examine what a truly relational approach to mixed methods would look like
and offer an in depth example of how a relational ontology would meaningfully relate qualitative
and quantitative methodologies within a particular mixed methods research context.
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Chapter 2: Examining Mixed Methods
Although the current movement for mixed methods is itself relatively recent, a number of
scholars have pointed out that the idea of using multiple methods within a study is not new (e.g.,
Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005b; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). For example, Teddlie and
Tashakkori (2003) observed that the first half of the 20th century was a period in the social
sciences that held a lesser demand for methodological orthodoxy. During this period many
researchers drew upon both qualitative and quantitative methods with very little protest or
concern for methodological worldview clashes. Teddlie and Tashakkori explained that it was not
until the period following World War II that the field moved toward greater methodological
orthodoxy with the ascendancy of positivism (and later post-positivism). Even within this period
where post-positivist orthodoxy dominated, they noted that post-positivists still acknowledged
the importance of multiple methods (though typically multiple post-positivist methods),
maintaining that the validity of research findings is bolstered by confirming evidence from
multiple research methods (e.g., Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Likewise, with the rise in
prominence of qualitative methods in the 1970s and 80s, many advocates of qualitative methods
argued for this sort of method triangulation to include both qualitative and quantitative methods
(Connidis, 1983; Deshpande, 1983; Greene & McClintock, 1985; Hinds & Young, 1987; Jones,
1987; Lipson & Meleis, 1989; Mark & Shotland, 1987).3
Nevertheless, critics of mixing methods are quick to point out that the approaches
described in the brief historical sketch above do not, in fact, involve mixing methodological
worldviews (e.g., Sale, Lohfeld, & Brazil, 2002). For example, it is quite common for

3

These researchers, however, tended to advocate triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data without
addressing the potential problems that could arise at the methodological or worldview level.
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quantitative researchers to run qualitative focus groups to help establish quantitative
questionnaire items without ever departing from the post-positivist worldview. The use of a
focus group does not depend on an alternative worldview. Rather, within the post-positivist
framework the focus group is simply a “quick and dirty” initial step toward the quantitative work
that will better accomplish the goals of post-positivism (e.g., objectivity, generalizability, etc.).
Mixing methods in this sense typically leaves the issues of methodology and worldview in the
background because the methodological worldview is “given” and likely taken for granted at the
outset.
However, the mixed methods movement is calling for something much more radical than
simply using multiple methods within a single worldview. Rather, many within the mixed
methods movement are advocating for researchers to draw upon a mixture of methodologies
(Bazeley, 2009; Howe, 1988). These researchers argue that the real strength of mixed methods is
in allowing for the methodological diversity that comes from using methods across worldviews
rather than in simply using both numerical and textual data. As I discussed in the previous
chapter, because methodologies are inherently tied to worldviews, a mixture of methodologies
must address how those methodologies‟ worldviews are integrated as well. This is no small
task—it was the tension and seeming incompatibility between post-positivist and interpretivist
worldviews that gave rise to the paradigm wars. Because these worldviews made contradictory
ontological assumptions (e.g., objective material reality vs. interpretive meaning-based reality),
many researchers concluded that psychological researchers were left to choose one worldview or
the other as a better fit for making sense of psychological phenomena (Bednarz, 1985; Smith &
Heshusius, 1986). In this sense, the mixed methods movement‟s call for research drawing upon
multiple methodologies is unprecedented and many within the movement have struggled to
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articulate how researchers might meaningfully integrate qualitative and quantitative
methodologies (see Yanchar & Williams, 2006).
Perhaps one reason for this struggle is because the push for mixing methodologies gives
rise to difficult questions regarding how one might practically overcome the problems raised by
the paradigm wars that would seem to prevent integration. For instance, how might a researcher
take seriously the post-positivist demand that researchers be objectively detached from their
object of study and at the same time embrace the interpretivist demand that researchers directly
engage their object of study, fully expecting their biases and values to be involved in the
process? Or, in considering the findings of multiple studies, both qualitative and quantitative,
how should a researcher weigh the evidentiary value of a randomized controlled trial against a
phenomenological study? Should the researcher view them in terms of the post-positivist values
of predictability and control or in terms of the interpretivist values of context and lived
experience? As these problems imply, the clash of worldviews suggested by the paradigm wars
creates not only philosophical, but also practical problems for researchers attempting to mix
qualitative and quantitative methods.
Thus, in this chapter I offer a critical examination of the mixed methods literature on the
integration of qualitative and quantitative methods. In particular, I attend to the need to integrate
methodologies and worldviews because, as mixed methods advocates have argued, the thrust of
the mixed methods movement is that these paradigms or worldviews need not be exclusive and
competitive, but rather can be complementary and synergistic. First, I examine proposals from
mixed methodologists on how researchers should go about mixing methods, assessing the extent
to which the authors offer a true methodological integration. This examination will describe how
many mixed methodologists fall short of their goal of meaningfully integrating qualitative and
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quantitative methodologies. Concluding this examination, I will suggest that these mixed
methodologists lack a clear framework for bringing about a meaningful integration of qualitative
and quantitative methodologies at the worldview level and that these methodologists end up—
often unknowingly—adopting a framework that actually prevents such an integration. Second
therefore, I explore these problematic frameworks with particular attention to those frameworks
that appear to be operating unacknowledged and unexamined. As we will see, these frameworks
overwhelmingly embrace mixing methods within a single dominant worldview and discard the
alternative worldview.
Mixing Methods
As the previous chapter discussed, many researchers are arguing that they do not need to
choose between quantitative methods with a post-positivist worldview and qualitative methods
with an interpretivist worldview. One of the challenges for these researchers has been
demonstrating how researchers can mix methods without losing what is essential to either
method. It is well recognized in the philosophy of science that methods cannot be what they are
without methodologies and worldviews to guide them (see Bishop, 2007), so a meaningful
mixture of methods should also include a meaningful mixture of methodological worldviews.
In their efforts to describe how researchers might practically accomplish such a mixture,
proponents of mixed methods have made arguments for mixing at various levels of research.
Some have argued that researchers should, at a minimum, be able to draw upon studies from both
qualitative and quantitative traditions in their systematic reviews of research literature, bringing a
diversity of worldviews and methods to their conclusions about a particular literature. Many
others go farther, arguing that researchers can benefit from methodological diversity within a
single study that uses both qualitative and quantitative methods. I will take each of these
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proposals in turn, examining whether they successfully achieve a diversity of worldviews in their
mixing of methods.
Mixing methods across studies. In both the interpretive and post-positivist worldviews
many take it for granted that researchers can draw upon evidence arising from a diversity of
research methodologies in conceptualizing their object of study and contextualizing their
research question in the literature (e.g., Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Shadish, et al., 2002).
Until meta-analytic techniques emerged in recent decades, reviews of research literature did not
explicitly rule out one class of methods or the other. Nevertheless, several critics have observed
that the methodological biases of the researcher‟s worldview tend to focus systematic literature
reviews to a single class of methods for those studies included in a review, rather than a mixture
of methods (Dixon-Woods, et al., 2006; Harden & Thomas, 2005).
Perhaps the most thorough attempt to document the possibilities of mixing qualitative and
quantitative methodologies in literature reviews comes in the 2004 report from the Health
Development Agency arm of the British National Health Service by Dixon-Woods, Agarwal,
Young, Jones, and Sutton. The report addresses the growing importance of qualitative
methodology in medical and public health research and the need for evidence-based practitioners
to incorporate not only quantitative, but also qualitative research into the evidence base that
guides their practices. Although Dixon-Woods and colleagues offer a wide range of approaches
to integrating qualitative and quantitative research in literature reviews, they acknowledge that
none of these approaches is likely to be philosophically satisfactory to both post-positivists and
interpretivists as they tend to compromise one worldview or the other. They noted, for example,
that where quantitative (post-positivist) literature reviews tend to employ criteria for the quality
of research that is included in the review, many qualitative (interpretivist) researchers oppose
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such abstract criteria, arguing that the quality of qualitative research is dictated by the context of
the study. They further note that some interpretivists are concerned that criteria could stifle the
methodological creativity that is a hallmark of much of qualitative methodology. Thus,
researchers are left to choose the value of one worldview or the other—either embrace postpositivist objectivism by using quality criteria or interpretivist contextualism by eschewing
quality criteria.
Furthermore, Dixon-Woods and colleagues (2004) observed that a number of purists
within the interpretivist tradition object to synthesizing research across qualitative traditions, let
alone across interpretivist and post-positivist methodologies. They explained these purists were
concerned that removing findings from the philosophical and methodological context in which
they were generated would distort and perhaps misrepresent the findings. This objection
characterizes what Dixon-Woods and colleagues observed as potentially problematic with many
of the approaches to synthesis that they offer—these approaches tend to advocate translating
findings from the language and worldview of one approach in order to make them compatible
with the findings that are in the language and worldview of the other approach.
The report refers to this practice as “qualitising” quantitative results (translating the
numbers of quantitative findings into the narrative language of qualitative research) and
“quantitising” qualitative results (translating the narrative reports of qualitative findings into
numbers that are compatible with quantitative findings; see also Dixon-Woods, et al., 2006). Not
only do these practices create practical methodological problems (e.g., the lack of statistical
power in low n qualitative studies compared to typically higher n quantitative studies; the
relative lack of narrative detail in quantitative studies when translating them into qualitative data;
Dixon-Woods, et al., 2004), but more importantly they risk diluting or distorting data through the
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translation process and ultimately discount one worldview in favor of the other (Harden &
Thomas, 2005).
In an attempt to avoid the problems of synthesis that Dixon-Woods and colleagues (2004)
encountered, others have attempted to mix methods in literature reviews by opting to perform
systematic reviews in parallel, with a separate meta-analysis of quantitative data and textual
analysis of qualitative data (Harden & Thomas, 2005). The trouble with this approach is that it
never truly relates qualitative and quantitative findings. For example, in their review of
qualitative and quantitative research on computerized cognitive behavioral therapy Waller and
Gilbody (2009) address each of their research questions with separate reports for qualitative and
for quantitative findings, but then offer no discussion of the relationships of these findings.
Furthermore, they bypass any question of methodological worldview, treating the findings of
both methodological approaches as if they are already philosophically compatible. Harden and
Thomas (2005) argue that these parallel findings can then be related via “triangulation” (more on
triangulation below), but, as is often the case with this term, they merely give a name rather than
an explanation for how this is to be done. How does one “triangulate” completely different
philosophies of what is real?
Thus, although many assume that both systematic and informal reviews of research
literature are amenable to mixed methods approaches, it remains unclear as to how to relate the
findings of two methodologies without one worldview and its methodological biases being made
into the other. As the researchers reviewed above demonstrate (Dixon-Woods, et al., 2004;
Dixon-Woods, et al., 2006; Harden & Thomas, 2005), it is possible to engage both qualitative
and quantitative methods in literature reviews, but they fall short of integrating the worldviews
of the two methodologies (which Dixon-Woods, et al., 2006 acknowledge) because their
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guidelines lead researchers to either favor a single worldview or to avoid relating the two
worldviews. These flaws appear to fall short of the aims of mixed methods researchers who
want to engage and relate, not only methods from both traditions, but also their worldviews.
Mixing methods within a study. In addition to using mixed methods across studies, it is
also possible for researchers to attempt to mix methods within a single study, using both
qualitative and quantitative methods to investigate a particular research question. As we saw
with mixing methods across studies, however, much also remains unclear regarding how to
properly integrate qualitative and quantitative methods and worldviews within a study. For
example, Morse, Niehaus, Wolfe, and Wilkins (2006) argued that studies that employ both
quantitative and qualitative methods tend to treat one method as more central or dominant (at
least implicitly), with the other method serving a supplementary role. These reports of the
repeated dominance of one worldview over another would seem to violate the quest for
methodological diversity and the egalitarian spirit of many calls for mixed methods (e.g.,
American Psychological Association Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice, 2006;
Kelle, 2006).
Perhaps the most obvious way in which this happens is when mixed methods are used in
sequence in a study, with one method seen as laying a preliminary or exploratory groundwork to
then be built upon by the dominant and culminating method (e.g., de Vries, et al., 1992). This
hierarchical approach to methods has long been associated with the post-positivistic worldview‟s
treatment of qualitative methods as subservient to quantitative methods, with qualitative methods
frequently viewed as hypothesis generators or questionnaire item generators for the quantitative
work to come (Pernice, 1996; Plewis & Mason, 2005). In this sense, the post-positivist
worldview generally views qualitative research as helpful and appropriate for the discovery
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context of research, but not for the justification context, all of which is still post-positivist in
nature. However, this practice has fallen under sharp criticism from interpretivists, many of
whom claim that this approach severely limits the nature and scope of qualitative methods under
consideration and overlooks the purposes and values that many qualitative researchers attribute
to these methods (Bryman, 1984; Morse, 2005). The point here is that mixing methods
hierarchically falls short of integrating methodological worldviews and often continues to
exclude or discount methods that the opposing worldview finds valuable and important.
Some have tried to deal with this problem by proposing a more formalized approach to
deciding which method should dominate a study. For example, Morgan (1998) argued that it is a
practical necessity that one or the other method dominate a study and that researchers should
deliberately choose how this will take place in their study. Morgan offered a “Priority-Sequence
Model” which advocates that researchers choose which method will be primary in a study and
then determine whether the complementary method will play a preliminary or follow-up role.
Unfortunately, Morgan does not offer any guidance as to how a researcher might determine
which method ought to dominate a study. Rather, he merely outlines the technical details for
how research designs might be carried out once these decisions have been made. Thus, it
remains unclear as to how researchers might mix methods without uncritically defaulting to one
worldview or the other.
Some may wonder whether it is really a weakness if one method dominates a particular
study, especially if researchers balance this dominance across studies. However, Yanchar and
Williams (2006) demonstrated how the worldview of the primary method tends to pervade the
use and interpretation not only of the primary method in a mixed methods study, but also of the
supplementary method. They gave an example of a mixed methods study (Onwuegbuzie &
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DaRos-Voseles, 2001) in which qualitative phenomenological data were translated to
quantitative data (frequency counts) and were marshaled as support for causal inference. As
Yanchar and Williams (2006) observed, this practice not only overlooks some of the greatest
potential strengths of qualitative methods (e.g., contextual detail and phenomenological insight),
but it also employs them to ends for which they are ill suited.
Their example here raises several important questions. First, is a mixture of methods
without a mixture of the methodologies that originated and guided the methods sufficient to
achieve the purported advantages of mixed methods approaches (e.g., diversity of strengths and
weaknesses, richness of multiple sources of data, etc.)? Yanchar and Williams argued that, if
anything, the use of mixed methods did not achieve these advantages, but instead it weakened the
study in their example because of the poor fit of methods to the task at hand. They explained
that attending to methodological worldviews is essential in mixed methods research because the
worldviews that produce methods do so with particular goals for those methods (e.g., postpositivist methods are generally geared toward producing objective and generalizable accounts
of causal processes) and mixing methods uncritically can lead researchers to use methods that are
suited to goals that do not match their research goals. Analogously, a “mixed methods”
carpenter could approach cutting boards with both hammers and saws—perhaps even
occasionally succeeding in chopping the wood with the hammer. However, the carpenter‟s need
for a precise, clean, and fast cut point to the saw as the tool for this job and the hammer as the
tool for a different job.
This discussion leads to a second question: if researchers use supplementary methods for
purposes to which they are ill suited (those of the dominant methodology), would they not be
better served by methods from the dominant methodology which match their purposes? It
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appears unlikely that qualitative methods would provide any advantage toward causal inference
(the goal of quantitative methods) that would not be met at least as well by a quantitative
method, nor that quantitative methods would add contextual richness or phenomenological
insight (the goal of qualitative methods) beyond what could be achieved with qualitative
methods. Returning to the carpenter analogy, various types of saws might aid the carpenter in
his needs for cutting, but hammers are unlikely to meet these needs. Likewise, a variety of
hammers are ideal for pounding, whereas saws are not. Furthermore, and perhaps most
importantly, the supplementary method in a very real sense ceases to be “supplementary”
because it loses its role of “supplementing” the primary method‟s worldview with the
perspective of an alternative worldview. A supplementary hammer in a cutting task simply
becomes a poor saw.
It appears, then, that the major obstacle that impedes mixed methods approaches, either
across or within studies, is achieving an adequate integration of research methodologies and their
associated worldviews. The examples reviewed above demonstrate that, despite their intentions
for methodological and worldview diversity, these mixed methods approaches ultimately
subscribe to a single dominating worldview. Perhaps one reason why they fall short of this
diversity is because there is no apparent framework to guide how qualitative and quantitative
methodologies are to be integrated at any level of analysis. As Yanchar and Williams (2006)
demonstrated, methods lose their identities without methodologies and worldviews to guide
them. Yet many of the researchers reviewed above seem to overlook the crucial role of
methodologies in the mixing of methods.
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Hidden Frameworks for Methodological Integration
The above discussion suggested that the dilemma of mixed methods arises, at least in
part, from focusing on methods while ignoring methodologies in mixed methods approaches. By
ignoring methodologies, we risk being guided in our research by a framework that is implicit,
unacknowledged, and unexamined (Slife & Williams, 1995) and that may not actually serve our
purpose of meaningfully relating the worldviews and methodologies that ground quantitative and
qualitative methods. In other words, the task of integrating qualitative and quantitative methods
in a way that attends to their guiding methodologies involves a guiding framework or theory for
how to relate those methodological worldviews (see Slife, 2000). Whereas the previous section
of this chapter addressed the struggle of mixed methods researchers in relating qualitative and
quantitative methods at the worldview level, the purpose of this section is to examine what lies
behind this struggle—their theoretical frameworks for methodological integration. As I will
illustrate below, most current approaches to mixed methods are, in fact, guided by frameworks
for integration that not only sidestep meaningful integration of methodologies, but are also often
unacknowledged or hidden . I will examine these frameworks for methodological integration in
terms of three basic categories: methodological eclecticism, methodological appropriation
(acknowledged), and methodological appropriation (unacknowledged).
Methodological eclecticism. Methodological eclecticism can be defined as the use of
qualitative and quantitative methods that relies on an established set of procedures to mix the
methods, usually without true integration of their incumbent worldviews. The emphasis for
methodological eclecticism is on the procedures or methods that are meant to ensure proper
integration of methods because methodological eclecticism is based on the assumption that,
given the proper procedure, researchers need not concern themselves with methodologies or
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worldviews—the procedures somehow attend to these problems for them. I will review three
examples of methodological eclecticism here: triangulation, methodological demarcation, and
methodological reclassification.
Triangulation. Perhaps the earliest and best known version of methodological
eclecticism is the concept of triangulation (Webb, 1966). The term refers metaphorically to the
geometric principle of the same name that is used to determine the coordinates of and distance to
a point, given a knowledge of two other fixed points. For social scientists triangulation has come
to mean that researchers can take greater confidence in the validity of a research finding if the
research draws upon multiple methods with converging findings (Bryman, 1984; Harden &
Thomas, 2005; Kelle, 2006; Sechrest & Sidani, 1995). Put another way, researchers assume that
they are able to map a clearer and surer picture of reality when findings from multiple methods
converge. This approach is procedural at a fairly general level; the procedure being the use of
multiple methods in the service of validity.
Triangulation has fallen prey to two main criticisms. First, Harden and Thomas (2005)
questioned the rationale of checking the results of one method against the results of another
method, arguing that not all methods are equally suited to every research question. They pointed
out that, in practice, data from different methods often conflict rather than converge and that
these conflicts are typically resolved by favoring one method‟s reliability over another‟s. Harden
and Thomas explained that “using two or three different methods that are weaker than others at
answering a particular type of question does not give a more reliable and valid answer. The
selection of method should be determined by the question being addressed” (p. 268). In other
words, multiplying methods does not necessarily lead to greater validity. For example, recall
Yanchar and Williams‟s (2006) critique of Onwuegbuzie and DaRos-Voseles‟s (2001) mixed
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methods study. Not only were the qualitative methods forced to fit the causal question being
addressed, but as Yanchar and Williams (2006) observed, they detracted from the validity of the
overall findings because of the poor fit of the methods to the question.
Second, triangulation ignores the problems that arise when triangulating methods also
means triangulating worldviews. Triangulation within a worldview is less problematic because
there is greater consistency across methods in their basic ontological and epistemological
assumptions that guide researchers in everything from conceptualizing the phenomenon of
interest to posing the research question to designing the study. However, when the studies to be
triangulated are grounded in different worldviews they will be making very different and often
incompatible assumptions about reality and knowledge. For example, Annells (2006) argued
that triangulation will inevitably break down when triangulating worldviews that are discordant
in their basic assumptions about reality, their justifications for the research process, and their
criteria for the quality of research. Although it is possible that the findings of studies based in
opposing worldviews may converge, it is much more likely (as Harden & Thomas, 2005 noted)
that the findings will conflict in some way (e.g., Perlesz & Lindsay, 2003). Because these
conflicts are philosophical (worldview-based) rather than empirical they require a philosophical
solution, but triangulation has none to offer.
Methodological demarcation. In addition to triangulation, several researchers have
proposed a second variety of methodologically eclectic approaches in recent years in which they
attempt to formally demarcate the appropriate domains for qualitative and quantitative
methodologies respectively. For example, McKeganey (1995) suggested that quantitative
methods are particularly suited to large group research and qualitative methods to studying
individual differences. He argued that by using these methods in tandem, each method can point
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the other toward what is less clear within its respective domain. Nevertheless, as with
triangulation, McKeganey‟s approach ignores the problems that arise in relating studies that are
based in opposing worldviews. Rather, McKeganey simply assumed that, given their appropriate
domain, qualitative and quantitative research could be compatible. Likewise, his division of
qualitative and quantitative methods in terms of their suitability to sample size would likely be
unsatisfying to many researchers of both camps. Not only do both methodologies have certain
methods for both large and small sample sizes, but many researchers rank other characteristics of
the object of study as more important than sample size in the selection of an appropriate research
method (e.g., Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Denzin & Lincoln, 1994; Kazdin, 2003).
Methodological reclassification. As a third example of methodological eclecticism,
Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005b) also suggest a reclassification of quantitative and qualitative
methods, this time in terms of exploratory and confirmatory methods. They explain that
exploratory methods include quantitative methods (e.g., descriptive statistics, cluster analysis,
exploratory factor analysis) and qualitative methods (e.g., traditional thematic analyses).
Likewise, they assert that confirmatory methods are not limited to traditional quantitative
inferential statistics, but can also include “confirmatory thematic analyses” which researchers
seek to confirm previous findings by replicating qualitative thematic analyses. According to
Onwuegbuzie and Leech, conceptualizing methods and methods courses as exploratory and
confirmatory rather than as qualitative and quantitative will foster a less polarized attitude,
leading researchers to see both qualitative and quantitative methods as part of a common
toolbox.
The problem here is that Onwuegbuzie and Leech do not address how the fact that
methods could have certain common investigatory purposes (exploration and confirmation)
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overcomes the basic differences in the ontological and epistemological assumptions of each
worldview. Indeed, these worldviews have quite divergent values and assumptions regarding
confirmation and exploration. Qualitative research is rarely seen as confirmatory and
interpretivists assume a dynamic reality, leading them to be less concerned with replication since
they often expect their findings to be unique to the time, place, and sample investigated.
Likewise, post-positivists tend to see exploration as a preliminary step toward the more
important confirmation of contextless laws and principles, whereas interpretivists tend to see
exploration as both the start and endpoint of research. Classifying methods as Onwuegbuzie and
Leech propose ultimately ignores the dilemmas of relating worldviews and methodologies rather
than resolving these dilemmas.
The common problem of these methodologically eclectic approaches is that they each
offer a procedure for mixing methods that does not ultimately address the problems and
contradictions arising from sharp differences in the respective worldviews of each methodology.
In these cases the procedure offers the appearance of adequately relating the two sides without
really addressing the fundamental problems.
Methodological appropriation. In addition to methodological eclecticism,
methodological appropriation is another framework that guides many mixed methodologists. As
its name implies, methodological appropriation refers to mixed methods approaches that seek to
assimilate the seemingly disparate worldviews of qualitative and quantitative methodologies by
adopting qualities of one within the other. Methodological appropriationists approach this
reconciliation by combining the methodologies, as best they can, within their own native
worldview. As I will discuss below, this becomes problematic for a variety of reasons. I will
explore two types of methodological appropriation: acknowledged and unacknowledged.
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Methodological Appropriation (Acknowledged). Unlike methodological eclecticism,
acknowledged methodological appropriation attempts an integration of methodologies at the
level of their worldviews. Acknowledged methodological appropriation is the deliberate
integration of one methodology into the worldview of the other. For example, Looker and
colleagues (1989) proposed a method for translating qualitative data for quantitative analysis,
thus making qualitative research amenable to the worldview and skill set already in place for
quantitative researchers. Likewise, Pernice (1996) and Plewis and Mason (2005) argued for the
use of qualitative methods as a supplement to quantitative methods. These approaches
intentionally retained the goals and assumptions of the post-positivist worldview and employed
qualitative methods inasmuch as they might provide supplementary advantages that could not
already be met by quantitative methods. Conversely, Mason (2006) championed a mixed
methods approach that is consciously driven by an interpretivist worldview. She argued that the
interpretive approach common to qualitative methods can accommodate the study of multiple
dimensions of the social world, including quantitative dimensions.
The real strengths of acknowledged methodological appropriation are that it addresses
mixing methods at the level of the worldview and it does so deliberately. Because this approach
is deliberate, proponents are generally aware of the major criticisms of methodological
appropriation. The primary criticism is that methodological appropriation sidesteps any true
integration of worldviews by simply opting for one worldview or the other and accommodating
both types of methods as that worldview allows (Morse, 2005). This is particularly worrisome as
it amounts to the outright dismissal of a worldview without any real evaluation or justification
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(Looker, et al., 1989; Mason, 2006; Pernice, 1996; Plewis & Mason, 2005).4 Furthermore, critics
have observed that this approach at best allows only a limited application of the methods not
traditionally associated with the adopted worldview because methods are designed to suit the
purposes, values, and assumptions of their original worldview and thus carry these qualities of
their worldview with them (Buchanan, 1992). Because the respective purposes, values, and
assumptions of post-positivist and interpretivist worldviews are often contradictory (e.g.,
nomothetic generalization vs. ideographic particularity), many methods resist this sort of
assimilation. Likewise, those methods that might assimilate into the new worldview are
arguably no longer the same methods because the new worldview demands that they be made to
fit a different set of purposes, values, and assumptions (Buchanan, 1992; Morse, 2005).
Methodological Appropriation (Unacknowledged). Although some researchers are
deliberate with their methodological appropriation, methodological appropriation is much more
commonly unintentional. In other words, a majority of researchers who propose mixed methods
approaches unknowingly do so through the lens of a single unacknowledged worldview. This
unacknowledged appropriation leads to the same problems of distortion and devaluation
associated with acknowledged appropriation, but is further complicated by the fact that these
consequences remain hidden from researchers who engage in unacknowledged appropriation.
Thus, researchers can propose a mixed methods approach that appears to integrate qualitative
and quantitative methods without ever really addressing the problems of integration at their most
basic level.

4

Another possible variation on this theme would be incorporating the two worldviews into a third worldview, which
is unlike either of the others—a syncretism of sorts. This would fail for the same reasons—it ultimately discards the
worldviews rather than integrating them.
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The most common example of unacknowledged methodological appropriation has been
the incorporation of some qualitative methods into the currently dominant post-positivist
worldview (Morse, 2005). Typically, this approach involves treating qualitative methods as
laying the preliminary groundwork for an underdeveloped domain of study, to later be built upon
and refined by quantitative methods (e.g., Barrett, 2003; de Vries, et al., 1992; Gürtler & Huber,
2006; Hayward, Peck, & Smith, 1993; Lund, 2005; Sechrest & Sidani, 1995). Qualitative
methods, then, serve the role of theory development, hypothesis generation, and exploratory
study (the context of discovery), whereas quantitative methods are reserved as more valid for
confirmation of refined theories and for establishment of causal relationships (the context of
justification). This approach is post-positivistic not only because it places a priority on the work
done by post-positivistic quantitative methods, but also because this separation and sequencing
conforms to the linear approach typical to post-positivism (see Bishop, 2007; Slife, 1993).
An example of this sort of unacknowledged methodological appropriation is the 2006
document from the APA Presidential Task Force on Evidence-Based Practice. One of the key
aims of task force‟s policy on evidence-based practice was a move toward endorsing a the
evidentiary value of a diversity of research methods, both qualitative and quantitative, in contrast
to previous proposals which had more narrowly focused on randomized controlled trials and
meta-analysis. However, as Wendt and Slife (2007) observed, the task force‟s proposal places
qualitative methods on the bottom of a hierarchy of research methods, ranked according to their
rigor and value within a post-positivistic worldview. Wendt and Slife further argued that by
adopting a post-positivistic worldview, the task force unintentionally made a philosophical
(worldview) decision without acknowledging it as such and without offering the philosophical
justification necessary to support such a decision.
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Although it is possible for unacknowledged methodological appropriation to occur in
favor of the interpretivist worldview, this is much less common in practice. This imbalance
reflects the dominance of post-positivism in the mainstream of the discipline, especially when
many in the mainstream view post-positivism as axiomatic rather than as a point of view. This
imbalance is also because interpretivist approaches are still closely tied to their philosophical
roots and tend to be more self-conscious of their ontological and epistemological assumptions.
Thus, most interpretivist methodological appropriations tend to be overt about their appropriation
(e.g., Mason, 2006). Interestingly, when interpretivists are guilty of unacknowledged
methodological appropriation, they tend to adopt a post-positivist rather than an interpretivist
worldview as Yanchar and Williams (2006) observed in their analysis of Onwuegbuzie and
DaRos-Voseles‟s (2001) study, discussed above. Again, the unconscious and permeating
dominance of post-positivism in the discipline may explain this unlikely tendency.
Unacknowledged methodological appropriation has even influenced decisions regarding
which studies are published. Barbour (2003) noted that as qualitative research has gained
acceptance in the mainstream, journal editors have fallen prey to evaluating the significance and
publication status of qualitative studies according to standards that are more reflective of
traditional post-positivistic values and practices in deciding whether a study is worthy of
publication. According to Barbour, many editors have tried to reduce qualitative methodologies
such as grounded theory to a “checklist” in order to more easily evaluate the rigor of a study.
Unfortunately, as Barbour explained, this reduction can lead editors to overlook many strengths
and weaknesses of a study that would be more obvious with a broader contextual understanding
of interpretivist worldviews.
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The Problem
As this review of the mixed methods literature has shown, integrating qualitative and
quantitative methodologies is more complex than many have supposed. Although many
researchers have attempted to mix numerical and textual procedures, it appears that they have
fallen short of integrating the worldviews that underlie and guide qualitative and quantitative
methods. Mixed methods approaches continue to subscribe to either a post-positivist or
interpretivist worldview. This adherence to only one worldview also limits the methods that can
be accommodated from the opposing worldview, leading to narrowness rather than diversity in
methods, despite the intentions of many mixed methods advocates. In fact, this narrowness
suggests that there is a deception of sorts in mixed methods—these approaches are touted to
employ the strengths of a diversity of worldviews when in reality they do not. What is more, the
quest for methodological diversity is further frustrated because the purposes and rationales of
research methods are tied to the worldview that grounds them and they are thus often distorted or
misunderstood when methods are imported from one worldview to the other, potentially
weakening rather than strengthening a study.
The APA Task Force (2006), for example, clearly recognized the need for diversity of
methods in evidence-based practice, but nevertheless grounded their approach in a single postpositivist worldview. Not only did this cut off any diversity of methodologies, but it also
severely limited the methods that could be accommodated within the post-positivist worldview,
weakening rather than strengthening their approach as they claimed a diversity would do. In
other words, their inability to relate methodologies at the level of their worldview made it
impossible for the APA Task Force to achieve the methodological diversity that they claimed is
so important, ultimately making their claim of diversity somewhat deceptive. Thus, the problem
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for mixed methods approaches remains: is it possible to meaningfully relate qualitative and
quantitative methodologies at the level of their worldviews, and thus accommodate a true
diversity?
On its surface, this problem appears unsolvable. Post-positivist and interpretivist
worldviews make basic ontological and epistemological assumptions—assumptions about the
nature of reality and knowledge—that are at odds with one another. As the incompatibility thesis
suggests, subscribing to one worldview appears to logically rule out the other worldview. This
problematic impasse of worldviews is clearly not an empirical problem—“empirical” itself is
part of a worldview that an interpretivist would not accept, inasmuch as it refers to post-positivist
epistemology. Rather, this is a philosophical problem to be solved at that level. Indeed, when
unsolvable problems have occurred historically, the foundational (ontological) assumptions have
often been the culprit (Kuhn, 1962). In fact, the ontological is often considered the deepest level
of philosophical assumption. It is possible that the very properties of mixed methods approaches
that have proven so problematic are actually manifestations of a particular ontology.
Addressing the Problem
If the problem I have described is, in fact, rooted in the ontology of mixed methods
approaches then an ontological analysis of mixed methods approaches appears to be in order. To
be sure, several others have taken on the dilemma of mixed methods by proposing alternative
approaches to mixing methods. For example, Slife and Gantt (1999) proposed a methodological
pluralism based on community discourse involving multiple worldviews. Likewise, Yanchar,
Gantt, and Clay (2005) and Yanchar and Williams (2006) argued for a critical approach to
methods that requires researchers to be aware of their fundamental assumptions and to choose
methods based on assumptions that best illuminate the object of study. These researchers
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implicated ontological problems in mixed methods approaches, but their projects have been
primarily to flesh out alternative approaches rather than to offer ontological analysis. Indeed,
such an ontological analysis is conspicuously lacking from the mixed methods literature. Thus,
in the following chapter I will offer an examination of the ontologies that could underlie mixed
methods approaches in preparation for offering an ontological analysis of mixed methods
proposals.
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Chapter 3: Ontologies and Mixed Methods
Thus far, I have outlined the mixed methods approach to combining qualitative and
quantitative methodologies and demonstrated in my review of the mixed methods literature that
methods integration almost invariably defaults to the dominance of a single worldview. Because
mixed methods researchers intend to not only mix methods, but also methodologies and their
incumbent worldviews (e.g., Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004),
this next phase of my project takes on the obstacles preventing mixed methods researchers from
preserving and drawing upon multiple methodological worldviews rather than one dominant
worldview. In the previous chapter I argued that these obstacles are likely the result of a
problematic ontology and I called for an ontological analysis of mixed methods approaches in
order to examine whether the root of these problems is ontological. Thus, in anticipation of an
ontological analysis, this chapter delves into what ontology is and lays out the basic
philosophical tools that will be necessary for the ontological analysis.
The term “ontology” refers to a philosophy of being or existence—essentially it is a
philosophy of what is most real or most fundamental. In fact, many philosophers consider
ontology to be the foundation of all philosophy and knowledge (e.g., Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger,
Gadamer, Taylor). Furthermore, because ontology is so basic and fundamental to our experience
of the world, it is often taken for granted and left largely unexamined (Bishop, 2007; Heidegger,
1967; Slife & Williams, 1995). This is one reason why approaching mixed methods at the
ontological level is so important—ontology not only addresses what is most fundamental and
basic to mixed methods approaches, but it also seeks to articulate and explore what might
otherwise operate unexamined.
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Indeed, philosophers of science have observed that in most cases research methods have
been formulated without explicit ontologies in mind, even though they have clearly made
implicit and thus unexamined ontological assumptions (Bishop, 2007; Polkinghorne, 2004; Slife
& Williams, 1995; Williams, 2005). For example, Slife and Williams (1995) observed that many
of psychology‟s quantitative methods developed in the late 19th and early 20th centuries are based
on an implicit and largely unexamined ontology that was borrowed from the physical sciences of
the day. They explained that this ontology assumes that reality is the result of material and
efficient causal processes and that these methods by extension make similar assumptions.
According to these authors, one of the principal dangers of adopting an unexamined ontology is
that it can shape theory and research in unintended and potentially distorting ways. They
explain, for example, that such research methods have led many psychological researchers to
approach their objects of study (humans) as if they are causally determined in the way that
physical scientists typically approach the objects of their study, even though most people (and
many researchers) believe that they have some form of agency.
In examining research methods, there are two basic types of ontology at play in the social
sciences: abstractionist ontology and relational ontology (Slife, 2004a). Although these terms
are not universally employed in discussions of ontology, they refer to basic problems that are at
the heart of most discussions of ontology (Bernstein, 1983; Gergen, 2009; Slife & Richardson,
2008). Likewise, the relational and abstractionist ontologies are particularly appropriate here as
they are the most cited in the social sciences and are fairly exhaustive in their scope (Bishop,
2007; Gergen, 2009; Slife & Richardson, 2008). Put perhaps overly simply, an abstractionist
ontology is one that assumes that something is most real and fundamental when it is abstracted
from context. A relational ontology, on the other hand, assumes that something is most real and
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fundamental when it is understood in relation to the context of which it is part. In this chapter I
propose to explore abstractionist and relational ontologies in order to provide a framework or
method for my ontological analysis of mixed methods. Here I offer an in-depth discussion of
each of these ontologies, outlining corresponding key features of each ontology. Throughout this
exploration of abstractionist and relational ontologies I will highlight their differing implications
for the problems facing mixed methods researchers.
An Ontological Toolbox
The purpose of this chapter is not only to give an overview of abstractionism and
relationality, but to also provide the philosophical tools necessary to conduct an ontological
analysis of mixed methods writings in the following chapter. Thus, the discussion that follows is
oriented toward key features of abstractionism and relationality. These key features will help
both to illustrate what is at stake for each ontology as well as to offer guideposts that can indicate
where a particular ontology may be operating behind the scenes. That is to say, in my
forthcoming analysis, I will look for these features in the mixed methods writings to provide
evidence for which ontology is predominantly at play in mixed methods.
Abstractionist Ontology
According to abstractionism, things are most real and fundamental when they are
contextless (Slife & Richardson, 2008). This notion is what has driven laboratory sciences in
their attempt to sterilize their subject of its native context (Polkinghorne, 1983). They assume
that they must remove the contextual “noise” from a phenomenon in order to find its real nature.
From this abstractionist viewpoint, the object of interest is the same in any context, so removing
the context leaves behind only the object of interest without anything to distort or obscure our
view of it. Thus, if a researcher is interested in a particular behavior, the laboratory model would
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suggest that the researcher should seek to simulate that behavior in the lab where she can control
and supposedly minimize the impact of context.
There are several basic features of abstractionism that help clarify both why and how
abstractionists value abstractions over context. The first three features that I will discuss,
atomism, essentialism, and universalism, are each facets of this same impulse toward abstraction
and it will become clear that each of these features implies the others. The fourth feature,
sameness, is an outgrowth of the other three and is of particular importance for my upcoming
analysis of mixed methods because it highlights how abstractionism approaches the sorts of
relationships that mixed methods researchers are trying to bring about between post-positivist
quantitative methods and interpretivist qualitative methods.
Essentialism. Abstractionism is aligned with philosophies that are concerned with the
“essential” qualities of things (Bohan, 1993). For example, Plato‟s theory of forms states that the
purest and truest reality is made up of forms—the perfect and ideal instances of any given quality
or characteristic of reality (Robinson, 1995). For Plato, our mortal experiences of the world are
merely imperfect impressions of these ideal forms. Thus, Plato was concerned with coming to a
knowledge of these forms in as pure a state as possible and sought to abstract the essential
characteristics of such things as justice from his and others‟ everyday experiences of justice.
Accordingly, abstractionism assumes that reality is made up of essences, along the lines
of Plato‟s forms, that can become obscured by the incidentals of context. Thus, to know this
reality, abstractionists seek to “abstract” these essential qualities from the contextual noise of the
incidentals (Bishop, 2007). Indeed, this language of “essential” and “incidental” highlights how
abstractionists see context as merely ancillary and largely unnecessary to the essential or
necessary qualities (Bohan, 1993). For example, a clinical psychologist might have a client take
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a personality measure in order to identify his essential personality characteristics. Indeed,
personality is commonly defined in abstractionist terms as those qualities that a person exhibits
regardless of context (e.g., American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Thus, the personality
measure is used as a tool to abstract what the clinician believes is essential in understanding her
client from the contextualized totality of the client‟s thoughts and behavior.
This move toward abstracting the essentials from the incidentals leads many
abstractionists to value theories, principles, and laws as key sources of truth (Polkinghorne,
2004). This is because theories, principles, and laws seek to present what is essential about a
given topic that can then be applied in any given situation. The law of gravity, for example,
expresses a higher truth for the abstractionist than does any given instance of a falling body
because the law expresses the essential truth of what lies behind the process of all falling bodies.
Likewise, an abstractionist would seek to formulate theories that distill the essence of what the
theory describes and leave behind the particulars of how that theory might be applied in context.
In terms of research methodologies, abstractionists seek to formulate methods that will
capture the essence of research problems, enabling the methods to find application to all kinds of
research problems regardless of their contextual particularities (Polkinghorne, 1983). Thus,
abstractionist methods typically make no prescriptions in terms of the experimental content to
which they should apply—the procedures strive to be sufficiently abstract to contain only the
essential properties for their purpose and to avoid limiting themselves to any particular context.
This is why abstractionists often talk about “the” scientific method as if it is a singular method
(Slife & Williams, 1995). Furthermore, within abstractionist methods the point is typically to
“tease out” only the essential qualities of the phenomenon of interest from its context. This is
why many abstractionist methods are focused on “isolating” variables and “controlling” or
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“manipulating” the experimental situation to minimize the influence of context. They assume
that context only introduces “error” that can obscure the essence of what they are trying to
investigate.
Essentialism has a number of implications for mixed methods. For instance, rather than
understanding methods within the context of a worldview, abstractionists would see methods in
terms of essential characteristics such as a logic, a set of procedures, and a type of data.5 Thus,
the abstractionist approach to mixed methods would suggest that a method could be applied in
any worldview context so long as it shows those essential characteristics. For example, a postpositivist might claim that he is using the same methods that interpretivists use by including
interviews that are subjected to textual analysis in a mixed methods study, despite the fact that
within his post-positivist framework textual data and analysis are used to derive generalizations
to apply in a predictive model. From an abstractionist viewpoint, the fact that the values and
purposes driving the quantitative investigation as well as the researcher‟s overall interpretation of
the data are at odds with interpretivism is irrelevant because the researcher has maintained the
essential procedures and textual data that make up “qualitative” research.
Atomism. The essentialist leanings of abstractionism are closely tied to abstractionism‟s
tendency toward atomism—the assumption that the essential qualities of a thing are selfcontained within that individual thing (Gantt, 2005; Martin & Sugarman, 1999). Indeed, one
might say that atomism provides the container and essentialism provides the contents. Because
abstractionists assume that what is most real about something (its essence) is independent of
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These essential characteristics would suggest that the method has “internalized” attributes of a founding
worldview, obviating any further contextual grounding in the worldview for its identity as it is applied.
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context, that reality is likewise assumed to be a property of the thing itself rather than a property
of the thing-in-context (Slife, 2004a).
One implication of atomism is that abstractionists tend to view the world primarily in
terms of its parts and only secondarily in terms of the relationships of those parts (Gergen, 2009).
This is one reason that many abstractionists tend to think in terms of “variables”—they assume
that the truth that they are after in their experimentation is contained within these key pieces that
need to be isolated to be understood (Slife, 2004b). Thus, from this view, a researcher who is
interested in studying successful marriages would try to isolate the variables that she expects
make up successful marriage like spouses‟ ratings of marital satisfaction (Ostenson, 2009). The
marriage is interpreted in terms of parts like self-contained spouses and their self-contained
“satisfaction” rather than in terms of what is between spouses. Interactions of variables or other
relationships among self-contained atoms, then, are explained in terms of their parts. When the
abstractionist marriage researcher wants to describe the relationship between a husband and wife,
she does so in terms of spouses‟ internalized perceptions of one another (e.g., attitudes, beliefs,
feelings). The researcher presumes that the spouses are self-contained individuals first, and that
their interaction or relationship (their marriage) is secondary to their identity.
Furthermore, because atomism suggests that parts carry their identity from context to
context without any real alteration to that identity, abstractionists assume that parts are generally
interchangeable and transferrable from one context to the next (Slife, 2004b). To return to the
example of personality, a person‟s behavior may differ to some degree from context to context,
but their self-contained personality that drives that behavior is constant because it is independent
of context. In like manner, abstractionists see methods, methodologies, and worldviews as
distinct, separable, and portable (Yanchar & Williams, 2006). Because they are assumed to be
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self-contained, abstractionism dictates that we should be able to use methods within a variety of
methodological or worldview contexts without essentially changing that method‟s identity so
long as they retain their self-contained essential characteristics.
Universalism. Rather than changing from context to context, what is essentially true
about something for abstractionists is unchanging and applicable to all situations—it is universal
(Slife, 2004b). Thus, universalism builds closely upon atomism and essentialism. Because parts
are assumed to be self-contained and to bear essential characteristics that are independent of
context, they can freely apply to any context without any essential change or adaptation to the
context. For example, many abstractionists point to theories and principles as universal and
independent of context. Thus, an abstractionist Freudian therapist would assume that the
“pleasure principle” universally drives his clients‟ (and his own) motivations, regardless of the
situation (Rychlak, 1981). The principle need not be adapted to the motives of African
tribesmen or to late afternoon motivations; it is meant to be universal and thus free of any
particular cultural or temporal context. This is one reason why abstractionists prefer theories to
be as general as possible—generality presumably contributes to a theory‟s universality because it
distances the theory from any particular context (Slife, 2004a). Indeed, this universalist
approach to theory builds upon a prominent understanding of truth, namely that the Truth (with a
capital “T”) about the world is general, universal, and independent of context.
Likewise, for abstractionists a research method should have universal application within
the scope of problems it purports to address (Gadamer, 2004). Thus, an RCT does not specify
whether it is intended to test the effectiveness of a medication or the impact of an educational
intervention. The contextual particulars of any given RCT are incidental. The RCT design is
intended to be a universal logic, applicable to any research situation that calls for testing the
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impact of one or more interventions. Indeed, this sense of universalism seems to inhere in what
most people think of as methods—procedures that when applied in a variety of situations bring
about an intended outcome. For methods to be useful, we generally expect them to be repeatable
in new situations rather than rooted in a specific context.
Of course there are exceptions to this universalist understanding of methods. Some
qualitative methods, for example, are described as emergent (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010).
Rather than dictating a set of procedures a priori, these approaches suggest that the methods be
formulated throughout the research process, adapting to the contextual demands of the research
situation. Although researchers using emergent designs likely draw on their knowledge of how
previous studies have approached problems, they nevertheless seek to adapt whatever procedure
they use to the context of their particular project and to adjust procedures as the context
demands. The point is that although we tend to default to a universalist understanding of
research methods, this is not the only way to approach methods.
Because abstractionists assume that what is most true about the world is universal, they
also presume a bounded reality—one that has the potential to be known comprehensively (W.
Berry, 2001). That is, for theories to be true (the most real) they must be universal, and to be
universal they must be comprehensive. Whether or not we actually comprehend all of reality,
according to abstractionism each and every bit of reality could eventually be known by
abstracting the essential and washing out the noise of context. Consequentially, abstractionists
prefer theories that attempt to be comprehensive rather than limited in scope and application
(Slife, 2004b). Accordingly, abstractionist approaches to mixed methods would favor a single,
comprehensive, overarching worldview to orient research rather than multiple limited
worldviews.
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Sameness. Building upon the previous three, the fourth feature of abstractionism refers to
abstractionists‟ emphasis on sameness. This feature indicates that for abstractionists sameness is
the fundamental basis for relationships and difference is generally seen as a barrier to
relationship (Ostenson, 2009; Slife & Wiggins, 2009). Sameness is so important here because
abstractions themselves (e.g, concepts, theories) are formed in terms of commonalities and
similarities manifested across contexts. In other words, to abstract is not merely to divorce from
context, but also to focus on similarities (Slife, 2004a). Thus a person‟s depression is seen from
this perspective as a set of depressive episodes, as if “other” episodes matter less (Slife, 1993).
The depression is an abstraction from a person‟s broader contextual experiences in terms of these
depressive similarities. In this sense, the assumption of sameness is closely tied to universalism
because it suggests that different contexts are essentially the same in the ways that matter and
can be universally accounted for in terms of these similarities.
Similarly, atomism also contributes to the abstractionist assumption that relationships
must be based on sameness. By assuming that identities are self-contained—that they make no
essential reference outside of themselves—abstractionists explain interactions of identities in
terms of their own self-contained properties (Yanchar, 2005). That is to say, they explain an
identity by reference to itself and not in terms of something that is “other” or different from
itself. Recall our earlier discussion of how atomism requires that interacting parts internalize any
outside influence, with the outside influence being explained in terms of the properties of the
part. This example suggests that under atomism all relationships are self-relationships
(sameness) because they are always reduced to properties of the self. Thus, if a worldview is
self-contained it can only internalize parts of other worldviews that are similar or that can be
made similar, but it cannot truly engage or preserve the otherness of an alternative. This is why
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some mixed methods researchers assume that they must translate one form of data into the other
form of data for analysis (e.g., Onwuegbuzie & DaRos-Voseles, 2001)—they assume that they
cannot otherwise integrate the two unless they are sufficiently similar.
Likewise, essentialism demands sameness because it suggests that the self-contained
properties of a part are all that is essential to its identity and that anything “other” is incidental
and unnecessary (Bohan, 1993). Ultimately, essentialism amounts to a de facto rejection of
otherness because it presumes that anything that is other than what it deems essential is
unessential. Hence, this leads abstractionists to only attend to those things that are similar to the
essential qualities of a variable, a method, or a worldview and to ignore or reject those that are
not.
Accordingly, an abstractionist approach to mixed methods would operate much like what
we observed in Chapter 2—it would be driven by a single worldview that would either assimilate
methods from other worldviews into its own approach (altering them where necessary) or reject
and/or ignore any alternative methods that could not be assimilated. A mixed methods
researcher grounded in post-positivism, for instance, may seek to integrate qualitative methods
by focusing on features that are potentially similar to traditional post-positivist methods. This
researcher might home in on the way many qualitative methods guide researchers to extract
themes from their textual data, seeing this as a reductive process similar to the way that many
quantitative methods reduce rich and complex situations to key variables or factors. In making
such an application of qualitative methods, however, the researcher would have to discard many
of the interpretivist practices that seek to recontextualize themes and to caution researchers
against ultimately interpreting themes reductively and abstractly. Thus, abstractionism guides
the researcher to attend to similarities in integrating diverse methods and to discard major
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differences. In this sense, the abstractionist approach to integrating diverse methods greatly
reduces the diversity of the methods.
In addition, there is a sense that the method wars were based on this assumption that
relationships must be based on sameness. This is because the method wars were all about how
the differences between interpretivism and post-positivism are insuperable barriers to any sort of
integration of the two worldviews (Howe, 1988; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2007).
That is, the scholars arguing for interpretivism or post-positivism recognized that these
worldviews are profoundly different from one another and they assumed that any attempt to
relate the two would result in washing out these important differences in order to make them
compatible, particularly considering that one worldview or the other was expected to be
universal (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Thus, these differences between the worldviews appeared
as threats to one another‟s identity because they suggested an either/or orientation where
adopting one worldview would simultaneously reject the other.
Relational Ontology
In contrast to abstractionism, a relational ontology assumes that things are most real and
fundamental when they are in context (Slife & Richardson, 2008). That is to say, things are
defined (at least in part) by their contextual relationships. For example, relationists would argue
that a woman‟s motherhood only makes sense in relationship to a broader context of her
children, as well as her personal and cultural notions of what it means to be a mother. In other
words her motherhood is tied up in her relationship to her broader context.
These features of a relational ontology that I discuss below correspond to the
abstractionist features already discussed and thus hang together in a similar fashion (see Table
1). That is, the first three features—contextualism, holism, and changeability—each offer a
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Table 1
Contrasting Features of Abstractionist and Relational Ontologies
Features of Abstractionism

Features of Relationality

Essentialism—reality is made up of “essences,” the

Contextuality—reality is contextually situated;

basic essential qualities of a thing; all else,

what is essential to a thing is rooted in its

including context is incidental.

contextual relationships.

Atomism—reality is made up of self-contained

Holism—every “part” of reality is inextricably

parts. This means that parts contain within them all

related to a greater whole, with part and whole each

that is necessary to their identity (e.g., essences),

contributing to the identity of the other. Thus,

requiring no reference outside of themselves.

identity always goes beyond the thing identified.

Universalism—what is essentially true about the

Changeability—what is true about the world is

world is unchanging and applicable to all

fundamentally contextual and thus has the potential

situations; it is universal. Thus, theories and

to change as contexts change. Thus, theories and

methods should be independent of any given

methods should adapt and be secondary to any

context.

particular context.

Sameness—relationships are based on similarities

Difference—relationships require difference as

and differences are seen as barriers to relationship.

well as similarities. This is because a relationship

Sameness is so important because abstractions

requires something that is truly “other” or different

themselves are formed in terms of commonalities

from the self with which to relate.

manifested across contexts.
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different view of the same relational impulse for understanding the world as contextually situated
and the three go very closely hand-in-hand. The fourth feature, difference, likewise reveals how
the other features of relationality impact the way that relationists approach relationships,
particularly relationships between quite different things, such as post-positivism and
interpretivism.
Contextualism. Whereas abstractionism assumes that context obscures the essence of a
phenomenon, relationality assumes that context itself is essential (part of the essence) in knowing
what is real and fundamental (Freeman, 2010; Slife, 2004a, 2004b). For example, a wooden
spoon might be a stirring implement in one context and a tool of corporal punishment in another.
To understand what sort of tool we are dealing with, the relationist would argue we need to
examine whether the context more closely resembles a bowl of cake batter or a disobedient
child‟s backside. This is because according to relationality the reality of the spoon is tied up in
its context—it is the stirrer in the bowl and it is the spanking paddle in the angry parent‟s hand.
Thus, one of the major implications of relationality is that the more removed we are from
the context we are attempting to study, the less we grasp what is real, fundamental, or essential
(Yanchar, 2005). In fact, relationists would question whether we even really can be removed
from context, arguing that abstraction merely obscures context rather than escapes it (Bishop,
2007; Slife, 2004a). This is not to say that relationists do not rely on abstractions from time to
time. Indeed, relationists see abstractions such as theory and language as indispensible (Slife &
Richardson, 2008). However, from the relational perspective abstractions should not be
mistaken for reality. Rather, they should point back to the rich contextual world and are most
useful when they are regularly recontextualized.
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Accordingly, theoretical discussions such as this dissertation draw heavily on abstractions
such as language and theory. Indeed, one may raise the question of whether I can adequately
represent a relational ontology in these fairly abstract terms of philosophical language and
“features.” These abstractions are not problematic in and of themselves from a relational
perspective, but they become so if they are treated as if the language and theories in question are
the truth (i.e., if they are reified), rather than as rough approximations that are subordinate to the
rich contextual situations which they describe. Thus, relationists strive to use abstractions
tentatively and to persistently recontextualize them. For example, the hermeneutic circle is a
method of interpretation that states that the whole of a text is best understood in relation to its
individual parts and the parts of a text are best understood in relation to the whole (Bernstein,
1983; Palmer, 1969; Ricœur, 1981). In moving through this interpretive circle, a reader engages
in temporary abstraction by reflecting on a part of the text or on the whole of the text, but then
seeks to return from this abstract view to recontextualize insights that emerged in the provisional
abstraction. This method has been extended beyond textual analysis to include all interpretation,
including our interpretation of the world. Thus, this hermeneutic method would suggest that we
must be in a continual process of abstracting and recontextualizing, following the circular flow
from whole to part and part to whole.6
Contextualism likewise leads relationists to understand identity as deeply contextual
(Freeman, 2010; Macmurray, 1998; Slife, 2004a; Slife & Richardson, 2008). Consider again the
example of the clinical psychologist interested in a client‟s personality. From a relational
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This description of the hermeneutic circle is itself an abstraction from the practices of hermeneutically oriented
researchers. The point from a relational perspective is that this abstraction is helpful in describing what
hermeneutically oriented researchers do; nevertheless it is a thin approximation of those practices. The method
would become abstractionist if we were to treat it as if it is the same thing as what such researchers do and disregard
the variety of contextual adaptations in each instance of the “method.”
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perspective the clinician would be interested in getting to know what the client is like in a variety
of contexts, attending not only to what is the same across contexts, but also to what is different.
This is because for the relationist the client‟s personality itself changes in certain ways as the
context changes. Thus, the clinician is open to understanding the client as introverted in some
contexts and extroverted in others, rather than expecting the client‟s behavior to be different
manifestations of unchanging underlying traits. Indeed, this relational perspective on personality
could account for the low correlations that are often observed in trait studies (e.g., Taylor,
Kluemper, & Mossholder, 2010).
In like manner, for the relationist there is a sense that a research method must be
rewritten to some degree with each application to a new context (Yanchar, et al., 2005). This is
because the method was formulated within a particular context and was thus shaped and defined
by that context (Danziger, 1985, 1990). As the method is carried into a new context, the method
must change to adapt to the context. Indeed, there may be many similarities from one context to
the next (they share a context of contexts), but the relationist attends equally to the differences,
as these new particularities can redefine the method in important ways. Indeed, it is common
practice in many qualitative studies to cite research designs that inspired a particular study, but to
then elaborate on the many important adaptations that were made to the design to better suit the
context of the study at hand (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Although it is more common in
quantitative research to treat research designs as prefabricated frameworks for research (Kazdin,
2003), relationally oriented quantitative researchers would likewise see the adjustments that
researchers make in their quantitative methods as a similar form of “rewriting” the method.
Perhaps to an even greater extent, then, relationists would expect that applying research
methods to a completely different worldview context would likely result in some important
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changes to the identity of the method (Yanchar & Williams, 2006). For example, qualitative
methods that are intended to be used hermeneutically, with general themes identified which are
then related back to the broader context of interviewee‟s responses, could be adapted to only
focus on their ability to generalize themes. From a post-positivist perspective, these sorts of
generalizations could prove helpful in devising hypotheses or generating questionnaire items for
further quantitative research. However, the method (originally interpretivist) in its new
application has been fundamentally changed, even though the procedures for collecting and
analyzing the data are basically the same. The change comes because the purposes of the
method as well as the mode of interpreting the results of the analysis are quite different from
those that applied in the interpretivist context. In this sense, a relational ontology is more of an
anti-system rather than a system because it does not presuppose to have a ready-made method or
theory for any given situation—the situation or context dictates and shapes the method.
Holism. Because relationality asserts that the essence of a thing lies in its relation to
broader contexts, a relational ontology implies a type of holism where a part‟s qualities and
identity are tied up in its relationships with a greater whole (Gantt, 2005; Slife, 2004b). This
holism contrasts sharply with the abstractionist assumption of atomism which assumes that a
part‟s identity is self-contained, requiring no reference “outside” of itself. Instead holism implies
a relational identity—an identity that is mutually constituted by a part‟s relationship with its
broader contextual whole (Freeman, 2010; Gergen, 2009).
For example, many typical personality qualities like introversion become nonsensical
without some reference to relational context. Not only does introversion imply and require other
people from whom a person could turn inward, but the meaning of introversion is also subject to
situational and cultural contexts. So called “introverted behavior” takes on very different
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meanings when it is exhibited in different contexts such as a football game, a religious service, or
a dinner out with friends. Likewise, cultural expectations for such behavior vary and a person
who is seen as problematically introverted in the United States (where extroversion is often
valued) might be considered appropriately polite or respectful in a culture where people are
expected to be more reserved and demure (Freeman, 2010).
Holistic relational identity not only applies to people, but to all that exists (Slife, 2004a).
For example, a glass of water can be many things in different contexts. If I‟m feeling parched,
the glass of water is a source of thirst quenching relief. However, if a small fire breaks out
nearby it becomes a fire extinguisher. For the relationist these identities of thirst quencher or fire
extinguisher are an integral part of the glass of water‟s existence within those greater contextual
wholes. Thus, identity here is also “between” parts rather than merely within them (Gergen,
2009). In this sense, identity always exceeds the thing identified because it points out to the
broader context (Freeman, 2010). This is one reason why relationists argue that research
methods are always shaped by their worldview and methodological contexts—the methods
necessarily conform to the assumptions and values of the broader worldview context (Danziger,
1990; Yanchar & Williams, 2006).
Another implication of holism for relationality is that we (along with everything else that
exists) are related first and individual second (Slife & Wiggins, 2009). That is to say, it is our
nature to be in relationship (to context, to others, etc.) and our individuality can never be truly
separated from these relationships. Indeed, individuality, as such, is an abstraction inasmuch as
it obscures our fundamental relatedness (Cushman, 1996; Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon,
1999; Slife & Wiggins, 2009). In other words, there is no true “partness” except in relationship
to a greater whole. Thus, the worry for relationists is that when we use abstractions such as

53
variables or constructs to emphasize a part from the whole, we might lose sight of the fact that
the part is nevertheless rooted to the whole. In this vein, a relational approach to mixed methods
would emphasize the importance of attending to the impact on methods as they are brought in
relation to an alternative paradigm (Yanchar & Williams, 2006).
Changeability. In contrast to abstractionism‟s assumption that abstracted truths are
universal and unchanging across contexts, relationality assumes that all truth is contextdependent and changeable in relation to contexts (Slife, 2004b). Put another way, abstractionism
assumes that something is true in spite of its context, whereas relationality assumes that
something is true because of its context. As mentioned previously, this contextualism means that
when a research method is applied to a new context, it can change in important ways and
accordingly becomes a “new” method in the new context. Thus, a method may provide a pattern
based on previous contexts that can be helpful in its application to a new context, but it must
accommodate and adapt to the differences of the new context (Yanchar, et al., 2005). In this
sense, methods always have a limited application and are secondary to the particular demands of
the context of the given problem.
Whereas abstractionist universalism assumes a bounded reality, relationality assumes a
reality that always exceeds and overflows our comprehension (Heidegger, 1967; Lévinas &
Nemo, 1985; Slife, 2004b). That is to say, reality will never be fully knowable in the
comprehensive sense for relationists. Relationists often use an analogy of the horizon to explain
our limited view of the world (e.g., Gadamer, 2004). From any given vantage point we are able
to view a vast landscape, but our view is limited by the horizon where the landscape continues
beyond our sight. As we move toward the horizon, some of the previously obscured landscape
comes into view, as other elements previously visible recede behind the horizon to our back.
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Likewise, our experience of the world itself is always limited in scope. Our experience gives us
a view of the world which always implies something beyond, but which invariably gives up
some of its present view in moving toward that beyond.
This limited view of the world cautions relationists against treating contexts themselves
as potentially self-contained. There is always a greater context or a “context of contexts.” Thus
the term “whole” in holism refers not to a comprehensively self-contained whole, but rather to
the unlimited connectedness of contextual relationships. In this sense, any understanding of the
whole for relationists is necessarily incomplete and nonfinal. In the words of William James,
although the world is not a “through-and-through unity of all things at once [as a self-contained
reality would imply] . . . each part hangs together with its very neighbors in inextricable
interfusion” (1987, p. 778). This connection of contexts is a strong indicator that relationality is
not a relativism in which each person creates his or her own truth (see Slife & Richardson,
2008). Rather, truth here is relative to the context which is beyond any individual person and
which “hangs together” with contexts beyond.
Because relationists recognize our view of the world to be necessarily limited, they tend
to favor theories (including worldviews) that are likewise limited in scope and that seek to
acknowledge their incompleteness (Slife, 2004b). This contrasts with abstractionism‟s tendency
toward comprehensive systematic theories. The role of theories (as with all abstractions) for the
relationist, then, is to provide a provisional vantage point for glimpsing the world, but not to
represent and subsume all of reality (as a set of principles or universals). Thus, a relational
approach to mixed methods would favor multiple worldviews inasmuch as they help illuminate
and make sense of the world. However, relationists would go further by insisting that these
worldviews should be held somewhat provisionally, recognizing that any worldview is limited in
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what it can reveal (Yanchar, et al., 2005). Furthermore, by treating worldviews as provisional,
the relational approach leaves more of an open ground for engagement and relationship of
worldviews because worldviews are no longer expected to account for all of reality. Relationists
can then be genuinely open to the possibility that an alternative worldview can speak to and
inform their current worldview.
Difference. In fact, this assumption that theories and worldviews are limited and
provisional is a major reason why relationists believe that difference is just as vital to
relationship as sameness. They recognize the value in looking to something beyond or other than
one limited worldview in order to make better sense of the world (Gergen, 2009; Ostenson,
2009; Slife & Wiggins, 2009). Indeed, the relational notion of identity requires that there be
something beyond (Freeman, 2010). By acknowledging limitations and by not expecting
comprehensiveness, relationists leave open the possibility of incompleteness, difference, and
even contradiction (Bernstein, 1983; James, 1987). These differences and contradictions can be
illuminating and valuable, so it is important to relationists that they see these differences as
differences and not turn them into similarities in their encounters with alternatives. For example,
psychotherapists might be tempted to view their depressed patients primarily in terms of their
similarities (e.g., through an abstract theory of depression) and thus approach them similarly
(Slife & Wiggins, 2009). However, a relational psychotherapist would resist this temptation by
seeking to recognize those inevitable moments when his client breaks from his theory of
depression, manifesting important differences from any previous client. These moments of
difference present new possibilities to the relational psychotherapist for understanding and
intervening with his client. Likewise, the relational psychotherapist would see attending to these
differences as a safeguard against imposing a theory upon a client without regard for its fit.
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One reason that difference is so important to relationists is because, according to holism,
differences are key to the relational identities of the things or persons in relationship with one
another (Freeman, 2010; Slife, 2004a). That is, holism asserts that the identity of a thing is
partly found in its relationships to its broader contexts, its relationships to things other than itself.
For example, a mother is not the same person as her daughter, but her identity as a mother is tied
up in someone other than herself, namely her daughter. The otherness of her daughter and her
relationship with her daughter as an other, are integral to her identity as a mother. In this sense
difference is not only possible and helpful for relationists, but it is also essential in making sense
of the world. According to William James (1987), without difference or otherness all that exists
ultimately reduces to one great singularity and any difference or plurality that we experience is
ultimately epiphenomenal. In step with relationists, James argues that the plurality that we
experience in the world is real and that relationships need not destroy the otherness of the other.
One type of relationship that relies on differences is a dialectical relationship (Rychlak,
1981). A dialectical relationship is one in which something is defined in contrast with something
that it is not. For example, we might define post-positivism‟s emphasis on minimizing values in
research (thus seeking objectivity) in contrast with interpretivism‟s claim that values are
inescapable and should be embraced in the research process. Not only can the contrast make
clearer what the one thing is by pointing out what it is not, but it also reveals possibilities of what
it could be. Thus, dialectical thinking is important for relationists because it helps them to see
beyond any one theory or worldview and critically evaluate it against other possibilities.
Indeed, this sort of dialectical relationship hints at one way that relationists might
approach the problems facing mixed methods. That is, they might advocate that the worldview
debate continue, but with the recognition that these worldviews are incomplete, thus allowing
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adherents to different worldviews to approach one another with humility and learn from their
differences. Indeed, they might argue that the tensions among these worldviews are, to some
degree, necessary to their identities. Likewise, they might employ this sort of dialectical
relationship in mixed methods experiments by seeking to preserve the differences in qualitative
and quantitative methods and then engaging the findings of the two strands in terms of both
similarities and differences. Thus, an appropriate integration for a relationist might as likely be
an exploration of contradictions and disagreements between two strands of research in a study as
it is a conciliation of the two.
Conclusion
This discussion of abstractionist and relational ontologies has demonstrated that each
provides strikingly different ways of understanding reality: the former arguing that truth emerges
as we abstract things from the context in which they occur, the latter arguing that we can only
really understand the truth about something when it is in context. Likewise, I have suggested
that there are important differences in the ways that each ontology would approach the mixed
methods project, particularly in the manner that they would relate worldviews and would treat
methods in the context of an alternative worldview. For abstractionism, worldviews should be
universal and comprehensive and so abstractionists would tend to favor ultimately using a single
worldview. Consequentially, abstractionists would only relate worldviews based on sameness
because this would allow them to incorporate any alternative worldview into the single
overarching worldview. Likewise, abstractionists would assume that methods are self-contained
and that they retain their essential characteristics in whatever worldview context they find
application. For relationality, worldviews are necessarily provisional and incomplete and thus
relationists would favor a plurality of worldviews. In order to preserve this plurality, relationists
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would assume that the relationships among worldviews must be based on difference as well as
sameness. Regarding methods, relationists would assume that they are defined by their
relationship to the context of a study‟s orienting worldview and that the character of a method
changes if it is applied under alternative worldviews (if it can be accommodated at all).
In the previous chapter I suggested that the problems mixed methods researchers have
faced in integrating interpretivism and post-positivism is likely the result of a problematic
ontology and that an ontological analysis was in order. With an understanding of relational and
abstractionist ontologies now in place, we are ready to undertake this ontological analysis of the
mixed methods literature. The purpose of the ontological analysis will be to see whether mixed
methods writings suggest that there is an abstractionist or relational ontology at play, or some
combination of the two. Thus, the following chapter will undertake this ontological analysis.
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Chapter 4: An Ontological Analysis of Mixed Methods
In previous chapters I have described the mixed methods project and outlined how
current approaches to mixed methods appear to fall short of a true integration of qualitative and
quantitative methodologies. I have suggested that this problem may be due to a problematic
ontology and that an ontological analysis is thus in order. In preparation for this ontological
analysis I have described two basic ontologies—abstractionism and relationality—and outlined
several contrasting features of these ontologies.
In this chapter I will provide my ontological analysis of the mixed methods literature.
The purpose of this ontological analysis is to reveal the ontology or ontologies guiding the mixed
methods project through a close analytical reading of the mixed methods literature. Using the
basic features of relational and abstractionist ontologies as I have described them in Chapter 3, I
will critically evaluate whether the mixed methods literature appears to be founded upon
relationality or abstractionism or some combination of the two.
Methodology: Ontological Analysis
The purpose of an ontological analysis is to reveal and describe the ontology underlying a
particular theory and its associated literature, in this case the mixed methods approaches to
integrating qualitative and quantitative methodologies. In order to undertake such an analysis we
need to have an understanding of the possible ontologies that could underlie the theory (hence,
Chapter 3). As is the case in this analysis, it is typical for an ontological analysis to employ at
least two opposing ontologies for comparison so that the features of one ontology can stand out
in contrast to the other. As mentioned in chapter 3, the relational and abstractionist ontologies
are particularly appropriate here as they are the most cited in the social sciences and are fairly
exhaustive in their scope (Bishop, 2007).
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Dialectic approach. The method employed in this analysis is a dialectic approach,
meaning that it emphasizes contrasting relations. As alluded to in the previous chapter, the
dialectical method involves understanding something by placing it in contrast with what it is not.
The basic idea here is that the ontological assumptions in the mixed methods literature will
become clearer as they are placed in contrast with alternative assumptions. This is particularly
important because, as several scholars have observed (e.g., Richardson, et al., 1999; Rychlak,
1981; Slife & Williams, 1995), ontological assumptions are often taken for granted and thus
remain “hidden” to those who assume them. Thus, contrasting these assumptions with
alternative assumptions will help bring them into greater relief, making more apparent their
operation in the mixed methods literature.
Indeed, this dialectical method is not new—it dates back at least to the ancient Greeks.
Socrates, for example, would not state his philosophy monologically, but instead was fond of
engaging in dialectical dialogues. Through this dialectical approach he would critically engage
his interlocutor, questioning and examining his understanding of a topic against that of his
dialogical partner. Socrates‟ student Plato likewise used this dialectical format in his writing,
using multiple voices representing contrasting perspectives to arrive at the truth of a question.
These multiple perspectives allow readers to critically evaluate both sides of an issue and to
judge conclusions not just on their own merit, but also in how they contrast with one another.
Hegel was a modern philosopher who is similarly well known for employing a dialectical
method for making sense of history. According to Hegel, the progress of history begins with a
thesis which is countered by an antithesis. The confrontation of these ideas leads to a higher
understanding which is then itself countered again, ad infinitum. Marx, likewise, employed
Hegel‟s dialectical method to demonstrate how present day economic realities contrasted with
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and arose out of their previous historical iterations. The point for both Marx and Hegel was that
we can best know something by contrasting it with what it is not.
In modern psychology the dialectic method has similarly found fruitful application.
Rychlak (1981), for example, employed the dialectical method to illustrate the underlying
assumptions of classic personality theories in psychology, using contrasting assumptions to
highlight the assumptions of a particular theorist. A particular strength of Rychlak‟s approach is
that it helps readers to not only recognize the philosophical assumptions of personality theorists,
but to also compare these theorists to one another and critically evaluate their theories through
contrast.
Similarly, Slife (2011) developed a textbook in psychology called Taking Sides which
presents contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues in psychology. The text is set up to
engage students in debates which compare and contrast the opposing viewpoints and to come to
conclusions based on this dialectical exchange. In fact, the text was so successful that it is now
in its 17th edition and a whole series of Taking Sides books has been developed for a variety of
fields. One of the major strengths of this series is that it invites students to approach their
discipline as critical thinkers who can question the claims and assumptions of any one thinker in
the field by engaging an alternative viewpoint for comparison.
Indeed, many modern educators now see this dialectical approach as central to critical
thinking in general (e.g., Brookfield, 1987; Norris, 1985; Phelan & Garrison, 1994; Yanchar &
Slife, 2004). Within psychology, this approach to critical thinking has found application in a
recent book edited by Slife, Reber, and Richardson (2005). The book is arranged with chapter
pairs that explore mainstream and alternative assumptions (often ontological assumptions) of
various sub-fields of psychology. Through this method of contrasting relationships the chapters
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not only attempt to point out the assumptions that undergird mainstream psychology, but also to
highlight them in contrast possible alternatives. According to Slife, Reber and Richardson, the
presentation of alternatives was particularly important because they help to bring to light
assumptions that might otherwise be taken to be “just the way things are” rather than one option
among many of approaching psychology.
The present analysis. There is a sense that this dissertation has already been employing
the dialectical method in my presentation of abstractionism and relationality in Chapter 3. That
is, by presenting the two ontologies side by side and in contrast with one another, it has been my
intention to bring greater clarity to how each ontology operates as it stands out against its
alternative. In similar fashion, this ontological analysis will build upon the dialectical contrasts
of the previous chapter by applying an understanding of relationality and abstractionism to the
mixed methods literature. One particular appeal about the dialectic method for this project is that
it is not unique to either relational or abstractionist ontologies. That is to say, the dialectical
method has found application within abstractionism (e.g., Plato, 1997) as well as relationality
(e.g., Slife, 2004a). In that sense, drawing dialectical comparisons does not in and of itself
presuppose one ontology or the other. This analysis involves extracting ontological themes
through a close reading of the mixed methods literature and identifying those themes with the
features of one or the other ontology. When I identify a theme with one particular ontology,
where appropriate or needed, I also describe how the alternative ontology would approach the
same issue, thus dialectically illustrating the fit with one ontology and the contrast with the other.
The “data” of this analysis is focused on literature involving mixed methods approaches
to integrating qualitative and quantitative methodologies. I have identified three basic categories
of writings that pertain to methodological integration for inclusion in the analysis:
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1. Articles and chapters that address integration at the worldview or paradigm level. These
articles argue against the qualitative/quantitative divide of the paradigm wars and argue
in favor of some sort of mixing of qualitative and quantitative methodologies.
2. Articles and chapters that address integration at the methodological level. These articles
describe the technical elements of conducting mixed methods studies such as research
design.
3. Articles and chapters that address integration at the methods level. These articles
describe empirical studies employing mixed methods designs.
I have organized this analysis according to these categories, labeled with shorthand: worldview,
methodology, and methods. For each of the first two categories, worldview and methodology, I
have identified a comprehensive exemplar article or chapter that represents common themes
from and takes into account the relevant literature for that category. Likewise, for the methods
category (which represents the broadest literature) I have identified five exemplar studies
representing each of the five basic types of mixed methods research designs. Thus, for each
category I will identify themes that emerged in my reading of the literature and then provide an
in-depth analysis of those themes using the identified exemplar that illustrates the ontological
foundations of that particular facet of mixed methods. Because the point of an ontological
analysis is to provide a close and in-depth reading, this analysis necessarily focuses on a small
number of articles rather than exploring a “thinner” reading of a great many articles. As I
introduce my exemplar articles I will provide justification for how the articles are “exemplary”
and comprehensive and I will provide references to the broader literature which they represent.
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Analysis
Worldview. Within the mixed methods literature, articles that address worldview issues
generally take on two primary tasks: 1) critiquing the incompatibility thesis arising from the
paradigm wars and 2) arguing for a new worldview to ground mixed methods (e.g., Creswell &
Plano Clark, 2011; Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Howe, 1988, 1992; Johnson &
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Kelle, 2006; Lund, 2005; McKeganey, 1995; Morgan, 2007; Onwuegbuzie
& Leech, 2005a, 2005b; Plewis & Mason, 2005; Scott & Briggs, 2009; Sechrest & Sidani, 1995;
Shah & Corley, 2006; Steckler, et al., 1992; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003, 2009). My principle
exemplar of these worldview articles, Burke Johnson and Anthony Onwuegbuzie‟s 2004 article
“Mixed methods research: A research paradigm whose time has come,” takes on both of these
tasks. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie are two of the leading scholars of mixed methods research,
particularly in addressing philosophical issues relating to mixed methods and they are well
published in these areas. This article, in particular, is widely cited as definitively establishing
mixed methods as overcoming the incompatibility thesis and providing a paradigm of its own
(Bazeley, 2006; Dellinger & Leech, 2007; Denscombe, 2007, 2008; Greene, 2008; Leech &
Onwuegbuzie, 2009; Mertens, 2009; Morgan, 2007; Raudenbush, 2005; Teddlie & Tashakkori,
2009; Teddlie & Yu, 2007). Furthermore, this article is fairly comprehensive and representative
of what many other mixed methods researchers have argued on these issues (e.g., Creswell &
Plano Clark, 2011; Howe, 1988, 1992; Morgan, 2007; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005a, 2005b;
Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003, 2009).
Theme: Problems with the paradigm wars. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie‟s (2004) first
major argument is that the incompatibility thesis arising from the paradigm wars is incorrect in
asserting that qualitative and quantitative methods are incompatible. According to these authors,
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the era of the paradigm wars was a period where methodologists overemphasized philosophical
differences between interpretivism and post-positivism and created an unnecessary divide
between qualitative and quantitative researchers. They suggest that this divide has led to a state
of affairs where graduate students often believe that they must declare allegiance to one
methodology or the other as they embark on their research careers. The authors go on to argue
that qualitative and quantitative methods themselves are much more loosely tied to their
founding paradigm or worldview than the paradigm wars would indicate. Likewise they contend
that the differences between the worldviews of interpretivism and post-positivism are overblown
and that they share many important similarities that are favorable for mixing methods,. The
authors conclude that because these traditions are, in fact, so similar and because methods need
not be rooted in a single paradigm, researchers can and should combine qualitative and
quantitative methodologies.
As they argue against the incompatibility thesis of the paradigm wars, it initially appears
that Johnson and Onwuegbuzie could be assuming a relational ontology. After all, they are
arguing against the division that has treated qualitative and quantitative methods and worldviews
as self-contained and incompatible because of differences. However, on closer inspection their
approach to overcoming the paradigm wars shows many signs that they are, in fact, assuming an
abstractionist ontology. First, the authors assume atomism in their treatment of research methods
as if they are self-contained, independent from any fundamental connection to a broader context,
including a worldview context. They assert, “Although many research procedures or methods
typically have been linked to certain paradigms, this linkage between research paradigm and
research methods is neither sacrosanct nor necessary” (p. 15). According to Johnson and
Onwuegbuzie, methods retain their identity regardless of paradigmatic or worldview context and
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the authors argue that this independence allows for mixing methods because it frees researchers
from concerns over paradigm conflicts. In other words, the authors are asserting that we should
understand methods as atomistically self-contained, requiring no reference outside of themselves
(e.g., to worldview contexts) for their basic identity.7
Similarly, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie assume atomism in their characterization of how
mixed methods bridges the interpretivist and post-positivist paradigms. They describe “a
continuum with qualitative research anchored at one pole and quantitative research anchored at
the other” and then assert that “mixed methods research covers the large set of points in the
middle area” (p. 15). This continuous model of research methodologies suggests that the authors
are trying to unite qualitative and quantitative (and between them mixed methods) in one selfcontained system where differences are merely differences of degree. On the other hand, the
authors do go on to offer an alternative metaphor for those who prefer to think categorically:
“mixed methods research sits in a new third chair, with qualitative research sitting on the left
side and quantitative research sitting on the right side” (p. 15) The point for Johnson and
Onwuegbuzie is that mixed methods is a middle ground between the two purist positions. It is
possible that with this categorical explanation the authors mean to allow for the three approaches
to be distinct and related, as holism would advocate. However, they go on to extol the
similarities across these traditions (more on this below) and to reject purist positions, suggesting
that they are instead arguing for one overarching and self-contained system in which any
worldview distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is wiped out.

7

The atomism seen here is perhaps even a stronger form of atomism than many abstractionists would assume. That
is to say, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie are asserting that methods are independent of paradigms or worldviews. Other
abstractionists, such as those in the paradigm wars, recognize methods as necessarily related to worldviews because
they are informed by the logic of a worldview—the logical relationship suggesting that they are at least weakly
related (as opposed to the strong relationship of a contextual identity) rather than fundamentally independent.
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Closely tied to the authors‟ assumption of atomism is their corresponding assumption of
essentialism. Because methods and procedures are assumed to be self-contained, they are
likewise assumed to retain their basic “essence” as they are abstracted from their original
worldview context. In other words, a method‟s identity presumably does not change in a new
context because it preserves its essential characteristics. According to the authors, what is
essential to research methods are the basic procedures involved in them and they argue that this
essence is retained regardless of the paradigmatic or worldview context. Indeed, the authors
provide no indication that methods would be any different when taken out of their original
worldview context. Instead, they argue that methods do not depend on their worldview to be
what they are and to be useful to researchers.
Furthermore, the authors assume universalism when they assert that methods can be
applied to whatever worldview context researchers deem appropriate. Whereas the paradigm
wars contended that worldviews limited what methods could be accommodated, Johnson and
Onwuegbuzie argue that paradigmatic worldviews need not limit methods and that methods can
be universal to any worldview. Because methods are assumed to be atomistically self-contained
and therefore to carry their basic essence from context to context, there appears to be no
limitation in their application to any given context. Furthermore, by rejecting the purist points of
view, the authors have sought to make their model for research methods comprehensive. That is
to say, there is no research situation to which their approach to qualitative and quantitative
research is expected not to apply. Their model itself is expected to be universal.
One of the most prominent abstractionist features in Johnson and Onwuegbuzie‟s article
is their assumption that relationships must be based on sameness. They argue that one of the
major flaws of the paradigm wars “has been the relentless focus on the differences between the
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two orientations” (p. 14). Instead, they argue that the two orientations are actually much more
similar (and therefore relatable) than the paradigm wars have indicated. The authors emphasize
this sameness in terms of how both approaches employ empirical observation, describe data,
provide explanations of data, speculate about the outcomes of observations, and attempt to
provide warranted assertions about human beings. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie attempt to reduce
the differences between qualitative and quantitative orientations to issues of micro and macro
observation and then argue that these differences are complementary and that one does not
exclude the other—essentially making them similar by arguing that they are two sides (macro
and micro) of the same coin (observation). This move, however, simply ignores some of the
more fundamental philosophical differences between the worldviews (e.g., objectivism vs. valueladen research, sensory observation vs. lived experience, etc.; see Chapter 2), In other words they
minimize some differences and flatly ignore other important differences. Ultimately, the authors
assume that differences between the two worldviews would be barriers to their relationship and
thus the attempt to downplay any differences and to focus on what they see as similarities that
should allow for relationship.
These examples suggest that Johnson and Onwuegbuzie‟s critique of the paradigm wars
is thoroughly abstractionist in its ontology. They assume that methods can be universally applied
across paradigms because they are atomistically self-contained and thus carry their essential
qualities with them from context to context. They likewise assume that the relationship between
qualitative and quantitative worldviews must be based on sameness and they accordingly
emphasize the similarity of the two worldviews. Furthermore, they put forth a model for
understanding qualitative and quantitative methods that seeks to be universal to all research
situations and to contain any relevant methodological approach.
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Had the authors assumed a relational ontology, they would have approached their topic
quite differently. Perhaps the most important change would be an emphasis on relationships of
difference. A relational approach would seek to preserve the otherness of differing research
paradigms and so would seek for a mixed methods that allows the traditions to speak to one
another in their difference, perhaps through contradiction and disagreement as well as
convergence. In other words, a relational ontology would lead the authors to explore how the
differences between post-positivism and interpretivism are themselves grounds for relationship.
Furthermore, a relational approach would have led the authors to take seriously the role of
worldviews as context for research methods. They likely would have explored how methods
might need to change if they are to be accommodated within alternative worldviews in order to
fit the alternative assumptions and values. Likewise, assuming relationality would have led the
authors to consider how their model for mixing methods likely does not account for every
possible research situation and thus advocate an openness to differing perspectives.
Theme: A new “third” paradigm for mixed methods: Pragmatism. Johnson and
Onwuegbuzie acknowledge that, despite the points of commonality in qualitative and
quantitative research, the interpretivist and post-positivist paradigms (in their “purist” iterations)
give rise to a variety of philosophical problems. According to the authors, these philosophical
debates are likely “interminable” and they argue that it is not the purview of social scientists to
resolve these conflicts. Moreover, they suggest that pursuing these debates is not likely to make
any meaningful difference to the practical problems that researchers face. Instead, they claim
that in order to avoid these apparently irresolvable conflicts from the purist positions, mixed
methods must put forth a “third” alternative paradigm which can better accommodate both
schools of methods without the conflicts.
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In step with the overwhelming majority of mixed methods researchers (e.g., Biesta, 2010;
Feilzer, 2010; Greene & Hall, 2010; Howe, 1988; Morgan, 2007; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005a;
Scott & Briggs, 2009), Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) argue for pragmatism as the best
alternative paradigm to serve as a foundation for mixed methods.8 According to Johnson and
Onwuegbuzie, pragmatism is an approach that emphasizes the practical over the ideal. What this
means for researchers is that “when judging ideas [like worldviews and methodologies] we
should consider their empirical and practical consequences” (p. 17). In other words, researchers
should judge claims about interpretivism and post-positivism as well as qualitative and
quantitative methods based on the practical consequences of accepting those claims or
employing those methods. More specifically, the authors assert that researchers should “choose
the combination or mixture of methods that works best for answering [their] research questions”
(p. 17). Thus, they identify the research question as the “most fundamental” determinant of the
appropriate methods and methodologies for any given project.
The decision to opt for a new worldview in pragmatism, rather than relating the two
founding worldviews of qualitative and quantitative methods, has important ontological
implications and suggests that, here too, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie are employing an
abstractionist ontology. As they did in making their argument against the paradigm wars, the
authors continue to assume here that methods are atomistically self-contained and therefore can
have universal application across worldviews (such as pragmatism) without any loss of their
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A number of other paradigms for mixed methods have been suggested, including the transformative paradigm
(Mertens, Bledsoe, Sullivan, & Wilson, 2010), critical realist paradigm (Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2010), and
dialectical paradigm (Greene & Hall, 2010). Because the pragmatic paradigm is most widely regarded in the mixed
methods literature, my analysis here focuses on Johnson and Onwuegbuzie‟s account of pragmatism. However, as I
will expand upon below, much of my analysis and critique of pragmatism applies more broadly to any of these
“third” paradigm approaches, inasmuch as they sidestep relating positivism and interpretivism by devising a new
worldview that is neither positivist nor interpretivist.
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essential qualities. Likewise, they assume that the foundations of qualitative and quantitative
methods are basically similar and that because of this similarity these methods can be related and
mixed. It is on the basis of these assumptions that they argue that qualitative and quantitative
methods can operate unchanged within pragmatism. However, in their argument for pragmatism
it becomes clear that the authors are making these assumptions not only about methods, but also
about worldviews and paradigms.
Initially it appears that the authors are critical of the abstractionist treatment of
worldviews in the paradigm wars. It was common in the paradigm wars to treat post-positivist
and interpretivist worldviews as all-encompassing abstractionist systems of thought.
Worldviews were assumed to be atomistically self-contained—ideally worldviews would
describe and account for all that matters to researchers and thus need no reference outside of
themselves to other worldviews. Likewise, worldviews were meant to encompass everything
that is essential to understanding the world. Thus, researchers in the paradigm wars assumed that
worldviews contained all of the essential characteristics necessary in a worldview to account for
the world. Because worldviews were intended to be all-encompassing they were also assumed to
be universal. That is to say, worldviews intended to account for all there is, or at least all that
matters to researchers. It was not the intention that researchers draw upon different worldviews
depending on the context. Furthermore, relationships among worldviews were understood only
in terms of sameness. Because these worldviews were so different, they were presumed to be
irreconcilable. Moreover, the intention that worldviews be able to account for all possible
situations placed these worldviews in competition—either they were the same and in agreement
(one might even say they would be redundant) or they were different and rejected one another.
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Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, along with many other mixed methods researchers, reject the
way that the paradigm wars assumed qualitative and quantitative methodologies to be insulated
from and opposed to one another, based on this similar tension between worldviews. However,
as my analysis of their treatment of the method wars suggests, rather than ultimately questioning
the abstractionism underlying the method wars‟ understanding of worldviews, Johnson and
Onwuegbuzie instead brought this same abstractionism to bear on methods and used it to import
methods into a new third (abstractionist) worldview or paradigm. In other words, rather than
challenging the philosophical structure that made post-positivism and interpretivism (and their
methods) seemingly irreconcilable, the authors made from the same philosophical cloth a new
“container” for qualitative and quantitative methods that could presumably house both
approaches without conflict. That is to say, in pragmatism the authors have put forth a
worldview that is itself atomistically self-contained, presumably containing the essential
characteristics to universally account for all research situations, both qualitative and quantitative.
Indeed, this is the same problem that arises for all “third” paradigm approaches—rather than
questioning the abstractionism that seems to prevent meaningfully relating post-positivism and
interpretivism, they merely opt for a new abstractionist paradigm (one that is neither postpositivist nor interpretivist and thus is not a true “relating” of the two).
In fact, Biesta (2010) contends that Johnson and Onwuegbuzie are not actually offering
an alternative paradigm in pragmatism.9 Rather, he argues, they are advocating what he calls
“everyday pragmatism,” the notion that we should emphasize “what works” and favor practice
over philosophy. This everyday pragmatism, according to Biesta, does not delve sufficiently into
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Biesta (2010) applies this critique not only to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), but also to several of the
prominent mixed methods accounts of pragmatism (e.g., Morgan, 2007).
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the breadth and depth of philosophical pragmatism as articulated by philosophers such as Pierce,
Dewey, James, Davidson, and Rorty. Instead, they offer some general maxims about
“workability” and leave much of their philosophical worldview unarticulated. Because they are
not fully articulating a pragmatic worldview, this leaves open questions about what sorts of
worldview assumptions would ground this pragmatism.
For example, what is it about the practical situation that can resolve conflicts between
qualitative and quantitative approaches where philosophical and methodological discussions
have supposedly failed? Are worldview conflicts only philosophical or can they be practical as
well? For instance, a mixed methods researcher drawing from the same subject pool for both the
qualitative and quantitative strands of a study might be faced with a practical conundrum: should
she strive for objectivity by employing a double blind in her mixed methods study as the
quantitative strand would suggest or should she instead embrace the value-laden perspectives of
researchers and participants as the qualitative strand would suggest? This dilemma is
simultaneously practical and philosophical, so how does the practicality of the situation rescue
the researcher from the philosophical problem? Likewise, how does a theory of “what works”
determine what our standards for “working” are? In other words, what values does pragmatism
presuppose? What might pragmatic researchers be tacitly assuming about what are worthwhile
research ends and what are appropriate research questions to which “workable” methods can be
applied?
In raising these questions I do not mean to suggest that pragmatically oriented mixed
methods researchers could not offer an account of how pragmatists ought to determine
“workability,” how practical worldview conflicts might be settled, or more generally what sort of
value system underlies their pragmatism. However, in this case (as with other mixed methods
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accounts of pragmatism; see Biesta, 2010) Johnson and Onwuegbuzie treat pragmatism as a
system that can objectively arbitrate methodological and worldview conflicts using the
supposedly value-free tools of the research question, the (ambiguous) standard of “workability,”
and the practical situation. It appears that in this “everyday pragmatism” there is an
unacknowledged and unexamined value system at play, much as I described in Chapter 2 under
the label “unacknowledged methodological appropriation.”
Had Johnson and Onwuegbuzie assumed a relational ontology, instead of responding to
the paradigm wars with a new paradigmatic worldview, they likely would have pursued more
relational ways of understanding worldviews and their methods. First, they may have explored
how it changes our understanding of worldviews if we no longer treat them as self-contained
systems, but rather as incomplete worldviews in the context of other worldviews. One result of
this contextualist assumption would be that they could explore how the differences between
worldviews can themselves strengthen mixed methods. For example, they could explore how a
mixed methods study could put the two worldviews in dialogue and debate with one another on a
research question. Likewise, the authors may still have drawn inspiration from the methods of
the pragmatists inasmuch as they point researchers to attend to the context of practical situations.
However, they would have further explored how researchers must nevertheless examine their
notions of “what works” and orient any given practical situation to its broader context. In fact,
they may have found a welcome application in the hermeneutic circle, because rather than
stopping with workability and the practical situation, the hermeneutic circle would suggest that
researchers recontextualize these specifics in terms of their broader cultural and philosophical
contexts. This circular movement from part to whole and whole to part would prevent
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researchers from treating any one context (like the practical situation) as if it is not contextually
situated itself.
Summary. As my analysis of Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) has indicated, although
they appear to show some relational impulses, mixed methods accounts of worldview issues
ultimately assume an abstractionist ontology. In their critique of the paradigm wars as well as in
their proposal of a new paradigm in pragmatism, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie treat both
worldviews and methods as atomistically self-contained systems that retain their essential
characteristics regardless of the context in which they are applied. Likewise, the authors assume
that in order to be meaningfully related, worldviews or methods must be similar and that
differences are barriers to relationship. Furthermore, this analysis has suggested that
pragmatism, the favored “third” paradigm or worldview for most mixed methods researchers, is
likely not so much a bona fide worldview as it is a screen for hiding the operations of
worldviews in mixed methods research. Had the authors assumed a relational ontology they
instead would have emphasized the differences as well as the similarities between interpretivism
and post-positivism and explored how these differences are borne out in methods practices.
Furthermore, they would have sought to bring about a meaningful relationship between the
worldviews that preserves these differences, rather than dissolving them into similarities.
Likewise, they would have assumed that method practices are necessarily shaped by their
worldview contexts and they would have explored the ways that bringing methods in contact
with new worldviews might alter them.
Methodology. With the development of mixed methods research over the past 20 years,
a number of researchers have proposed a wide variety of possible mixed methods research
designs (e.g., Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007, 2011; Jones, 1987; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009;
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Mason, 2006; Morgan, 1998; Sandelowski, et al., 2007; Sherman & Strang, 2004; Teddlie &
Tashakkori, 2009; Teddlie & Yu, 2007; Wheeldon, 2010). Creswell and Plano Clark (2011)
have summarized these designs and provided a basic typology of mixed methods designs in the
recent second edition of their textbook on mixed methods research. For my exemplar of
methodological approaches to integration I will draw upon their textbook chapter that describes
these typologies. Creswell is a leading figure in mixed methods with several successful
methodology textbooks to his name in qualitative, quantitative, and mixed designs, many in
collaboration with Plano Clark (Creswell, 2007, 2009, 2011; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007,
2011; Plano Clark & Creswell, 2007; Plano Clark & Creswell, 2009). Likewise, Creswell is one
of the founding editors of the Journal of Mixed Methods Research, the leading mixed methods
journal. Creswell and Plano Clark are co-directors of the Office of Qualitative and Mixed
Methods Research at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and their expertise is often sought in
providing training and workshops in mixed methods designs (e.g., Creswell, February, 2008;
Plano Clark & Creswell, July, 2011). Their widely regarded textbook (Creswell & Plano Clark,
2007, 2011), is frequently cited by researchers as the source of their mixed methods design (e.g.,
A. Berry, Katras, Sano, Lee, & Bauer, 2008; Davidson, et al., 2008; Davis & Higdon, 2008;
Quan-Haase, 2007; Vitale, Armenakis, & Feild, 2008), suggesting that this textbook and the
chapter under analysis here are fairly representative of the mixed methods community‟s
approach to methodology and design.
Theme: Emergent vs. Fixed Designs. In opening their chapter, Creswell and Plano
Clark acknowledge that mixed methods research can employ both emergent and fixed designs.
Fixed designs are those that determine ahead of time all of the methods and procedures that
researchers will use in conducting their experiment and are more typical in post-positivist
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research. Emergent designs, on the other hand, are those for which the design and procedures
“emerge” throughout the research process as the researchers seek to mold their design to the
dynamic and unfolding contextual demands of the research situation. Accordingly, emergent
designs are more typical in interpretivist research. Creswell and Plano Clark state that both types
of designs are important, but go on to only describe fixed designs, hinting at a possible bias
toward post-positivism rather than the integration or even co-equal status of post-positivism and
interpretivism.
Moreover, fixed designs lend themselves more readily to abstractionism. For example,
they appear to be self-contained (with no loose ends for “emergence”), with their essential
qualities already accounted for and prescribed. Context then can fill in the details as the design
is applied, but the basic character of the design is independent of any particular research context.
Likewise, fixed designs presume a sort of universalism—they are universal to particular types of
research situations (thus Creswell‟s term “typology”) and they neglect the inherent changeability
of research situations that a relational ontology would suggest.
According to the authors, they limit themselves to fixed designs because their emphasis
here is on planned research and because the “linear and fixed nature of printed text” (p. 55) is
inadequate for an exposition of emergent designs. However, the authors chose this emphasis and
could have just as well described emergent possibilities throughout the research process.
Likewise, other methodologists have successfully described emergent designs in printed text
(e.g., Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010). Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) could have at least
provided a case example of an emergent study (as they did with the fixed designs they outline) to
illustrate emergent possibilities, but they did not. Thus, the authors appear to pay lip service to
emergent designs (and their relational implications), but go on to exclusively feature fixed
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designs. Had the authors assumed a relational ontology they likely would have featured a fuller
exploration of emergent designs, particularly considering how oriented emergent designs are
toward context. Likewise, in discussing fixed designs they would take particular care to discuss
how fixed designs will likely need to be adapted and “rewritten” to address the contextual
demands of a given research situation.
Theme: “Mixed” worldview designs: Convergent parallel designs. This first category of
designs draws upon what Creswell and Plano Clark call “mixed” worldviews (meaning they mix
qualitative and quantitative methods in a single worldview) and is made up of convergent
parallel designs. Convergent parallel designs, the most common mixed methods design
according to the authors, are designs in which qualitative and quantitative data are collected at
the same time with each strand of research addressing the same research question. The data are
collected in parallel, meaning that they are collected simultaneously, but separately. The
convergence of the two data strands, then, takes place in the overall interpretation of the data,
typically in the discussion section of the write-up. The authors stress that in these designs the
qualitative and quantitative strands should have equal importance in answering the research
question—neither should provide a “dominant” methodology.
Creswell and Plano Clark acknowledge that placing equal importance on the qualitative
and quantitative strands of convergent parallel designs raises significant philosophical challenges
regarding how to relate interpretivism and post-positivism. They state: “Instead of trying to
„mix‟ different paradigms, we recommend that researchers who use this design work from a
paradigm such as pragmatism to provide an „umbrella‟ paradigm to the research study” (p. 78).
In other words, the authors are advocating that researchers rely upon a single worldview, albeit a
worldview which they identify as “mixed” in orientation. This move toward pragmatism in
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many senses sidesteps the question of how to relate post-positivism and interpretivism and also
invokes many of the same ontological issues that come from the “third” worldview approaches
(specifically pragmatism) discussed above.
Accordingly, several features of convergent parallel designs suggest that these designs
rely on an abstractionist ontology. By importing qualitative and quantitative methods into a new
“umbrella” worldview, convergent parallel designs invoke the abstractionist trio of essentialism,
atomism, and universalism. They assume that the methods are essentially the same under the
new worldview, because they carry with them their essential characteristics. Likewise, in order
to retain their essential qualities from one worldview to the next, methods must be atomistically
self-contained. That is, the methods do not depend on anything outside of themselves (such as
the worldview context of a research situation) for their identity. What is implied here is that
methods can be universal to any worldview. Thus, Creswell and Plano Clark give no indication
that there is any essential change to these methods when the two strands of data are “converged”
at the interpretation stage, suggesting that they continue to retain their basic essence.
Abstractionism (and essentialism in particular) is particularly evident here because convergent
parallel designs include those that involve researchers translating qualitative data into
quantitative data for a converging quantitative analysis. The quantitized data are assumed to
retain their basic essence from their qualitative form, despite their massive reduction from textual
data to numbers.
Furthermore, convergent parallel designs assume that relationships must be based on
sameness. This need for sameness is seen most prominently in Creswell and Plano Clark‟s
argument that researchers should adopt a single “umbrella” worldview rather than relate
interpretivism and post-positivism. One of the major justifications they give for sidestepping
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relating the two worldviews is because they are too different—they diverge too significantly on
key issues. In other words, they see the differences between the worldviews as preventing an
adequate relationship between the two and instead they turn to a single worldview that
emphasizes points of sameness between qualitative and quantitative methods. Beyond
worldview considerations, these designs require an emphasis on sameness across the qualitative
and quantitative research strands. The authors emphasize that in order to converge the findings
at the interpretation stage, it is important for both strands to be in lockstep with one another in
the ways that they define the phenomena under consideration. This imperative ignores that there
are often important differences between qualitative and quantitative approaches to
conceptualizing their object of study. Quantitative methods tend to favor precise definitions
(typically operational definitions geared toward quantitative measurement) of the object of study
at the outset. On the other hand, many qualitative methods begin with a working definition
(typically linguistic) of the phenomenon, fully expecting the ensuing data collection and
interpretation to revise and inform the definition along the way. Thus, these practices encourage
researchers to treat these methods as if they are more similar and to ignore important differences,
all in the name of making them more relatable to one another.
It is true that Creswell and Plano Clark acknowledge that the two strands of research in
convergent parallel designs may result in divergent findings, which divergence may at times be
insightful. However, the authors nevertheless point to the importance for researchers to resolve
such divergence, typically with further data collection. Although resolving divergent findings
may be one fruitful option, the authors ignore the possibility that emphasizing the differences
and mining these differences for what they can say about the phenomenon under consideration
might often be an appropriate and illuminating option. Moreover, resolving divergence with
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further data collection begs the question of what type of data should be collected: qualitative,
quantitative, or both? In fact, divergent findings may sometimes occur because of important
differences between the methodologies. Hence, choosing one method to resolve differences may
in reality be merely ignoring differences—the differences emerge from the methods as much as
(or more than) from the findings.
Had the authors assumed a relational ontology they likely would not have defaulted to a
single worldview like pragmatism, but would have sought to preserve worldview differences by
advocating that interpretivism and post-positivism ground the qualitative and quantitative strands
respectively and then relate these strands in terms of these differences. Furthermore, they would
have assumed that methods are shaped by their worldview contexts and would have explored
how methods might be impacted by coming up against a different worldview, either in
pragmatism or in the “integration” of the two strands at the interpretation stage. In order to
assure that both worldviews were indeed represented, the authors also would have explored how
differences between the worldviews and their methods matter to their identities and would have
sought to preserve these differences. Furthermore, the may have also considered ways that
divergent findings could be understood in terms of worldview differences and encouraged
researchers to explore these differences rather than merely seeking to resolve them.
Theme: “Multiple worldview” designs—Explanatory and exploratory sequential
designs. Explanatory and exploratory sequential designs, according to the authors, are twophased mixed methods designs that are intended to draw upon multiple worldviews. Explanatory
sequential designs begin with a quantitative phase that addresses the primary research questions
and then is followed by a qualitative phase, which is geared toward explaining the quantitative
results in greater depth. Conversely, exploratory sequential designs begin with a primary
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qualitative phase which is followed by a quantitative phase aimed at generalizing the qualitative
findings. This design is often employed to develop quantitative measures of phenomena
originally observed qualitatively.
Creswell and Plano Clark argue that these designs draw upon multiple worldviews, by
employing the respective worldviews in sequence. They acknowledge that it will be tempting
for researchers to default to the primary worldview and they admonish researchers to make a
shift to the alternate worldview when shifting to the other methodology. However, this approach
to integration implies a sort of atomistic independence, where each phase of research is selfcontained. The trouble is that Creswell and Plano Clark do not explain how to make this shift or
how to relate the two worldviews if the shift is made. Rather, they give procedural explanations
for how the second phase is informed by the findings of the first phase, as if the two phases are
already compatible. By making the shift procedural, without attending to the philosophical
challenges that are also implied, they risk the possibility that no true shift in worldview will take
place (see Chapter 2 on methodological eclecticism).
Instead, it is more likely that rather than relating methods from multiple worldviews,
researchers will default to a single dominant worldview for the entire study as they formulate an
overall conception and purpose for the study (which indeed is what we see in the studies
employing these designs covered below in the “Methods” section of this analysis). In fact, from
the authors‟ discussion of these two designs it appears that the designs likely have a postpositivist bent. The explanatory sequential design, according to Creswell and Plano Clark, is
better suited for post-positivist researchers because it emphasizes quantitative methods. The
qualitative methods here are more of an “add-on” to provide in-depth description of what has
been explored quantitatively. Likewise, although they identify qualitative methods as the
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primary method in exploratory designs, they describe how the typical purposes of these designs
are to pursue post-positivistic goals: identifying variables for quantitative research and
developing quantitative measures. The dominance of post-positivism suggests an
unacknowledged universalism—the values of post-positivism are implicitly universal in these
designs, even where qualitative methods are employed.
By avoiding the discussion of how to relate the two methodological phases and likely
ending up with a single dominant worldview, the authors appear to also be assuming that
relationships are based on sameness. They do not discuss how to relate truly post-positivist and
truly interpretivist research strands in ways that draw on their differences because they have no
language for it. Likewise, the dominance of post-positivism in these designs betrays that fact
that the differences that an alternative worldview could have brought are ultimately ignored.
Thus, the risk for these “multiple worldview” designs is that one methodological
worldview (typically interpretivism) may become subservient to the other (typically postpositivism) and ultimately subsumed by the dominant worldview. Thus, these designs do not in
fact invoke and relate multiple worldviews, but instead are more likely to point to a single
worldview. My analysis above suggests that this dominance of a single worldview is the result
of an underlying abstractionist ontology in these designs, as evidenced by assumptions of
atomism, universalism, and sameness. Had the authors assumed a relational ontology they likely
would have taken greater care that the two strands in these designs be grounded in different
worldviews, post-positivism and interpretivism. To ensure that multiple worldviews are indeed
implemented, the authors would have explored in greater depth the differences between these
two worldviews, including where their respective assumptions might lead to certain
incompatibilities that could prevent a seamless crossover from one strand to the next. Indeed,
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they would have explored how relationships based on these differences might be a way of
interfacing the two methodologies rather than demanding that they be compatible based on
similarities. Furthermore, they likely would have laid out dilemmas that might arise in the
transition from one strand to the next and explored how researchers can make critically informed
decisions about shifting from one worldview‟s conception of a phenomenon to that of the other
worldview. A relational approach also would likely have led the authors to provide several
examples to illustrate how researchers have responded to such situations based on the contextual
demands of the research situation.
Theme: Dominant worldview designs—Embedded designs, transformative designs.
Creswell and Plano Clark identify embedded and transformative designs as mixed methods
designs that employ a single dominant worldview. They describe embedded designs as those
that employ a traditional qualitative or quantitative design, but that mix methods by including
quantitative or qualitative data to answer a secondary question in the service of the overarching
dominant research design. For example, a researcher may collect supplementary qualitative data
in order to inform and improve recruitment in an overarching quantitative design. According to
the authors, the worldview of the dominant methodology should be used to ground the entire
study. Although the embedding of alternative data can take place within qualitative and
quantitative designs, the authors acknowledge that in practice the majority of embedded designs
involve embedding qualitative data within quantitative experimental designs under the guidance
of a post-positivist worldview.
Transformative designs are those mixed methods designs that employ a transformative
worldview throughout a study, including the design of the study. The transformative worldview
is “a framework for advancing the needs of underrepresented or marginalized populations” (p.
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96). According to Creswell and Plano Clark, the researcher may use a variety of research
procedures that are similar or identical to those that the authors describe under other names.
However, the key feature of the transformative design is that the researcher is approaching the
design according to what research decisions will best empower marginalized populations and
encourage social justice-oriented change. In this sense, the authors consider the transformative
worldview a research paradigm rather than merely a theory orienting the content of a study
because it is employed to inform research design decisions as well (cf. Mertens, 2007).
Although embedded and transformative designs employ both qualitative and quantitative
data, they do not attempt to integrate post-positivist and interpretivist worldviews. Instead they
incorporate the two types of methods within a single dominant worldview. As we have already
seen with other one-worldview designs, these dominant worldview designs imply an underlying
atomism and essentialism because they assume that self-contained qualitative or quantitative
methods can be imported into alternative worldviews and still retain the basic essence that makes
them what they are. Furthermore, these designs default to an assumption of universalism
because they treat research situations as if a single worldview is universally applicable. They do
not guide researchers to be sensitive to changing contexts as a relational approach would suggest.
Transformative designs, for example, do not caution researchers to be aware of instances where
social justice concerns should recede into the background. Likewise, embedded designs do not
point to instances where researchers should engage the alternative worldview rather than merely
using alternative procedures within the dominant worldview. Indeed, it is telling that embedded
designs are primarily used with a post-positivist orientation, suggesting that many researchers
may be assuming a universal post-positivism, despite their use of mixed methods.
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Likewise, because they employ a single worldview, methods in these designs are related
based on sameness rather than difference. Embedded designs focus on the way that
supplementary methods can be put to the same purposes dictated by the overarching design. The
supplementary methods are included not because they provide a contrasting worldview, but
because the supplement the existing worldview. Correspondingly, transformative designs focus
on similarities based in social justice goals—whatever methods offer in pursuit of these goals is
included, all else is discarded. Hence, transformative designs do not engage alternative
worldviews (e.g., interpretivism or post-positivism) that are not explicitly concerned with social
justice.
Had Creswell and Plano Clark employed a relational ontology there likely would have
been several important differences. First, they would have discussed how importing methods
from their original worldview into an alternative worldview necessarily changes the method
because it has changed its context. In other words, they would have emphasized how methods‟
identities are contextual and explored how researchers must adjust methods to the demands of a
new worldview. Likewise, they would have cautioned researchers against defaulting to a single
worldview with these designs, as if their chosen worldview is universal. Rather, they may have
suggested that researchers (at least in the planning stage of design) consider the merits of several
worldviews for making sense of their phenomenon of interest before concluding that a single
dominant worldview (post-positivist, interpretivist, transformative, or otherwise) is the
appropriate fit in that particular instance. Furthermore, they likely would have cautioned that,
contrary to the goals of mixed methods, these single worldview designs limit the diversity of
methods available to researchers and recommended that researchers implement these designs as
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part of a broader program of research that engages and relates multiple worldviews with diverse
methods.
Summary. This analysis of the methodology of mixed methods, as typified by Creswell
and Plano Clark‟s (2011) chapter on research designs, has indicated that an abstractionist
ontology is at play in mixed methods methodology. Although they attempt to engage a variety
of worldviews in mixed methods research, this analysis has suggested that Creswell and Plano
Clark do not demonstrate how multiple worldviews (particularly post-positivism and
interpretivism) are meaningfully related in these designs. Instead, each class of research design
has been shown to ultimately employ only a single worldview, even where the authors have
suggested otherwise. Thus, not only have they failed to engage more than one worldview, but
they have removed any possibility of relating worldviews as mixed methods demands because
such a relationship requires multiple worldviews. Likewise, the authors treat the methods in
these designs as if they are self-contained atoms that can carry their basic essence from one
worldview to the next without any essential change to their identity in the new worldview
context.
This treatment differs fundamentally from a relational ontology because the relational
approach would see methods as necessarily contextual, deriving their identities in relationship to
their worldview context. Thus, relationality would demand that methods change in fundamental
ways as they are adapted to new worldview contexts. Likewise, a relational ontology would
have sought to preserve a plurality of worldviews in these designs by demonstrating and drawing
upon an awareness of important differences between worldviews. Indeed, a relational approach
would likely have led the authors to offer a much fuller explanation of how researchers might
relate the two strands of research in these designs, particularly in terms of their differences.

88
These differences would be essential because the goal for relationists would be to ensure that
they are in fact relating two different worldviews and not merely importing new procedures into
a single dominant worldview.
Methods. Thus far this analysis has indicated that writings addressing the worldviews
and methodologies of mixed methods are founded on an abstractionist ontology. However, the
question remains whether this abstractionism comes through in the practical application of mixed
methods designs or whether mixed methods researchers are more relational in their actual
experimentation. Because of the vastness of the literature comprised of studies employing mixed
methods designs, I have limited my analysis to five studies identified by Creswell and Plano
Clark (2011) as exemplars of the five types of mixed methods designs that they address in their
textbook and discussed above: convergent parallel designs (Wittink, Barg, & Gallo, 2006),
explanatory sequential designs (Ivankova & Stick, 2007), exploratory sequential designs (Myers
& Oetzel, 2003), embedded designs (Brady & O‟Regan, 2009), and transformative designs
(Hodgkin, 2008). These studies represent not only the design typology provided by Creswell and
Plano Clark (2011), but are likewise representative of other prominent classifications of mixed
methods designs (e.g., Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009; Morgan, 1998; Teddlie & Tashakkori,
2009; Teddlie & Yu, 2007) and broadly encompass the types of designs being employed in the
mixed methods literature. Thus, these articles represent the breadth of mixed methods research
designs and are recognized as “textbook” instances of those designs by leading mixed methods
scholars Creswell and Plano Clark (2011).
I will take each study in turn and, following a synopsis of the study in question, I will
provide an analysis of how the article approaches integrating the qualitative and quantitative
strands of the study. In this analysis I will first attend to whether and how the article addresses
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the worldview(s) at play in the study, including any discussion of integrating or otherwise
relating worldviews. I will also discuss whether and how the article addresses the manner in
which the worldviews at play impact the methods used in the study. These discussions of
worldview issues will be essential in distinguishing whether a study is employing an
abstractionist ontology or a relational ontology. This is because a relational ontology will
assume that worldview contexts play a major role in defining what a method is. Thus, relationists
likewise assume that it is necessary to explain the role of worldviews in order to make clear how
and why methods were employed in particular ways, especially where this involves using
methods in the context of alternative worldviews. Conversely, an abstractionist ontology is not
likely to address any issues arising from the application or integration of a method to an
alternative worldview because (as is now familiar) they assume that methods are:
1. atomistically self-contained and independent of worldview contexts,
2. portable from worldview to worldview because they retain their basic essence,
3. and universal or unchanging across worldview contexts.
Thus, the manner in which a study deals with (or fails to deal with) worldviews will serve as an
indicator of whether they are approaching methods under the relational assumptions of holism,
contextualism, and changeability or under the abstractionist assumptions of atomism,
essentialism, and universalism. Where relevant, I will also address whether the integration of the
quantitative and qualitative strands is based on relationships of sameness or difference.
Convergent parallel design: “Unwritten rules of talking to doctors about depression:
Integrating qualitative and quantitative methods.” As an exemplar of a convergent parallel
design, Creswell and Plano Clark selected Wittink, Barg, and Gallo‟s 2006 study on older
patients‟ communications with their physicians about depression. Recall that convergent parallel
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designs are those that employ separate and simultaneous qualitative and quantitative research
strands, with integration of the results taking place at the interpretation stage, typically in the
discussion section of the study.
This study investigated older patients (age 65 and older) who self-identified as depressed.
In the quantitative strand patients were surveyed using various measures of patient
characteristics, including depressive symptoms and functional status; their doctors were asked to
rate the level of the patients‟ depression. Patients whose doctors rated them as depressed were
compared to those whose doctors rated them as not depressed and no significant differences were
found, except for a small age difference between the two groups. In the qualitative strand
patients were interviewed using a semi-structured format on their experiences communicating
with their physicians about their emotions. Analyses of these interviews revealed four primary
themes:
1. “My doctor just picked it up” (patients did not bring up depression, but the doctor did,
possibly reading non-verbal cues)
2. “I‟m a good patient” (patients reported playing a role of being happy and cooperative and
thus did not bring up their depression)
3. “They just check out your heart and things” (patients believed that physicians are only
concerned with physical symptoms, not emotional symptoms)
4. “They‟ll just send you to a psychiatrist” (patients reported reluctance to bring up
depression because they worry that their physician would not be comfortable talking
about depression and “turf” them to a psychiatrist)
Integration. The authors did not address the worldviews guiding their methods, including
whether they employed pragmatism or some other “umbrella” worldview as Creswell and Plano
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Clark (2011) advise. If anything, their study seemed more oriented toward a post-positivist
worldview, with qualitative results viewed in terms of the generalized themes they offered rather
than the richer contextualized descriptions of patients‟ experiences they might also have offered.
Likewise, the researchers did not provide any discussion of how the methods were affected by
the worldview or worldviews guiding the study, suggesting that their implementation of this
design retains the abstractionist assumptions discussed in the “Methodologies” section.
Instead, the researchers emphasized the two methodologies as hypothesis testing
(quantitative) and hypothesis generating (qualitative). As discussed previously, this
characterization of qualitative and quantitative methods is further evidence that the study is
solely relying on a post-positivist worldview, with qualitative methods merely laying the
groundwork for the eventual (and epistemologically more important) quantitative hypothesis
testing. Likewise, it appears that the researchers are emphasizing the methods‟ sameness based
on an orientation toward hypotheses, rather than differences (many qualitative researchers see
qualitative methods as having little to do with hypotheses and prediction). The authors did
attempt to integrate the two strands by including a table that depicted columns based on each
qualitative theme and rows providing descriptive statistics of the “patient characteristics” for
those groups of patients that expressed each theme. However, the authors did not offer any
discussion of how these qualitative and quantitative data relate to one another nor did they
conduct any statistical analyses using these groupings based on the qualitative data. Thus, the
table does not actually provide an integrative interpretation of the data so much as present them
in a way that may allow the reader to extrapolate how they might relate to one another. In fact,
in their discussion section the authors talked less about an integration of their data and more
about how the qualitative data revealed helpful information about differences within the sample
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that were not indicated by the quantitative data. In this sense, they seem to be saying that the
qualitative method was more sensitive than the quantitative method, essentially dividing them
based on a lack of sameness rather than relating them in terms of how they mutually enrich their
understanding.
Hence, it appears that this study was based on an abstractionist ontology. First, there was
no real integration of the data so much as the data were rather presented side by side. Second,
the authors did not address worldviews, nor did they indicate how their methods changed in the
context of a new worldview. And third, both the qualitative and quantitative strands of the study
appear to have been approached through a post-positivist worldview and related in terms of
sameness. Had the authors assumed a relational ontology they would have taken greater care to
ground the two strands of their study in post-positivism and interpretivism and to explain the
different ways that these worldviews guided each strand. Likewise, they would have explored
how the context of multiple worldviews might have created tensions between their methods and
possibly led to adaptations in the methods. Perhaps most importantly, the authors would have
more fully explored the relationship between their two strands of data by placing them in
conversation with one another, highlighting where they complement one another as well as
where they diverge.
Explanatory Sequential Design: “Students’ persistence in a distributed doctoral
program in educational leadership in higher education: A mixed methods study.” As an
example of the explanatory sequential design, Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) chose Ivankova
and Stick‟s 2007 study examining the factors contributing to students‟ persistence in a
distributed (or distance-based) doctoral program. The explanatory sequential design begins with
a quantitative strand and is then followed by a qualitative strand that is intended to further
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explain the results of the quantitative strand. In this study, the quantitative strand involved a
survey of 278 current and former students in the University of Nebraska-Lincoln‟s distributed
doctoral program in Educational Leadership in Higher Education. A factor analysis of this data
resulted in five factors that were predictive of students‟ persistence in the program:
1. “program”
2. “online learning environment”
3. “student support services”
4. “faculty”
5. “self-motivation.”
The researchers followed the quantitative strand with a qualitative strand that further
explored the experiences of four students. One student each was selected from the pool of newer
students, matriculated students, program graduates, and withdrawn students. These students
were selected using statistical procedures to ensure that they were both statistically representative
of the groups from which they were drawn and that they represented maximal variation of the
overall sample of students. The four students were interviewed using semi-structured interviews
and researchers analyzed archival materials including online archives of classes the students had
participated in and notes and pictures the students submitted to the researchers. Analyses of
these interviews and other materials revealed four principle themes related to students‟
persistence in the program:
1. “quality of academic experiences”
2. “online learning environment”
3. “support and assistance”
4. “student self-motivation”
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Integration. In step with Creswell and Plano Clark‟s (2011) advice that researchers using
this design first orient themselves according to a post-positivist worldview, this study was
principally post-positivist with its focus on predictive factors and providing generalizable
descriptions of what impacts students‟ persistence in the program. However, when it came to
integrating the qualitative element of the study, rather than shifting to an interpretivist
perspective as Creswell and Plano Clark advise, Ivankova and Stick (2007) appear to approach
their qualitative data as merely an extension of their quantitative data and to view the qualitative
data through a post-positivistic lens. This is perhaps not surprising considering that Creswell and
Plano Clark (2011) offer little guidance regarding how to make such a shift, as mentioned above.
There are several indications that Ivankova and Stick (2007) oriented their qualitative
research strand according to a post-positivist worldview. For example, the researchers selected
their qualitative participants based on post-positivist values of representativeness and
generalizability. They likewise oriented their analysis and findings toward generalizable themes,
which they treated as if they applied to the broader sample of students, again emphasizing
generality over particularity. Consequentially, they were less concerned with providing a rich
account of the experiences of persisting or failing to persist in the program as an interpretivist
worldview might have dictated. Thus, there is a sense that the two strands are “integrated”
because they are approached through the same post-positivistic worldview, but it appears that the
researchers did not integrate or otherwise relate post-positivism and interpretivism.
Likewise, the researchers did not provide any discussion or other indication that they
approached their qualitative methods any differently from a post-positivist framework. Rather,
in step with an abstractionist ontology, they treated their qualitative methods as if they were
essentially the same within a post-positivist worldview as they are within an interpretivist
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worldview. Thus, this study also appears to have assumed an abstractionist ontology, lacking
any meaningful relating of worldviews or sensitivity to the impact of worldview contexts on
methods. Had they assumed a relational ontology the authors would have at least offered a
justification for only employing post-positivism and explained how their qualitative methods
were altered to their post-positivist context. More likely, however, relationality would have led
them to conceptualize their qualitative strand from a truly interpretivist perspective and to more
fully distinguish this strand from the quantitative strand. They may have approached their
qualitative sampling more in terms of selection methods that would help them get at the sorts of
experiences that they want to understand instead of focusing on generalizability. They also
would have offered a discussion of how these different worldviews shed light on students‟
persistence in the program from very different perspectives, drawing particular attention to how
the two perspectives speak to one another in terms of these differences.
Exploratory Sequential Design: “Exploring the dimensions of organizational
assimilation: Creating and validating a measure.” To exemplify exploratory sequential designs
Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) selected Myers and Oetzel‟s 2003 study that created and
validated a measure of organizational assimilation (the degree to which a person has assimilated
with an organization such as an employing business). Exploratory sequential designs begin with
a qualitative strand and are followed by a quantitative strand, building upon the quantitative
findings. As is the case with this study, the design is most frequently employed to devise a
quantitative measure.
In this study the researchers first interviewed 13 individuals of various ages, employment
histories, and organization types on their experiences of assimilation in their organization as well
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as on their observations generally of how they have seen others assimilate or fail to assimilate.
From these interviews the researchers identified six dimensions of organizational assimilation:
1. “familiarity with others”
2. “organizational acculturation”
3. “recognition”
4. “involvement”
5. “job competency”
6. “adaptive/role negotiation”
Based on these qualitative findings the researchers then devised a questionnaire with
multiple questions representing each of these six dimensions of organizational assimilation.
They surveyed 342 participants from a variety of organizations using their measure as well as
three other scales, which were used for validation purposes. The researchers then used
confirmatory factor analysis to test the content validity of the items and to winnow out any items
that had a factor loading below .40. They likewise performed tests of validity, demonstrating
that, as predicted, their scale correlated positively with measures of job satisfaction and
organizational identification and negatively with a measure of propensity to leave.
Integration. Although Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) advise that researchers using
exploratory sequential designs begin with an interpretive worldview and then shift to a postpositivist worldview, it appears that Myers and Oetzel (2003) relied solely on post-positivism to
orient their study and integrate their data. Rather than trying to get inside of interviewee‟s
experiences themselves, the researchers appeared to be using these experiences as a means of
getting at the “construct” of organizational assimilation that they presumed to lie behind those
experiences.
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This qualitative exploration was intended to identify “dimensions” rather than experiences and
was ultimately intended to result in a quantitative measure. Thus, the qualitative methods were
used for ultimately quantitative purposes and were not employed according to an interpretivist
worldview. Furthermore, because they employed only one worldview, the researchers were
unable to integrate or relate post-positivism and interpretivism. Accordingly, integration in this
study occurred as the qualitative data were used to generate the “dimensions” or “factors” of
organizational assimilation as well as the questionnaire items.
It appears that Myers and Oetzel have assumed an abstractionist ontology in their study.
As with the two previous studies I have discussed, they offered no indication that their methods
were changed or adapted to fit the new worldview. Likewise, they did not attempt to relate
worldviews and where they did relate qualitative and quantitative methods it was based on the
sameness provided by a single post-positivistic worldview. A relational ontology may have led
this study in several different directions. First, the researchers likely would have considered
whether organizational assimilation is more the sort of phenomenon that naturally lends itself to
counting or to linguistic description rather than assuming that their goal from the outset was to
quantitize organizational assimilation. In other words, they would have adopted methods
according to the contextual demands of organizational assimilation rather than assuming a postpositivistic framework by default. Assuming that they did find contextual justification for
qualitative and quantitative exploration, the authors would have approached their qualitative
strand first and foremost in terms of how it made sense of interviewee‟s experiences of
organizational assimilation. Likewise, in transitioning to the quantitative strand, the authors
likely would have discussed the philosophical decisions they faced in moving from rich textual
interviews to thinner and more general themes to numerical scores. They also would have
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cautioned their readers about the dangers of confusing these “thin” and abstract representations
of organizational assimilation with respondent‟s actual lived experiences and offered their
instrument only as a rough heuristic that should only be used in light of other contextual
information.
Embedded Design: “Meeting the challenge of doing an RCT evaluation of youth
mentoring in Ireland: A journey in mixed methods.” For their exemplar of embedded designs
Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) selected Brady and O‟Reagan‟s 2009 account of their journey
developing a mixed methods RCT evaluation of the Big Brothers Big Sisters program in Ireland.
Embedded designs are those that employ a traditional qualitative or quantitative design, but that
mix methods by including quantitative or qualitative data to answer a secondary question in the
service of the overarching dominant research design. This article is unique among Creswell and
Plano Clark‟s (2011) exemplars in that it does not describe the results of the experiment, but
rather provides a case study of a research team‟s process in developing their research design,
eventuating in an embedded mixed methods design.
In this article, Brady and O‟Reagan (2009) explored the challenges in meeting their
funding agency‟s preference for RCTs, citing the design‟s methodological rigidity and relative
unfamiliarity in evaluation in Ireland as particularly challenging. The authors described three
phases in the development of their design. In the first phase they initially designed their study
attending to the demands of the RCT methodology and grappled with the limitations they faced
in their particular research situation (ethical, practical, scientific). Specifically they were
concerned with the ethical implications of assigning some youth to receive no mentoring and the
practical demands of recruiting enough participants in the one region of the country where the
program was sufficiently well established.
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The researchers had received multiple requests from the service providers that they be
given an opportunity to offer qualitative feedback as part of the evaluation, so in the second
phase they looked at incorporating an embedded qualitative strand. This qualitative strand, they
explained, would allow them to supplement their primary research question regarding the
outcomes of this mentoring program with a complimentary inquiry into the mentoring processes
that would lead to these outcomes. Thus, this qualitative strand addressed two additional
research questions regarding how the program is experienced by stakeholders and how the
program is implemented.
When consultants were concerned that this qualitative piece could spin off on its own and
lack integration with the quantitative piece, they moved into the third phase in which they
anchored these strands of research to a theoretical model of mentoring and added a research
question that pointed toward integration. Specifically, they asked “What results emerge
regarding the potential of this youth mentoring program from comparing the outcome data from
the impact study with the case study data from the mentoring pairs?”
Integration. Because the article only describes the design phase of the study and not the
actual results or interpretation, it is difficult to speak to the actual integration of the qualitative
and quantitative research strands. Nevertheless, unlike the previous studies I have so far
analyzed, Brady and O‟Reagan did provide some discussion of the worldviews orienting their
study. They described a process of beginning in pragmatism where they focused on the fit of
their methods to their research questions and then moving to a dialectic worldview where they
poised the two methods to speak to one another in relationship. They did not, however, discuss
the way that pragmatism or dialectics relates to the original worldviews of their qualitative and
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quantitative methods, nor do they indicate whether there is any relational impact on one method
or the other as it comes in contact with a new worldview.
It is possible that the authors intend for their dialectic stance to describe a dialectic
relationship between the worldviews of post-positivism and interpretivism, rather than a dialectic
relationship of qualitative and quantitative procedures within a single worldview. However, they
do not indicate that such is the case and they speak of dialectics as the worldview grounding the
study rather than a framework for relating worldviews. Nevertheless, this dialectic stance leaves
open the possibility that the authors are open to relationships of difference, although it remains to
be seen whether they will actually employ relationships of difference or will rather default to
relationships of sameness.
Furthermore, the authors did discuss how they employed a theoretical model to unite the
qualitative and quantitative research questions. That is, the data from the two strands were
expected to speak to various facets of a theory about the impact of youth mentorship. However,
the authors did not indicate that this theory shows any promise of integrating the post-positivist
and interpretivist worldviews. They only suggest that both strands can shed light on the theory.
As we have seen in previous examples, it is quite possible to apply the data to inform a theory
through the lens of a single worldview rather than through multiple worldviews in relationship.
Considering that embedded designs, according to Creswell and Plano Clark (2011), typically rely
on a single dominant worldview, it is very possible that this study will employ the single lens of
the RCT‟s post-positivist worldview rather than relating post-positivism and interpretivism.
This study then, shows some potential signs of a relational ontology, but it remains to be
seen whether the authors‟ final approach will actually be relational or whether it will instead
assume an abstractionist ontology. Perhaps the key question for this study is whether the authors
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will be able to truly approach each strand of the study from the founding worldview of the
method they are using and then relate these strands in a way that preserves their worldview
differences. I have noted that there are some indications that they could end up employing a
single worldview. If this is the case, then from a relational approach they would want to offer
contextual justification for why a single worldview made sense for their study and describe how
the new worldview context altered their methods.
Transformative Design: “Telling it all: A story of women’s social capital using a mixed
methods approach.” Creswell and Plano Clark‟s (2011) exemplar of a transformative design is
Hodgkin‟s 2008 study on women‟s social capital, a construct referring to a person‟s involvement
in community relationships. Transformative designs are those that employ any configuration of
both qualitative and quantitative research strands and are oriented to the transformative
worldview (emphasizing social justice in each stage of research). In this particular study,
Hodgkin was concerned that previous research on social capital had largely been oriented to a
White, middle class, male conception of social capital and she wanted to investigate whether
there might be differences and even inequities in women‟s social capital that had heretofore gone
unexamined.
She began by conducting a survey of both men and women on which participants
indicated their frequency of participation in social, community, and civic activities. Hodgkin
conducted statistical analyses that indicated that there were indeed differences in the social
capital profiles of women as compared to men, with women participating in more social
activities overall, women more likely to engage in informal activities, and men more likely to
engage in formal activities. In the second phase of the study she interviewed 12 of the women
from the first phase in order to try to understand the motivations behind these women‟s
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participation in civic activities. Themes emerging from the interviews revealed a variety of
motivations for women to engage in social and civic activities. First, some women believed that
being socially engaged was their duty as “a good mother,” seeing these activities as part of
caring for their children. Second, others used these activities to avoid social isolation, attending
to their own needs. And third, others saw these activities as part of being “a good citizen,”
focusing their motives on the good of their community.
Integration. The integration of the qualitative and quantitative findings in this study took
place through the lens of a single transformative worldview, rather than incorporating an
integration of more than one worldview. That is, the methods were used instrumentally in the
service of the transformative worldview‟s higher values of social justice and giving a voice to the
voiceless. Thus, the author described the quantitative data as “providing the big picture,
revealing a different pattern of participation for men and women” and the qualitative data as
“developing and sharpening this picture, assisting to explain why this may be so” (p. 313). She
likewise characterized the quantitative data as useful in revealing larger patterns of difference
between men and women‟s social capital and the qualitative data as giving a voice to women
regarding their experiences within those patterns. In this sense, Hodgkin uses the transformative
worldview to emphasize points of commonality for relating the two methods—they are both
potentially tools for empowerment. Accordingly, Hodgkin did not indicate whether the methods
were adapted in any way to fit the context of a transformative worldview. Rather, she treated the
methods as if they could be imported into this new worldview without any essential change.
Thus, as with the four previous exemplars, it appears that Hodgkin‟s study is also
undergirded by an abstractionist ontology. She treats her methods as if they operate
independently of any particular worldview context and relates them based on their similarities
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rather than also allowing for their important differences. Had she assumed an abstractionist
ontology the author would have discussed her decision to use a transformative worldview in
contrast with the possibilities of employing post-positivism or interpretivism and explained how
the context of her research problem was best suited to a transformative approach. Furthermore,
she would have also been open to the possibility that her study warranted multiple worldviews,
particularly considering the differences that other worldviews could bring to bear on her research
problem. Likewise, she would have assumed that her methods are constrained by their
worldview contexts and explored how her methods are adapted to fit the transformative
worldview.
Summary. It appears that the authors of these five studies have successfully managed to
use qualitative- and quantitative-like procedures together to address common research problems.
However, with one possible exception, this analysis suggests that their use of multiple methods
has been under the guidance of a single worldview rather than multiple worldviews in
relationship. It is significant to note that, unlike the studies that explicitly stated that they were
using an alternative “third” worldview, the studies that did not discuss their worldview
orientation appeared to be oriented toward post-positivism. This unacknowledged postpositivism corresponds with what I observed in Chapter 2‟s literature review—that many
instances of mixed methods do not appear to draw upon interpretivism, but instead incorporate
textual procedures within the already dominant (and often taken for granted) post-positivistic
worldview.
Given that there was little discussion of the role of worldviews in these articles, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the authors correspondingly offered little discussion of the role that
their orienting worldview plays in contextualizing their use of research methods. Perhaps most
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indicative that these studies assumed an abstractionist ontology, none of the authors indicated
that their methods were impacted in some way by their application within a new worldview
context as a relational ontology would suggest. This assumption that their methods are
unchanged in new worldview contexts suggests they have retained the atomism, essentialism,
and universalism which I have previously identified in the writings on worldview and
methodology.
Likewise, where the authors did attempt to integrate their qualitative and quantitative
findings, they tended to base these relationships on sameness rather than highlighting the
differences that would be so important to a relational approach. The primary way that the
authors made their methods similar was by adapting one or both methods to fit within a single
uniting worldview. In this way, many of the authors were able to treat that data from one strand
of their study as if it was merely an extension of the other strand. Furthermore, the authors did
not explore divergent, contradictory, or otherwise conflicting relationships based on differences
between methodologies as a relational ontology would have indicated. Where they did point to
differences, they were complimentary differences that were more differences of degree rather
than of kind (e.g., hypothesis generation vs. hypothesis testing, breadth vs. depth). It does
remain to be seen, however, whether Brady and O‟Reagan‟s (2009) proposed dialectical
framework will allow them to approach their qualitative and quantitative strands in terms of their
methodological differences and allow these differences to engage one another dialectically.
Conclusion
At the conclusion of my literature review in Chapter 2, I suggested that the reason mixed
methods approaches are struggling to genuinely relate post-positivism and interpretivism could
be because they are assuming a problematic ontology. As this ontological analysis has borne
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out, it appears that mixed methods approaches to integration are largely, if not exclusively,
undergirded by an abstractionist ontology that prevents any meaningful relationship between
these two methodological worldviews that preserves their different identities. This
abstractionism favors an approach to worldviews that treats them as self-contained and
comprehensive, leaving little room for a relationship with an alternative worldview that purports
to be profoundly different. As my analysis has indicated, this abstractionist approach to
worldviews has emerged not only in writings that explicitly address worldview issues, but also
those addressing mixed methods at the methodological and methods levels.
In addition to this approach to worldviews, abstractionism has also led mixed methods
researchers to treat methods themselves as if they are contextless. Perhaps the most common
theme in this analysis has been that mixed methods researchers import methods into alternative
worldviews as if they operate essentially the same in any worldview context. As I have argued
above, this treatment of methods assumes that they are universally applicable across worldviews
because they atomistically contain the essential characteristics that make up their identity, and
therefore they require no further reference or adaptation to worldview contexts to be what they
are. In fact, as I have noted both in Chapter 2 as well as in various points in this analysis, it
appears that qualitative methods in particular end up being modified to fit an alternative postpositivist worldview, but because of these abstractionist assumptions this modification is not
acknowledged.
The primary implication of this analysis is that abstractionism as an ontological
foundation for mixed methods has prevented mixed methods researchers from approaching their
research through multiple worldviews and from drawing relationships between multiple
worldviews that preserve their differences. Accordingly, this abstractionism has prevented
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mixed methods researchers from truly mixing their methods because methods are guided by
worldviews. A possible implication of this failure is that an alternative ontology has a better
chance at approaching mixed methods in a way that is truly based in a plurality of worldviews
rather than a single worldview. In this vein, I propose to explore a relational ontology within
mixed methods to see if it can solve these problems that abstractionism seems to create In my
exposition of abstractionist and relational ontologies in Chapter 3, as well as in my dialectical
analysis in this chapter, I have offered hints at how a relational ontology would approach mixed
methods. My purpose in the next chapter, then, is to conclude this dissertation by more fully
illustrating how a relational ontology would transform mixed methods to be able to draw on the
breadth and diversity that the interpretivist and post-positivist worldviews have to offer.
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Chapter 5: An Ontologically Relational Approach to Mixed Methods
In Chapter 2 I argued that the problem facing mixed methods researchers was that,
despite their intention to integrate methods from differing worldviews, mixed methods
approaches to combining qualitative and quantitative data invariably did not integrate the
worldviews that drive the methods, and thus never did any real “mixing.” I suggested that
seemingly unsolvable problems like this one have often had roots in a problematic ontology and
I proposed an ontological analysis to investigate whether the problem facing mixed methods was
indeed ontological. Thus, in Chapter 3 I laid out the ontological tools necessary for an
ontological analysis of the mixed methods literature and in Chapter 4 I conducted the ontological
analysis. As this analysis revealed, existing mixed methods approaches are indeed founded on
an abstractionist ontology which appears to create this problem of disallowing the meaningful
relating and engaging of two or more methodologies. In conducting this analysis, Chapters 3 and
4 also included a contrasting exploration of a relational ontology and hinted at some of the
implications of an alternative relational approach to mixed methods. Perhaps the biggest
implication has been that a relational ontology might approach mixed methods in a way that
solves their problem—namely in that it appears to allow for a meaningful relating and
engagement of multiple worldviews, and thus meaningful guidance of a type of mixed method.
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to conclude this dissertation with an exploration of
how a relational ontology might help to resolve the dilemma of mixed methods by allowing
researchers to engage and relate multiple worldviews and, thus, truly draw upon a mixture of
methods. Of course, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide researchers with a
comprehensive “how to” manual on a relational approach to research methods. Instead, this
chapter has two goals: First, to coalesce the relational themes already present in previous
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chapters by providing an overview of how a relational approach to research methods would
change mixed methods and help to truly and meaningfully engage divergent methodologies.
Second, to more fully illustrate how relationality helps to solve the problems of mixed methods
by providing an example of a relational approach to a specific mixed method topic.
A Relational Take on the Current Practice of Mixed Methods
In a number of places my ontological analysis indicated that mixed methods writings
often showed relational impulses, even if these were ultimately premised by abstractionism.
Thus, I would like to begin by exploring how relationality might take some of these relational
intentions and see them through in a thoroughly relational fashion. As I have noted previously,
the mixed methods critique of the paradigm wars initially appears to be a critique of an atomistic
approach to worldviews (e.g., Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; see Chapter 4). The paradigm
wars were thought to treat post-positivism and interpretivism as if they are atomistically selfcontained, creating a rift between the two that apparently allows for no relating of the
worldviews or of the respective quantitative and qualitative methods that were associated with
them. Mixed methods researchers reacted to this atomism and criticized these approaches as
unnecessarily insular (Howe, 1988; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2007). They
argued that a researcher should be able to appreciate and draw upon both worldviews and both
types of data, linguistic and numerical.
A relational approach to research would be sympathetic to this critique of the paradigm
wars. Worldviews, according to relationists, are provisional, fallible, and contextual, so treating
them as if one overarching worldview should be able to contain all that is true about the world as
the paradigm wars appeared to do is problematic. Likewise, relationists would agree with mixed
methods advocates that it is essential for researchers to be able to engage and relate more than
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one worldview, if for no other reason than to dialectically reveal their own worldview
assumptions. Moreover, relationists would concede that there is nothing about post-positivism
that rules out linguistic data nor is there anything about interpretivism that rules out numerical
data.
However, from here relationists part ways with current attempts at mixed methods. As
the ontological analysis demonstrated, rather than approaching worldviews tentatively and in
relational plurality, mixed methods researchers have slipped back into a framework of selfcontained and comprehensive worldviews, thus not allowing them a meaningful relation of
worldviews and methods. They proposed new “third” worldviews to subsume all research
situations, but these were merely new worldviews with differing fundamental assumptions from
the older worldviews they were intended to subsume. In other words, the third worldviews did
not simplify, but instead complicated the overall mixed methods picture, including the
abstractionist notion of the self-containment (and thus unrelatability) of all the worldviews.
More often than not, the “subsuming” worldview merely incorporated textual data and analysis
into the existing and familiar post-positivist framework, and thus obliterated truly qualitative
methods. The biggest problem with their overall approach is that they have failed to mix
methods because a true mixed methods requires multiple worldviews (to guide multiple
methods) and a meaningful relating of those diverse worldviews and methods.
Thus, relationists would argue that mixed methods researchers have not actually “mixed”
methods, but instead have managed to liberalize post-positivism by expanding the types of data
and procedures available to post-positivist researchers. That is, they have failed to engage and
relate both interpretivism and post-positivism together, leaving their methods to be guided by a
single worldview and by extension a single family of methods. In fact, there is historical
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precedence for this sort of liberalization of post-positivism. Behaviorist post-positivism in the
early 20th century was based on a very narrow notion of observability which assumed that the
only real and scientifically investigable phenomena were observable behaviors (Gardner, 1987).
Under this behaviorist framework mental phenomena were explained in terms of behaviors:
memory was expressed in terms of behavioral learning and language in terms of “verbal
behaviors” (e.g., Skinner, 1957). The “cognitive revolution,” challenged this narrow rendition of
post-positivism by arguing that scientists can and should be able to study cognitive phenomena
that are not directly observable in the behaviorist tradition (Gardner, 1987). Noam Chomsky
(2002), for example, famously disputed B. F. Skinner‟s (1957) behavioral conception of
language by demonstrating that Skinner‟s theory of language could not account for the
syntactical complexity of language nor the rapid acquisition of grammatical language ability in
young children. Chomsky‟s triumph, in concert with other contemporary cognitivist challenges
to behaviorism (Miller, 2003), was hailed as a “revolution” that challenged psychologists to
broaden their scientific methods to include not only behaviors, but also mental phenomena,
however operationally defined (Gardner, 1987).
Although this “revolution” led to a broadening of post-positivistic practices, it did not
change the basic assumptive framework that makes up the post-positivistic worldview (Bishop,
2005; Yanchar, 2005). Bishop (2005), for example, demonstrated that cognitive psychology
continues to make the same basic assumptions of post-positivism (e.g., empiricism, efficient
causation) in its reaction to the behaviorist notion of science and that this cognitive approach
merely takes a more liberal view on scientific observability than did the behaviorists (cf.
Gardner, 1987). Analogously, my analysis of mixed methods has suggested that their
methodological “revolution” has further liberalized post-positivism by expanding the sorts of

111
procedures available to post-positivist researchers, although they have failed to relate and
employ both post-positivism and interpretivism. Though relationists might applaud this
broadening of post-positivism with its move toward greater diversity within the worldview, they
would nevertheless argue that this falls far short of their actual goal of mixing and relating
methodologies.
One particular worry from a relational perspective about the abstractionist attempt to mix
methods is that it could lead researchers to believe that they use, understand, and integrate both
qualitative and quantitative methodologies, when in fact they only use and understand one
worldview‟s version of using numerical and textual data. Nursing researchers Giddings and
Grant (2007) expressed just this concern, relating a scenario based on their experiences that
illustrates how abstractionist mixed methods can obscure the value and need for interpretivism:
A Masters student from a science department who was using a mixed-methods design for
her dissertation research (survey and semi-structured interviews) was overheard saying to
a faculty member after a research forum in which a hermeneutic phenomenologist had
presented her work: „You know, I don‟t know what they are going on about. Why they go
on into all that philosophical and methodological stuff. I‟m doing qualitative research and
it is pretty straightforward . . . doesn‟t need all that . . .‟ Both walked away looking
somewhat satisfied and somewhat bemused. (p. 201)
The student in this example dismissed an interpretivist qualitative approach because she assumed
that her understanding of qualitative research, as informed by mixed methods approaches, was
sufficient to address any qualitative research situation. Giddings and Grant expressed the worry
that in a similar manner abstractionist attempts at mixed methods will lead to the further
marginalization of truly interpretivist research by guiding researchers, funding agencies,
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academic departments, and policy makers to assume only a post-positivist revision of qualitative
methods and ignore or dismiss the interpretivist worldview, methodology, and methods. If this
becomes the case, mixed methods would not only have failed in making both interpretivism and
post-positivism accessible to researchers, but it would have actually done the opposite by
increasing the dominance of post-positivism and making interpretivism less accessible.
Furthermore, this state of affairs would only further emphasize that abstractionist attempts at
mixed methods have failed to actually mix methods because they have failed to “mix” the
interpretivism that is necessary to have a true “mixture” of methods.
Thus, a relational ontology has great sympathy for the relational intentions of the mixed
methods movement. In step with these intentions, a relational ontology would seek to move
away from the abstractionism implied in the paradigm wars and to increase diversity in the
methods available to researchers. However, the relational approach would seek to rectify the
apparent failures seen in the current abstractionist approach to mixed methods by ensuring that
they are not merely mixing procedures, but actually mixing methods which would require a
relationship of diverse worldviews.
A New Relational Direction
How then would a relational ontology seek to provide a true mixed methods that relates
post-positivism and interpretivism, thus resolving the problems of the paradigm wars? In this
section I will offer eight key features of a relational mixed methods. Each of these features are
integral to relationality‟s possible solution for relating multiple worldviews as the mixed
methods project ultimately requires. In explaining these features, I will attempt to describe some
of the specific practices that a relational ontology would imply for mixed methods researchers
and I will explain how these practices help to preserve a plurality of worldviews (and by
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extension a meaningful mixing of methods). Throughout this discussion it will be important to
recall that abstractions, as opposed to abstractionism, do have a place in a relational ontology
(see Chapter 3). Abstractions are both useful and necessary from a relational perspective
because they allow us to represent and reflect upon facets of our otherwise immensely complex
and boundless lived experience, although they are not viewed as contextless or unchangeable by
context differences. Thus, using language to describe an experience or an idea and using
theories or philosophies to describe an understanding of the world are all important ways that
relationists seek to make sense of the truth about the world. However, relationists assume that
these abstractions are necessarily impoverished, fallible, and incomplete representations of the
world and that they should point back to the richer and more real context of lived experience.
Conversely, abstractionists tend to treat abstractions themselves as if they represent what is really
real and true (and thus unchangeable) about the world. Hence, as we will see in this section,
relationists use abstractions, but do so contextually as opposed to the abstractionist approach
which treats abstractions as independent of context.
Feature 1: Shifting between and relating worldviews requires that researchers have
an awareness of the differences between worldviews in order to avoid simply imposing the
old worldview on a different set of methods. Indeed, the claim that relationships require
difference is one of the key assumptions I have attributed to a relational ontology. This feature
means that researchers need to be aware not only of the ways that worldviews might be
philosophically different, but also how they are practically different. For example, several of the
studies I examined in my ontological analysis used supposedly qualitative methods to generate
generalizations that they could apply to a broader population. A relational researcher would
recognize that these practices are grounded in post-positivism and that an interpretivist practice
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(in its differences from a post-positivist practice) would emphasize and seek out the rich
particularity of specific situations over thinner generalizations. By recognizing these differences
the researcher could more deliberately employ practices that actually draw on multiple
worldviews. To be sure, a relational approach would not rule out a researcher using postpositivist textual methods or interpretivist numerical methods. The point here is that a researcher
should be aware of these worldviews and how they differ so that such a choice can be made
deliberately and according to the contextual demands of the research situation, rather than
through the operations of an unexamined and unacknowledged worldview.
A further implication of this focus on difference in relational mixed methods is that
relational researchers would be reluctant to treat interpretivist and post-positivist strands of a
mixed methods study as if they are talking about the exact same thing. Recognizing that these
worldviews will often lead to different basic assumptions about the nature and identity of the
object of study, relationists would not assume that their approach in one strand would necessarily
translate to their approach in the other strand. Thus, their attempts to relate the two strands
would often involve other sorts of relationships than equation, such as comparison and contrast.
In this sense, the metaphor of “mixing” methods would have limited application here inasmuch
as it implies a blending of interpretivist and post-positivist methods at some point in the study.
For the same reason that American multicultural metaphors have moved from the “melting pot”
to the “tossed salad” (e.g., Bachmann, 2006), relational mixed methods would want to take care
that the distinct identities of the parts not be lost in their part-whole relationships.
This focus on differences implies a number of important research practices for relational
mixed methods. Perhaps most obviously, researchers would make a point of looking for
important worldview differences as they conceptualize, design, and carry out their research to
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ensure that they are holding true to their intended worldviews. Although much of this attention
to differences could occur informally, researchers may find it helpful and important to employ
fidelity checks in which experts on the worldviews in question review their research designs,
analyses, interpretations, and practices to ensure that they are faithful to their intended
worldviews. These fidelity checks could also be helpful in honing in on areas where the
demands of one strand of a mixed study appear to impinge on the normal worldview operations
of the other strand. Although such conflicts between worldviews may result in compromise,
these decisions can be made in consultation with experts and according to the contextual
demands of the object of study rather than by unconscious default to a dominant worldview.
Feature 2: A true plurality of worldviews will probably require a plurality of
worldviewers. That is to say, relationality would not expect that every person should be able to
comprehensively adopt and represent every worldview. This is because a relational ontology
assumes that people, like everything else that exists, are rooted within a particular context, which
context allows for some views of the world and obscures other views of the world. It may be
helpful here to recall the analogy of the horizon I discussed in Chapter 3. From a particular
vantage point we can see off to a horizon, beyond which the landscape nevertheless extends. As
we move toward the horizon, some of that previously obscured landscape comes into view while
other views recede behind the horizon to our backs. This analogy illustrates the relationist claim
that we are always limited in our ability to view the world and that our vantage point both reveals
and conceals aspects of the world. The analogy likewise implies that an effort to gain every view
of the world will be fruitless because each move to a new vantage point opens up certain vistas
and closes down others.
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Moreover, relationists assume that worldviews are “sticky.” That is to say, our
worldviews arise out of the context of our history, culture, family, friends, beliefs, and practices.
Although relationists would understand these contexts to be changeable, dynamic, and in flux,
they would likewise assume that our contexts hang together in “contexts of contexts” and thus
persist in important ways. Take culture for example. Much of a person‟s identity is shaped in
relationship to his or her culture and culture is generally assumed to play a part in a person‟s
view of the world. Although it is possible for a person to encounter and even immerse herself in
another culture, there is often a sense that she carries a certain “nativity” that colors the way she
encounters and interprets this new culture. Of course she can interpret her nativity in a variety of
ways and perhaps she could even be “adopted” into the new culture. These operations of culture
however are always in relation to where she has come from and the context in which she finds
herself. As an adoptee she has likely lost certain views of her native culture and nevertheless
lacks a multitude of other cultural viewpoints. The point here is that according to relationality
we cannot absolutely abstract ourselves from any particular context (like culture) to then enter
into any other context. Our contexts both constrain and enable our views of the world.
The analogy to culture does imply that relationality allows that we can “try on”
alternative worldviews and indeed it is important to the relational researcher to do so. However,
the analogy likewise warns that in trying on alternatives we may nevertheless be prone to
approach them in ways that are shaped and colored by our native worldview. Because of these
contextual constraints on our views of the world, a plurality of worldviewers becomes all the
more important to relational mixed methods. Such a plurality not only provides a diversity of
alternative worldviews for us to “try on,” but it also can place us in relationship with worldview
“natives” who can evaluate and challenge our representations of their perspectives. These
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worldview “natives” would be ideal experts to provide the worldview fidelity checks suggested
with Feature 2. In this light, fidelity checks not only emphasize and ensure a researcher‟s
faithfulness to an intended worldview, but they also relationally engage a plurality of
worldviewers in framing and interpreting a study.
Thus, to approach a truer plurality of worldviews a relational ontology would suggest that
a community of worldviewers can better engage and relate multiple (and more likely diverse)
perspectives. This is perhaps not surprising since relationists would reject the notion that a
plurality of worldviews should be atomistically contained within the perspective of any one
person. Of course, it is possible for a community to form based primarily on similarities in their
worldviews and to ignore or downplay their differences. However, a relational approach would
suggest that truly diverse views would be valuable and important in order to gain a richer
understanding of the world and thus would advocate for communities that draw on difference as
well as similarity (see Slife, 2004a for a fuller discussion of communities based on difference).
In other words, such a community would need to respect and value each other and the
worldviews others bring that are truly different from one‟s own. Likewise, it would be important
to relationists that these communities do not become “atoms” themselves. Because communities
and community members get their worldviews by virtue of their relationships to other
worldviewers, it would be important that community members partake in a variety of
communities and that communities overlap in important ways. Thus, just as relationality points
to “contexts of contexts” it would likewise emphasize “communities of communities.”
This move toward community anticipates one of the primary practical implications of this
feature: that researchers would seek to encounter a diversity of worldviews by engaging in
community relationships with others whose views of the world contrast their own. Such
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relationships would be enriching in their own right, but they could also be the source of research
collaborations that would be more likely to represent a true diversity of worldviews. For
example, a mixed methods study could involve a collaboration between a pair of researchers who
are each “native” to a different worldview and who value and respect the other‟s perspective.
Each researcher could provide guidance to the other in their efforts to be faithful to the
worldviews they are seeking to employ. Indeed, the reason they could understand one another is
because they dialectically imply one another—their contrasting differences highlight their very
identities. For example, the post-positivist‟s assumptions about avoiding bias and seeking
objectivity will likely bring into relief the interpretivist‟s assumptions about embracing bias and
seeking the best set of values. Their exchanges on issues surrounding these differences can help
each to see where the other is coming from (in their differences) and deepen their understanding
of one another. Likewise, a diverse community could be a source of dialogue and debate, with
community members regularly encountering new perspectives and challenges through discourse
with others in the community and in the broader communities of communities.
Feature 3: In designing a study, researchers would take their cues from the object
of study in context. This feature may appear similar to the pragmatist injunction that mixed
methods researchers often invoke: let the research question determine the methods (e.g., Johnson
& Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Morgan, 2007). Although this pragmatist move does suggest that the
research question provides a context to guide the methods, from a relational perspective starting
with the research question is not contextual enough. The problem is that research questions
themselves are shaped by a broader context, including the nature of the object of study. This
contextual nature of research questions means that relationists would not only tailor methods to
the context of the research question, but that they would also interrogate and explore the research
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question itself in terms of its cultural, ethical, and philosophical contexts and its fit with the
object of study.
Thus, an important research practice for relationists would be to reflect upon the nature of
the object of study and to approach it from the vantage point of several worldviews to see what
worldviews (and by extension what methods) show particular promise in making sense of it.
This reflection would likely include consideration for how these worldviews would shape
potential research questions. A researcher might consider, for example, whether the
phenomenon of interest is something that makes more sense in terms of efficient and material
causal processes or in terms of agentic causes that are rooted in formal and final causation (cf.
Slife & Williams, 1995). Indeed, the researcher may conclude that each perspective shows
promise and opt for a mixed approach. Whatever the conclusion, this decision will lead the
researcher to frame research questions in particular ways and to select methods that complement
the contextual identity of the object of study. In this sense, relational researchers are less
concerned about a commitment to a particular worldview (and thus a set of methods) and more
concerned about what is going to help them get at the thing they are trying to understand.
Feature 4: A relational ontology would encourage an openness to an even greater
diversity of worldviews, methodologies, and methods. In other words, relationality would not
expect that post-positivism and interpretivism be comprehensive, but rather that other
worldviews (indigenous to a particular culture or religion) could likewise be helpful and
illuminating. Indeed, post-positivism and interpretivism are both outgrowths of the western
intellectual tradition (Cochran, et al., 2008) and worldviews with roots in other cultures could
illuminate possibilities in research that are not readily apparent to these two worldviews. In
order to be open to such a breadth of worldviews, relationists would seek to be aware of their
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notions of knowledge and research to avoid unknowingly imposing these notions on other
cultural worldviews.
Traditional scientific worldviews, for instance, may not appropriately represent some of
the ways that a different culture approaches the world and the relationist would want to take care
to understand the cultural worldview on its own terms. Sociologist Douglas Porpora (2006), for
example, has observed that the methodological practices in most studies on religious experiences
tend to “bracket out” the spiritual objects of those experiences (e.g., God), assuming a sort of
atheism. According to Porpora, the problem here is that the contents of experiences are informed
by the objects of those experiences and he argued that researchers risk misconstruing and
misunderstanding these experiences if they rule out spiritual phenomena a priori. In fact, he
concludes that this bracketing implies “that there are no genuine experiences of anything so that
the very category of experience dissolves” (p. 59). The point for Porpora is that if researchers
want to understand religious experiences, they need to take seriously the worldviews of those
having the experiences because these worldviews help define those experiences.
For instance, Slife and Reber (in press) demonstrated that a theistic worldview provides
important advantages for psychologists who want to study religious experience because spiritual
worldviews themselves (e.g., theism) frame the experiences of the religious people under
investigation. To illustrate the problem of ignoring spiritual worldviews like theism, the authors
demonstrated that most psychological research on Christian prayer ends up instrumentalizing
prayer in ways that point away from the truly theistic understanding of prayer (e.g., glorifying
God, acknowledging dependence on God) that frames the experiences of participants. They
argued that if researchers really want to understand the meaning of Christian prayer, they would
need to know something about the theism of the person praying. Regardless of a researcher‟s
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orientation toward theism, according to these authors, giving credence to a theistic framework on
the part of their participants provides a better conceptual fit and greater illumination for making
sense of what they are trying to understand.
Thus, relational researchers would seek to encounter a broad diversity of worldviews,
methods, and methodologies by exploring different philosophical and cultural approaches to
knowing the world. Likewise, these explorations would be particularly guided by the things they
are trying to study, as in the example of theism for studying religious experience. Indeed, taking
participants‟ worldviews seriously in this manner reflects the relational impulse that has led
many researchers to refer to them as “participants” rather than as “subjects”—they literally
participate in shaping our understanding of the object of study. In this sense, relationists would
eschew any particular methodological or worldview orthodoxy in favor of a more pluralistic
approach to worldviews, methodologies, and methods.
Feature 5: Relationists would encourage creativity in response to the contextual
demands of research situations. Because relationality assumes that interpretivism and postpositivism are not comprehensive (nor are their current methods), a relational mixed methods
would call upon researchers to be innovative and creative in devising methods that help them get
at the thing they are trying to study. Of course, this sort of creativity will require that researchers
be aware of their own assumptions and seek out alternative assumptions so that they can be
sensitive to the creative possibilities in their research practices. Likewise, researchers would
persistently reflect upon the nature of their object of study as well as the limitations of their
current methods in order to discover new possibilities that can help them better understand their
object of study.
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Thus, researchers would approach each instance of research design as if they are
“rewriting” their methods in important ways. Although they may in many cases be tailoring
otherwise familiar methods to their particular research situation, they would nevertheless want to
be asking themselves how the contextual particularities of their object of study might dictate
innovations in their methodology. This practice of “rewriting” methods is perhaps more closely
associated with qualitative methods, but from a relational perspective it would apply just as well
to quantitative methods. That is to say, relationists recognize that quantitative researchers
regularly adapt their methods to the particular needs of their research project. The point here
would be to make this process more explicit and to immensely broaden the methodological
possibilities available to researchers.
Feature 6: Dialogue (as opposed to monologue) can bring a plurality of worldviews
into relationship. Perhaps the primary way that relationists would attempt to “integrate” mixed
methods would be to place them in dialogue with one another. Indeed, there is a sense that the
verb “integrate” is not quite apt for describing an attempt to relate different worldviews because
it implies that the worldviews would somehow reconcile into a single viewpoint (defeating the
goal of multiple worldviews). Dialogue, on the other hand, suggests multiple voices representing
multiple perspectives. Thus, the goal in a mixed methods study would be to interpret findings in
a way that places the two strands of research in dialogue with one another. This dialogue could
engage similarities and differences between the two strands, not only in terms of their findings,
but also in terms of the way that their worldview assumptions differently frame an understanding
of the object of study. Thus, research reports would try to convey these multiple voices in the
first-person, rather than the third-person monological style traditional to research reports. This
dialogical approach to interpreting and reporting findings could be particularly well suited to
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collaborations between “natives” of different worldviews who can each literally provide a
different voice to the dialogue.
Because relationists are interested in differences as well as similarities, they would be
open to the possibility that the dialogical engagement of two strands of a mixed study could
result in contradiction and disagreement as well as convergence and agreement. Researchers
might approach such disagreements in a variety of ways. As always, the object of study (and
information or “data” pertaining thereto) would be a primary consideration in arbitrating a
disagreement, and it could be the case that one perspective is judged to make better sense of it.
However, researchers may also choose to present their divergent findings and interpretations as
they stand in opposition, making the best case they can for each perspective. In this way they
can offer their audience a dialectical perspective on their study and engage a community of
researchers in further dialogue to explore such differences. Indeed, philosopher of science Paul
Feyerabend (1993) has argued that, historically, pursuing tensions between divergent viewpoints
has often led to scientific progress that could not have been anticipated in the midst of such
tensions. This is not to say that relationists would not be interested in resolving disagreements,
but rather that they would avoid being hasty in seeking a resolution if such a resolution shuts
down a perspective that still appears to have something to offer the conversation. Likewise, they
would expect that any resolution would come through the dialectical comparisons that emerge in
dialogue, thus allowing the community to critically evaluate how to best make sense of the
phenomenon in question.
Quantum physics offers a well-known example of progress emerging from divergent
viewpoints in the debate over whether light is a wave or a particle (Kumar, 2010; Slife & Wendt,
2009). Rather than coming to a resolution that favored one perspective or the other, physicists
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came to consider both viewpoints as correct depending on the context, even though the two
theories are considered to be quite different—even incompatible. That is to say, under some
observational contexts light is understood as a wave and under others as a particle. Indeed,
physicists generally regard these seemingly contradictory contextual properties as inherent to
nature of light (cf. Slife & Wendt, 2009). One major lesson that a relational ontology would
draw from this example is that in some situations the notion of “resolution” itself can be an
abstraction that does not reflect the true nature of the object of study. In other words,
abstractionist resolution is almost always thought to be based on similarities (i.e., abstract
concepts), which the wave/particle resolution cannot abide, rather than on differences, whereas
the relationist is open to both types of resolution (and reconciliation).
This sort of dialogue in research need not be merely between the worldviews of
researchers, but can also include dialogue with the worldviews of research participants and other
stakeholders in research (see Feature 4). For example, Steen Halling (Halling, Kunz, & Rowe,
1994; Halling & Leifer, 1991; Rowe, et al., 1989) has argued for a dialogical approach to
research that involves research participants as “co-investigators.” In Halling‟s approach,
participants not only provide “data,” but they also participate in the interpretation of the data
through a continual dialogue with researchers about what their data mean and how to make sense
of them. In their study on the experience of forgiving another, Halling and his colleagues
(Rowe, et al., 1989) argued that the radically interpersonal nature of forgiveness called for just
this sort of ongoing open dialogue with participants. The point for Halling here is that the
dialogical relationships that a relational ontology endorses can and often should go beyond
simply a dialogue between researchers.
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Feature 7: The necessarily limited and incomplete nature of any theory or position,
according to a relational ontology, demands that researchers approach knowledge claims
and one another with humility. Because a relational ontology assumes that a theory or other
knowledge claim, as an abstraction, is necessarily limited and incomplete, relationists likewise
assume that those making such claims must do so with a humility that acknowledges these
limitations. Indeed, not only are knowledge claims limited, but so is any individual‟s perspective
on the world, suggesting that no individual will ever escape this need for humility. Thus, in
contrast with abstractionism‟s assumption that comprehensive knowledge about the world is
possible (at least in theory), relationality is assuming that knowledge is always to some degree
incomplete and fallible. These limitations on knowledge do not mean that knowledge is not
possible—quite the contrary. The relationist would argue that it is because of our limited
perspective that we can know the world at all because our perspective allows us to engage the
world. The challenge for relationists, then, is to pursue knowledge and avoid error, all the while
acknowledging their limitations and maintaining a humble openness to the truth that might be
revealed through the perspective of another.
Accordingly, the goal for relational researchers would not be to propose comprehensive
theories or to outshine other researchers. Instead, relationists would expect that their theories
might help to illuminate a phenomenon in relation to a particular context, but they would also
recognize that new contexts and new understandings will necessarily revise and sometimes go
beyond their theories. Indeed, because relationists assume that the things they study have
contextual identities, they would expect that some contexts would change the very nature of the
object of study (e.g., the wave of light), requiring new theories and new understandings.
Likewise, recognizing their own fallibility and limited perspective, relationists would strive to
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recognize their need for others. They would seek out collaborations and seek to maintain an
openness to the ways others‟ views can sharpen their own understanding.
A word about these features. Upon inspecting these features, it may initially appear
that they essentially describe qualitative methods. Perhaps this is because the dominance of
post-positivism in psychology (itself an abstractionist understanding of post-positivism) could
lead to the conception that all alternatives are cut from the same cloth, lumping them together
under “interpretivism.” Furthermore, although it is true that some methodologists have
attempted to approach their methodology relationally (e.g., Slife & Gantt, 1999; Yanchar, et al.,
2005; Yanchar & Williams, 2006), these instances are rare, particularly considering how
relationality demands an openness to multiple worldviews and not just to interpretivism. In this
sense, interpretivist qualitative methods may attempt to be more sensitive to context in their
collection and interpretation of data, thus showing relational impulses, much as the liberalization
of quantitative research in the last few decades. Nevertheless many interpretivists tend to limit
themselves to a single worldview. Moreover, relationality as I have described it requires
quantitative methods because it acknowledges and expects that there are contexts where numbers
and counting are going to be especially helpful in making sense of the world. Furthermore, the
post-positivist worldview would be one among the many worldviews that relationists would
draw upon, being an essential tool in the relational toolbox. My point here is that, although some
interpretivist approaches may have relational elements, a relational mixed methods exceeds
qualitative methods and interpretivism because it values and requires a plurality of worldviews,
methodologies, and methods well beyond qualitative interpretivist methods.
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An Example of Ontologically Relational Mixed Methods in Action
To provide a fuller illustration of how a relational approach to mixed methods might
work, in this section I will offer a hypothetical example of relational mixed methods in action.
Of course, even with the practical detail I hope to provide here, this example is necessarily an
abstraction of what relational mixed methods would be like in practice. Thus, the purpose of the
example is not to capture everything that a relational approach could entail (indeed relationality
would suggest that such a task is impossible), but rather to highlight several practices that stand
out as uniquely relational and that show potential for engaging multiple worldviews within one
research context. These highlights, then, can serve as a guide and point of comparison for how
relational mixed methods might operate in other contexts. The example follows below.
Dr. Fletcher is a psychologist who works for the research department in the American
headquarters of a major Christian religion. Her background and training has emphasized postpositivist methods, but as a budding ontological relationist she has been making an effort to learn
more about interpretivism and interpretivist qualitative methods with particular interest in how
they might open up new possibilities in her research for the church. Her relationality has led her
to understand that no philosophy of science exists on its own in a final state pushing her to look
beyond post-positivism, in contrast to some of her colleagues who expect a single worldview to
be universally sufficient. Consequentially, she is curious about seeking dialectical alternatives,
in part to help her understand her own perspective. Likewise, she is hopeful that learning more
about interpretivism will enable her to expand her methodological “toolbox” and allow her to use
methods in combination to shed light on her research in ways that her post-positivism alone
might not. Recently Dr. Fletcher was given the task of investigating church attendance among
church members.
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As a relationist, Dr. Fletcher begins by reflecting on the nature of church attendance to
gain a better sense of what philosophies would be best suited to guide her conceptualization and
methodological choices in this study. She notes that in the past the research department‟s studies
on attendance have relied solely on quantitative measures to understand church attendance.
However, in reflecting upon the nature of church attendance she recognizes that there are aspects
of attendance that lend themselves to counting (how frequently do people attend church) as well
as aspects that do not (what is the nature of people‟s experiences attending church). Dr. Fletcher
is unsatisfied with the previous quantitative surveys on the meaning of church attendance
because she worries that they are not adequate to represent the diverse and dynamic meanings
that she suspects are core to the equally diverse church membership. Part of her concern is that
the fixed nature of a survey requires that she determine in advance what types of meanings
should be available to her participants and she is not confident that it is possible to sufficiently
anticipate all of the possible meanings that might be crucial here. Likewise, she is worried that
important meanings might be lost as participants attempt to translate their experiences from
ordinary language to the numerical language required in a quantitative survey. Thus, she
concludes that a purely quantitative post-positivist approach may not be the best fit for fully
understanding the church membership‟s attendance.
At this point we can already see that Dr. Fletcher‟s relational orientation is leading her to
make several important decisions that would likely be absent had she approached the study
assuming abstractionism. First, she is seeking out alternative worldviews to her own (Feature 1).
These alternatives are helping her to recognize worldview assumptions in some of her own postpositivist methods (e.g., that meanings can be abstracted into a fixed set of essential meanings on
a questionnaire, that people‟s experiences can adequately be represented by numbers). Likewise,
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she is careful to tailor her philosophical/methodological approach to her object of study (Feature
3)—she is concerned that the methods she uses will philosophically shape her understanding of
church attendance and thus wants to ensure that they make assumptions that fit closely with the
experiences of church attendees.
Dr. Fletcher anticipates that interpretivist qualitative methods might be able to better help
her get at the meanings church members experience in their attendance, alongside the postpositivist quantitative methods that would explore the frequency of members‟ church attendance.
However, because she does not consider interpretivism her “native territory,” Dr. Fletcher
decides to consult with Dr. Simon, a colleague at a local university who is an expert in
qualitative methods. As Dr. Fletcher describes what she is trying to get at in understanding the
meanings that church members experience in their church attendance, Dr. Simon suggests that a
qualitative method based in the phenomenological tradition might be a good fit for her purposes.
He explains that this sort of method seeks to understand particular experiences in the ordinary
language that people use to describe them and could allow her to pursue meanings as they
emerge throughout her investigation, including unexpected meanings. Dr. Fletcher invites Dr.
Simon to work with her on this project by serving as a consultant and a “native” representative of
interpretivism and he gladly agrees.
As the pair discuss the implications of using the qualitative method that Dr. Simon
suggested, it becomes clear to Dr. Fletcher that she needs to not only consider the worldviews
that guide her in her research, but also the worldviews of her participants. She recognizes that
the meanings she wants to get at are themselves part of a worldview context. Dr. Fletcher raises
this concern with Dr. Simon and points out that the church members she will be studying
subscribe to a theistic worldview that is not represented in either post-positivism or
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interpretivism. After exploring this observation they conclude that it will be essential as she asks
interview questions and provides interpretation of interview data that she do so from a
framework that assumes that God could be active in members‟ lives. Thus, she could refer to
“God” rather than merely to a church member‟s “conception of God” or “belief about God.”
Indeed, “conception of God” was previously and erroneously considered to be more neutral or
objective about theist‟s experiences, but this proved problematic because “conception” referred
to a participant‟s mental construct rather than to the God that a participant was claiming to
actually experience (cf. Slife & Reber, 2009). Hence, it is important to Dr. Fletcher that she not
treat her participants‟ experiences as if they are “all in their heads,” but rather that she take them
in the terms that her participants actually experience them. Thus, she could likewise ask about
“God‟s influence” on their attendance experiences rather than simply their “beliefs” or “notions”
of God‟s influence. This move would not be presumptuous because she can also refer to
“conceptions of God” or “beliefs” and “notions” about God when that is the nature of the
participant‟s experiences of “God.” Instead, it simply frees her up to take the experiences on the
participants‟ terms.
In Dr. Fletcher‟s consulting with Dr. Simon we can further see how her relational
orientation is impacting her research approach. Dr. Fletcher is acknowledging the limitations of
her own particular worldview, and in the humility that this limitation evokes (Feature 7) she
engages in dialogue (Feature 6) with another worldviewer (Feature 2) with the explicit purpose
of engaging a perspective that is different from her own. Note that she is not merely seeking Dr.
Simon‟s technical expertise in qualitative methods, but rather she is seeking out his full
perspective as a worldviewer (in part because she recognizes that such expertise implies a
worldview). Moreover, Dr. Fletcher‟s relationality leads her to not only engage a dialogue
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among researchers‟ worldviews, but also among the worldviews of their participants (who are
themselves worldviewers). Not only does this move show further relational adaptation to the
contextual demands of her object of study, but it also reflects Dr. Fletcher‟s understanding that
researchers‟ meanings and interpretations are not atomistically separate from participants‟
meanings and interpretations—they define and shape one another in holistic relationship.
Likewise, Dr. Fletcher‟s openness to and curiosity about different worldviews allows her to
consider a worldview in her participants that is different from either interpretivism or postpositivism (Feature 4). That is, she does not expect interpretivism and post-positivism to be
collectively universal. In order to accommodate her participants‟ theism, Dr. Fletcher and Dr.
Simon creatively adapt her approach to interviewing and interpreting interview data to reflect
this theism (Feature 5). In this sense, they have “rewritten” a method to uniquely address the
contextual demands of understanding the meanings of church attendance.
Although Dr. Fletcher has not yet collected or interpreted any data in this study, there is a
real sense that her interpretivism and post-positivism are already enriching one another. This is
because the worldviews side by side are drawing into greater focus their differences, including
what each could differently contribute to the project. Her qualitative methods bring into greater
relief how valuable her quantitative methods are for assessing and describing church members‟
attendance behaviors. Qualitative interviews by contrast appear much less suited to that job.
Likewise, her quantitative methods bring into greater relief how valuable her qualitative methods
are for exploring and understanding the meanings that church members experience as they attend
church. Quantitative measures of these meanings seem to fall short in contrast with what her
qualitative methods have to offer here. Thus, we are already seeing some of the fruits of
“mixing” or relating methods.
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As Dr. Fletcher and Dr. Simon consult on her research design they run into some
questions in discussing her sampling methods. Dr. Fletcher explains to Dr. Simon that in her
previous quantitative research she has preferred to use random sampling in order to obtain a
sample that would be representative of the broader church population and thus allow for
generalization of her results. However, she is concerned that the low number of participants in
the qualitative strand of her study will fall short of the requirements of probability sampling
theory for a representative sample. Dr. Simon explains that although qualitative methods are
concerned with a type of generalizability, they attend to it differently from probability sampling
theory and their sampling methods often have other concerns as well. He explains that her
sample needs to be representative of the sorts of experiences that she wants to understand and
that the focused and detailed scope of her method might require her to likewise focus what types
of experiences she expects to look at in this study. Dr. Simon goes on to clarify that
generalization based on this study would be judged more in terms of how similar the research
context is to the context to which she would like to generalize. If contexts are dissimilar then she
should expect that experiences in the different context could likewise be different and thus would
want to be cautious about making generalizations. However, he points out that generalizations
are primarily about sameness and that comparing the context of a qualitative study to a fairly
different context might nevertheless provide insights that could allow her to anticipate some of
the possible meanings of those differences.
Dr. Fletcher takes Dr. Simon‟s admonition to focus her qualitative research question and
consults with the church research department as well as some of the church leadership that will
be using her findings in order to decide what would be most helpful. The group is initially
confused as to why they cannot get the “big picture” in this study, but Dr. Fletcher explains how
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she believes that this qualitative method will allow them to see much that would otherwise be
lost in grasping at the “big picture” with a method that is less sensitive to the natural language
and diversity of church members‟ experiences. The group concludes that they are particularly
interested in the experiences of teens in their church attendance and that they want to get the
perspective both of teens who attend frequently and those who attend infrequently. They are
curious about whether and how the frequency with which teens attend distinguishes their
experiences. They also suggest that this mixed study could serve as a “test case” to see if the
qualitative approach indeed delivers as Dr. Fletcher has suggested it might. If so, then they
intend to follow up with similar studies into other experiences of their church members.
These exchanges with Dr. Simon and with the research department and church leadership
demonstrate further manifestations of Dr. Fletcher‟s relational ontology. Her conversation with
Dr. Simon illustrates how dialogue between worldviewers helps insure against imposing one
worldview on the methods of another (Features 1 and 6). Dr. Fletcher is learning how to reframe
her notions of sampling and generalizability (and by extension the goals of her qualitative strand)
to attend to the differences in interpretivism. Likewise, Dr. Fletcher is beginning to engage a
broader community in dialogue, including not only other researchers, but also stakeholders in the
research (Feature 2). This involvement of stakeholders in the process further acknowledges the
blurred boundary between theory (research findings) and practice (organizational action) because
it places the study in the context of the church‟s needs much in the tradition of “action research.”
That is, Dr. Fletcher is not pursuing an abstract theoretical understanding of attendance which
will later be applied to contextual situations in organizational decisions, but rather she is taking
her cues throughout the research process from the context of the organization‟s needs and current
understanding of attendance (Feature 3). Furthermore, we can already see that this relational
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dialogue is beginning to open up broader views within this community as fellow researchers and
church leaders begin to consider the interpretivist worldview. Their exchange about the “big
picture” illustrates how neither worldview will entirely “get its way” and how these
compromises are based on the demands of the object of study and its stakeholders, rather than on
an arbitrary worldview preference.
With their new focus, Dr. Fletcher and Dr. Simon hammer out the details of Dr.
Fletcher‟s research design and it begins to become clearer how the quantitative and qualitative
research strands might speak to one another. They decide that it will make most sense to begin
with her quantitative strand addressing the question of how frequently do church members attend
church services. This quantitative strand will draw from a very large sample and will describe
attendance throughout the church as well as in terms of demographic and regional groups.
Because the qualitative strand is framed in terms of teen‟s frequency of attendance, Dr. Fletcher
will follow the quantitative strand with the qualitative strand, using her quantitative data on
teens‟ frequency of attendance to help her define frequent attendees and infrequent attendees.
Based on these definitions, she will recruit five frequent attendees and five infrequent attendees
for qualitative interviews. This qualitative strand will primarily address the question of what is
the nature of teens‟ experiences attending church. Dr. Fletcher and Dr. Simon are framing this
question without reference to frequency because they do not want to assume at the outset that
frequency of attendance will distinguish teens‟ experiences. Thus, they will address this
question through an analysis of all of the teens‟ interviews. However, their secondary question
with this strand is whether any distinct themes emerge based on whether teens attend frequently
or infrequently and they will address this through separate analyses of the interviews for the two
groups of teens.
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With this second qualitative analysis, Dr. Fletcher is struggling not to approach it in
post-positivist terms, although she wants to be as faithful as possible to interpretivism and thus
takes care to check her post-positivist impulses. She is accustomed to treating the comparison of
two groups in terms of “variables” and “significant differences” and she wonders how this
comparison might differ. Furthermore, she wonders whether interviewers should be “blind” to
whether a participant is a frequent or infrequent attendee so as to not bias their interview toward
their expectations of attendance experiences based on frequency.
Dr. Simon explains that there are several important differences in the way that
interpretivism frames this qualitative comparison. He describes how qualitative meanings
typically are not taken to have the same strong (atomistic) boundaries that “variables” often
connote and so the different themes that may emerge should be understood as embedded in the
contexts of teens‟ experiences. In this sense, they are not looking for “factors” or “essential
characteristics” that distinguish frequent attendees from infrequent attendees, but rather for
narratives that may or may not distinguish the experiences at church of those who attend
frequently from those who attend infrequently. Put differently, they are looking at the contextual
relationships between two contexts.
Regarding the issue of interviewer bias, Dr. Simon agrees that it will be important to
attend to bias, but points out that interpretivism understands and approaches bias quite differently
from post-positivism. Whereas post-positivism seeks to minimize bias in the quest for
objectivity (and thus would favor “blinding”), interpretivism assumes that every perspective
inevitably has some sort of bias and so the goal would be to be aware of bias and to strive for the
sorts of bias that show promise in illuminating the object of study. He observes that in this case
they are interested in participants‟ “biases,” and so it will be important for interviewers to be
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aware of their own biases and to have training on how they can gear their interviews to favor
participants‟ perspectives. He explains that interviewers would also “test” or look for violations
of their own biases—a type of objectivity, but one that does not presume an independence from
values or biases. He would likely direct interviewers to refrain from guessing about things like a
participant‟s frequency of attendance, but would also expect that this sort of information would
likely nevertheless emerge in the course of the interview. Thus, interviewers would not be
“blind,” but would be careful to allow participants to have as much of a voice as possible in
framing and describing their experiences. He points out that this approach does not eliminate the
interviewers‟ perspectives, but it does frame their perspectives so that they are biased toward
understanding experiences in participants‟ own words. Because he is much more experienced
with these interviewing skills, Dr. Simon suggests that he conduct training for interviewers.
Again, in this exchange we see that dialogue between worldviews (Feature 6) can
dialectically distinguish one from the other and make clearer what each has to offer (Feature 1).
However, this dialogue also illustrates how each worldview (or worldviewer) interrogates the
other, pushing for greater clarity and understanding on issues that emerge from their own
perspectives (Features 1, 2, and 6). Although these sorts of exchanges between interpretivists
and post-positivists about bias are not unique to Drs. Fletcher and Simon, they illustrate how this
dialogue can challenge and sharpen a worldview‟s perspective. By asking about bias, Dr.
Fletcher raises an issue that is very important to her post-positivism and challenges Dr. Simon to
address this concern, albeit from through his interpretivism. This is not to say that interpretivism
would not otherwise attend to bias, but rather to point out that post-positivism here may help to
draw urgency and focus to the need for interpretivism to attend to the way it deals with bias. Put
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differently, interpretivism‟s attention to bias is, in part, a relational response to post-positivism
rather than a self-contained response to a self-contained problem.
Dr. Fletcher first collects and analyzes her quantitative data. The quantitative data show
specific patterns of attendance for different demographic groups of church membership. Within
the teenage group, the findings show that teenagers are more likely to either attend regularly
(>75% of Sunday services) or to attend infrequently (<25% of Sunday services) and that
relatively few teens fall between these two groups. These findings are fortuitous for Dr.
Fletcher‟s qualitative study because they provide a clear way of distinguishing frequent and
infrequent attendees that reflects the actual behavior of teenage church members. Using this
definition of attendance frequency (>75% or <25%) to sample participants, she collects and
analyzes her qualitative data. The overall qualitative analyses suggest that many teens
experience church attendance as an opportunity to socialize with other teens and to worship as a
community. Many teens expressed experiencing church as a place where they feel accepted and
a place where they feel they are better able to connect with God. They described feeling God‟s
presence in church and “hearing His voice in [their] heart[s].” A minority of the teens described
experiencing church attendance as a time where they felt that they did not quite fit in because
they felt somehow “different” from others at church. These teens said that they felt a connection
with God at church and that this led them to persist in attending, although feeling as if they were
on the outside made attendance more of a struggle.
Because this initial qualitative analysis suggests two different types of experiences for
teens, Dr. Fletcher wonders if this difference will sort out between frequent and infrequent
attendees in her subsequent analysis. However, to her surprise in her secondary analysis she
finds these themes emerging within both groups. Instead, the major difference that emerges is
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that many infrequent attendees reported feeling like other church members treated them as if they
are “special.” They generally described feeling like these church members wanted them to have
a good experience and to attend more frequently. However, those who reported “marginal”
experiences said that this “special” treatment felt insincere and seemed to heighten their sense of
being different, whereas those who reported feeling more integrated described this treatment as
contributing to their sense of acceptance and integration. Thus, frequency does not appear to
map onto whether or not teens felt marginalized, but it does appear to lead to experiences of
being treated as “special.” Likewise, teens‟ marginal or integrated status shaped the meaning of
this special treatment.
In writing up her findings and presenting them to church leadership and others in the
research department, Dr. Fletcher describes how the two strands of her study inform one another
(Feature 6): first, with the quantitative strand helping to define attendance frequency for the
qualitative strand, and second, with the qualitative strand describing in-depth experiences of
attendance as they relate to the frequency of attendance that the quantitative strand had counted.
She is also careful to point out that the quantitative and qualitative strands are addressing
different, but related, things (Feature 1). That is, the behavior of attending church frequently or
infrequently is not the same thing as the meanings experienced at church, although attendance
certainly is a necessary condition for those experiences and frequency seems to open up the
possibility for particular experiences. She explains that keeping these differences in mind has
helped guide her research decisions in employing different worldviews/methods that attend to
these differences (Features 1 and 3). She goes on to make explicit how worldviews operated in
her study, particularly when they conflicted, and how her interaction with Dr. Simon allowed her
to make deliberate decisions based on the contextual demands of the nature of church attendance.
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Because relationality would demand that a truly relational example not be self-contained,
allow me to provide a postscript that points toward what lies ahead for Dr. Fletcher and her
community. The research department and the church leadership are very pleased with what they
have learned from Dr. Fletcher‟s study and they are interested in making qualitative and mixed
methods a bigger part of how they do their research, suggesting that their community and their
research toolbox is growing more diverse (Features 1, 2, and 4). The leaders express that these
findings have proven quite useful and they, in consultation with Dr. Fletcher, are already
implementing changes in the church to address the needs of marginalized teens (the researchers,
stakeholders, and participants are relationally integrated in the process of the study, making this
action a natural extension of the research and not merely an “application” of the findings;
Features 2 and 3). The leadership and research department want to build upon Dr. Fletcher‟s
study by exploring the attendance experiences of other groups within their membership and
church visitors as well. If this ongoing research is to be truly relational, it will not merely be an
accumulation of more and more findings, but also a recurring recontextualization of their
understandings of attendance—a dialogue of sorts between their studies and the policies that are
enacted (Features 4, 6, and 7). They recognize Dr. Simon‟s important contribution and they hire
him on as a consultant to direct them in their qualitative efforts (Features 2 and 7). In this sense
the “mixing” is extending beyond the boundaries of this one study and leading to a greater
diversification of this particular community. Likewise, it is drawing on multiple overlapping
communities as Dr. Simon represents a broader community of interpretivists.
Conclusion
This dissertation has argued that existing approaches to mixed methods have failed in
their intention to engage and relate a plurality of methods from different worldviews and that this
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failure is the result of an abstractionist ontology. Fundamentally, an abstractionist ontology
assumes the abstractedness of worldviews (along with their methods; i.e., their self-sufficiency
or self-containment), and thus the independence or orthogonality of their identities from the
context of other worldviews and methods. This means that mixed methods either need to keep
their methods independent from one another or attempt a mixture within a subsuming worldview.
The trouble with these options, as my analysis has demonstrated, is that they both prevent
a true “mixture” or relationship of the methods involved. The first option leaves the methods
independent, foregoing any meaningful relationship between the two. Especially when method
implications differ, there can be no guidelines for drawing the kind of relationships among
methodologies that mixed methods researchers require. The second option merely complicates
the problem by introducing new worldview assumptions that are not the same as those of the
worldviews that mixed methods researchers intend to use and relate. In this sense, the methods
are guided by a different worldview and there is no evidence, let alone mixing, of the original
methods. Likewise, a variation on the second option has led some researchers (often
unknowingly) to attempt to incorporate methods from one worldview into the other. The
problem here is that within the new worldview the methods change and no longer carry the
attributes of the alternative worldview that mixed methods researchers intend to incorporate. In
each case the abstractionist understanding of worldviews appears to prevent mixed methods
researchers from relating post-positivist and interpretivist methodologies as they intend to do.
In this chapter I have suggested that a relational ontology could help mixed methods
researchers to actually engage and relate multiple worldviews in mixed methods. I have argued
that a relational approach might accomplish this through several unique features, including the
need for researchers to be aware of the differences between worldviews, to acknowledge the
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need for many worldviewers, to adapt their worldviews and methodologies to the object of study,
to seek out diversity in worldviews and methods, to employ creativity in developing the best
methods for the job, to engage in dialogue between worldviews and within research
communities, and to strive for humility in making knowledge claims and in relating to one
another.
The example of Dr. Fletcher and her community illustrates that a truly “mixed” methods
involves much more than using numbers and language within a study. Instead, drawing a
relationship between worldviews in a mixed methods study requires careful attention to those
worldviews (through their worldviewers) and to the nature of the object of study in context.
Likewise, the example illustrates that mixed methods necessarily exceeds the boundaries of a
single study because of the way that a study engages a broader community in its planning,
execution, and interpretation as well as in the way it invites dialogue with other researchers and
other studies, not to mention stakeholders and participants. Bottom line: it illustrates a true
“mixing” of methods. That is to say, this example demonstrates how relationality might allow
researchers to truly engage and relate multiple families of worldview, methodology, and method
in ways that enrich one another and their understanding of their object of study.
One might ask at this point, however, whether a relational ontology would suggest that
researchers should also be open to abstractionism as one more worldview that could benefit
mixed methods. The difficulty with abstractionism for the relationist is that it returns us to the
problematic self-containment paradigm that leads researchers either to distinguish different
methodologies, and thus methods, as opposed and poorly fit for relationship because of their
differences or to assimilate (and change) methods to fit within a single worldview—the very
paradigm that I have argued disallows the entire project of methodological pluralism and mixed
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methods. The relationist wants to avoid becoming the proverbial man with a hammer for whom
everything becomes a nail, and abstractionism appears to carry that threat. In fact, to stretch the
metaphor, abstractionism appears to carry the equal threat that the man with a hammer would
reject using both a hammer and a saw together in the same project because they are too
different—one is for a pounding project and the other is for a cutting project. The point here is
that abstractions themselves are not the problem (there are good contextual uses for a hammer),
but abstractionism is the problem because it treats abstractions as if they are contextless and
unchanging.
Indeed, the carpenter‟s relational use of a plurality of tools serves as a helpful analogy
and guide for the mixed methods project. The carpenter‟s tools represent a plurality of
worldviews, although often implicit (and perhaps often more obvious than the worldviews
implicit in psychology‟s research methods). Some tools “see” the world in terms of cutting,
pounding, smoothing, or shaping. Each is oriented toward the world in particular ways and the
carpenter chooses the tools that best suit the job at hand. In the carpenter‟s hand the various
tools work together in relationship to bring about the object the carpenter intends to build.
Although the carpenter may find creative and unorthodox uses for certain tools—perhaps finding
that a men‟s dress shoe is ideal for gently and firmly pounding wooden pegs into place—he is
likewise sensitive to their limitations. For example, a screwdriver is ideal for driving screws, it
might prove adequate for pounding a nail if a hammer is not at hand, but it would likely make a
very poor vice grip. This is why it is so important for the carpenter to be able to use a variety of
tools in concert with one another—his project requires pounding there, cutting here, and
smoothing there. Although each purpose and each tool is in certain ways distinct, these purposes
ultimately work together toward the carpenter‟s final goal: the well-crafted woodwork.
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Just as a sort of methodological pluralism is successful for the carpenter, it has been my
contention in this dissertation that a similar pluralism should be within the grasp of researchers in
psychology. The challenge that we face is that the complex and often abstract nature of research
methods can obscure the worldview implications of a method, making it difficult to see how to
relate methods from different worldviews. That is to say, picking up a hammer almost
intuitively implies pounding just in the feel of the heft and balance of the hammer in one‟s hand.
It is fairly obvious to the carpenter the ways his hammer can allow him to engage the world as
well as the points where he needs to pick up a different tool. In this sense, his hammer implies
where pounding leaves off in his project and where cutting or smoothing becomes relevant—it
implies a relationship with other tools. A correlational or ethnographic method, on the other
hand, does not seem to inspire this same sort of intuitive sense of the method‟s worldview along
with that method‟s value and limitations or its relationship with other methods.
However, it appears that a relational ontology is particularly well suited to bring these
worldview and method-relationship issues to light and to allow researchers to use mixed methods
with an ease that more closely approaches the carpenter‟s use of his diverse toolbox. As I have
demonstrated in this chapter, a relational ontology can allow researchers to bring various
methodological worldviews into dialectical relationship with one another, making explicit the
assumptions that might otherwise go undetected and the practices that might go unexamined.
This awareness can help researchers to tailor their use of methods according to the needs of their
object of study, recognizing where the usefulness of one method leaves off and another begins (a
relationship of difference), as we saw in the example with Dr. Fletcher. In this way, a relational
ontology can make clearer how to relate divergent worldviews, methodologies, and methods,
thus making a true methodological pluralism and mixture of methods in psychology possible.
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